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Abstract 
 
In the last decade of the nineteenth century, China experienced the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-
1895), the Scramble for Concessions (1897-1898), and the Boxer movement (1900), all of which ended 
disastrously. This period of high imperialism had rapidly changed Chinese Politics. By examining 
Zhang Zhidong’s role in Chinese politics in this period, my thesis argues that imperialism damaged 
central-provincial relations and divided Chinese politics along different political lines in the last decade 
of the nineteenth century. Ironically, this process of political fragmentation was not resulted from the 
direct working of imperialism but from Chinese struggle against imperialism. 
 
Seeing from a provincial perspective and utilizing Chinese sources that have not been fully explored by 
previous studies, the thesis exposes the effect of imperialism on Chinese provinces and uncovers the 
dynamics of imperialism in China. It examines imperialist actions previously seen as having economic 
effects through political eyes, puts single event into historical context to reveal its political significance 
and connections, and traces Chinese provincial struggle against imperialism in light of provincial 
governments’ relations to central government. 
 
Moreover, the thesis adds more details to the debate on the nature of provincial power with respect to 
the central government in late Qing China. In Zhang Zhidong’s case, his power was undermined in the 
last decade of the nineteenth century and during this period, the central government actually 
concentrated more power than ever in itself since the Taiping rebellion. However, sacrificing provincial 
interests in order to strengthen the central government is a double-edged sword. When Zhang 
Zhidong’s provincial government and the central government both faced imperialist pressure in 1900, 
Zhang chose to defend provincial interests instead of the central government since his connection to the 
central government had already broken and provincial interests were more important to him. When 
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studying central-provincial relations in the late Qing, we should study more governors-general and 
governors in detail and not only look at whether provincial governments or the central government had 
more power, but also pay attention to their relations. Their relations were just as important as the 
distribution of power in determining the political landscape in late Qing China. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
China’s experience of Euro-American and Japanese imperialism is a contentious topic even to this day. 
From the simple use of terms (imperialism, colonialism or semi-colonialism) to the extent and nature of 
imperialist aggression in China, historians disagree with each other widely. Paradigms in writings 
about imperialism in China range from affirming the positive effect of imperialism in modernizing 
China (the modernisation paradigm) to highlighting the suffering that imperialism brought to China and 
Chinese people (the revolutionary paradigm), to seeing imperialism as merely a set of limited 
encounters in a few treaty ports and insisting a “China-centred” historiography.1 Moreover, the recent 
rise of China creates additional complexities in understanding imperialism in China: modernisation and 
“China-centred” paradigms prevail and China’s struggles are seen as a remote past and irrelevant in 
today’s world, or even worse, as part of the People’s Republic of China’s grand narratives of “One 
Hundred Years of National Humiliation”. 
 
This thesis interrogates China’s experience of Euro-American and Japanese imperialism through the 
political career of a prominent Qing governor-general, Zhang Zhidong (1837-1909) in the last decade 
of the nineteenth century, particularly from the first Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895) to the Boxer 
Rebellion (1900). I have gradually limited my inquiry of China’s experience of Euro-American and 
Japanese imperialism to imperialism’s effects on late Qing political systems, especially central-
provincial relations because this emerges as a significant theme from Zhang Zhidong quanji and Zhang 
                                                
1 Jürgen Osterhammel, "Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth-Century China: Towards a Framework of 
Analysis," in Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities, eds. Wolfgang. J. Mommsen and Jürgen 
Osterhammel (London: German Historical Institute, 1986), 292-95; Paul A. Cohen, Discovering History in China: 
American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010 first published in 
1984), Chaps.1-3; For positive effect of imperialism on China, see John King Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China 
Coast: The Opening of Treaty Ports, 1842-1854 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953); Ho Chi-Ming, Foreign 
Investment and Economic Development in China, 1840-1937 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965).  
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Zhidong archives - the main primary sources that I use. Studying imperialism in China from a 
provincial perspective and using a provincial governor-general in central China, Zhang Zhidong as a 
case study help to illuminate the nuances of Chinese politics in this period. The key question that the 
thesis tries to answer is: to what extent imperialism affect Zhang Zhidong and central-provincial 
relations in the last decade of the nineteenth century? 
 
The focus on central-provincial relations in my thesis is not accidental since I have chosen Zhang 
Zhidong, a long-serving provincial governor-general in Hunan and Hubei as my primary research 
object. As a provincial governor-general, maintaining good central-provincial relations was one of 
Zhang Zhidong’s most important jobs. However, Zhang Zhidong faced great challenges and even had 
to choose between his provincial government and the central government when the tide of the high 
imperialism in the last decade of the nineteenth century hit Chinese land hard. 
 
Imperialism, colonialism or semi-colonialism 
 
Imperialism sometimes is used as a synonym of colonialism but the etymology of the two terms shows 
that they differ. The term colony is derived from Latin colonus (farmer) whereas imperialism comes 
from the Latin term imperium (command). Given the link of colonialism to colonies, the term “semi-
colonialism” often refers to the half colonized status of late-nineteenth and early twentieth-century 
China. There were a few colonies and leased territories mostly along coastal China, such as the British 
Hong Kong and Weihaiwei, the Portuguese Macao, the Russian and then Japanese Port Arthur 
(Lüshun, now part of Dalian), the German Jiaozhouwan (now part of Qingdao), the French 
Guangzhouwan and the Japanese Manchuria and Taiwan. Then there were the treaty ports with or 
without foreign settlements throughout China in coastal as well as inland areas, numbering 97 by 1917. 
Despite these foreign footholds, the vast majority of China remained under the authority of the 
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Chinese.2 In terms of sovereignty, China preserved independence in the eyes of most Chinese and 
foreign powers.3 
 
However, one must be careful when using the term “semi-colonialism” to describe China’s conditions. 
Sun Yatsen had warned that the use of “semi-colonialism” just obscured the fact that China was 
oppressed by multiple imperialist powers. This term can also limit the inquiry into China’s experience 
of imperialism to just those Chinese lands acquired by the imperialist powers and fail to capture 
imperialism’s other effects on China.4 The term “semi-colonialism” also implies that China’s 
experience was different from those under colonial rule, for example British India. As a result, using 
this term may lead to the notion that China was irrelavant when studying the broader processes of 
European expansion. Scholars using this term, for example Anne Reinhardt, value the term’s particular 
and comparative attributes, but have to carefully clarify that using this term doesn’t exclude China from 
analysis of global European expansion.5 Since my thesis is not focusing on colonies, leased territories, 
the treaty ports, or any contact zone such as the steamship in Reinhardt’s book, and the aim of the 
thesis is to uncover the effect of global European expansion on Chinese politics, especially on central-
provincial relations in China, I prefer to use the term “imperialism” as defined by Jürgen Osterhammel. 
Without binding himself to a particular political, economic, or cultural explanation, Jürgen 
Osterhammel defines imperialism as “a certain kind of politics that involves the crossing of borders, 
                                                
2 Bryna Goodman and David S. G. Goodman, Twentieth-century colonialism and China: localities, the everyday and the 
world (New York: Routledge, 2012), 1-2. 
3 Ibid, 13-14. 
4 Sun Yansen. San Min Chu I: The Three Principles of the People (English edition) (Taipei: China Publishing, 1963), 10; 
Bryna Goodman and David S. G. Goodman, Twentieth-century colonialism and China, 3-7. There is another term “informal 
empire” that could be used to describe China’s condition. But “informal empire” is from the historiography of the British 
empire, which is not enough to capture the presence of multiple imperialist powers in China.  
5 Anne Reinhardt, Navigating Semi-Colonialim: Shipping, Sovereignty, and Nation-Building in China, 1860-1937 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 3-7.  
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disregard for the status quo, interventionism, rapid military deployment at the risk of provoking war, 
and a determination to dictate the terms of peace”.6  
 
Using this definition of imperialism, the difference between the Qing empire in the High Qing period 
(under Emperor Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong) and in the period of my inquiry (the last decade of 
the nineteenth century) is clear. Until the 1880s, the Qing empire still had Vietnam and Korea as its 
tributary states and tried to intervene in Vietnam during the Sino-French war and in Korea during the 
first Sino-Japanese war. So according to Osterhammel’s definition of imperialism, the Qing empire in 
the 1880s was still an imperial power because of the existence of its tributary states and expansionist 
policies. Whether it was a Manchu empire led by Manchu imperialist rulers over Han Chinese and 
other ethnic groups (as the New Qing History argues), or a Chinese empire exercising imperialist 
policies is beyond the scope of the thesis.7  
 
However, the Qing empire’s defeat in the Sino-French war and the first Sino-Japanese war resulted in 
the loss of the two tributary states, and subsequently its policy changed to being completely defensive. 
Therefore, after the first Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895), the Qing empire had lost its previous status as 
an imperial power and become the target of other imperialist powers in the world. This is why I have 
chosen this period as the period of my inquiry into China’s experience of Euro-American and Japanese 
imperialism. My choice of the period is also generally in line with Willian T. Rowe’s discussion of the 
                                                
6 Jürgen Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2014), 432. 
7 For the New Qing History, see Evelyn S. Rawski, “Presidential Address: Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance of the 
Qing Period in Chinese History” The Journal of Asian Studies 55, no. 4 (1996): 829-850; Joanna Waley-Cohen, “The New 
Qing History.” Radical History Review 88 (2004): 193-206; Mark C. Elliott, The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and 
Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001); James P. Millward, Beyond the 
Pass: Economy, Ethnicity and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); 
Evelyn S. Rawski, The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1998). For responses to the New Qing History, see Ping-ti Ho, “In defense of SInicization: A Rebuttal of Evelyn 
Rawski’s ‘Reenvisioning the Qing’” The Journal of Asian Studies 57, no. 1 (1998): 123-155; Guo Wu, “New Qing History: 
Dispute, Dialog and Influence” The Chinese Historical Review 23, no. 1 (2016): 47-69. 
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term “imperialism”. According to Rowe, historians of the Qing empire often use the term 
“imperialism” in two different senses: 1) imperialism defined in economic sense in Lenin’s term as 
“the highest stage of capitalism”; 2) imperialism defined in more political and military sense as “the 
worldwide competitive scramble for territorial colonisaition by the Western Great Powers (and 
eventually Japan)”. The second definition of “imperialism” is also much more historicist and is often 
seen as starting from the late nineteenth century and ending with the First World War.8 The second 
definition of imperialism fits well with Jürgen Osterhammel’s definition of imperialism, thus also 
applies to my thesis. Essentially, the term “imperialism” in my thesis refers to Western and eventually 
Japanese expansionism of the late nineteenth century. Following Akira Iriye, Rowe dates the age of 
imperialism in East Asia from April 1895, the ending of the first Sino-Japanese War.9 I believe the date 
should be a little earlier, from 1894 when the first Sino-Japanese war started since Japan was also one 
of the imperialist powers.  
 
Literature review 
 
Euro-American and Japanese imperialism in China 
Since the 1980s, western historians writing on China turned to a “China-centred” historiography 
propagated by Paul Cohen’s Discovering history in China.10 This “China-centred” turn is a welcome 
correction to Fairbank’s “Western Impact–Chinese response” model which saw China as incapable of 
making its history without the West. However, the “China-centred” approach underplays Western 
presence in China and has its problems. In the preface of the second paperback edition of Discovering 
history in China published in 2010, Cohen points out that problems of a “China-centred” approach 
                                                
8 William T Rowe, China’s last empire: the great Qing (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2012), 231-232. 
9 Ibid, 233. 
10 Cohen, Discovering History in China. 
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include ignoring foreign influences and seeing Chinese historical experience as mirroring  European 
historical experience when studying collective and long-term processes (e.g. the debate about liberal 
tradition, modernity, public sphere and civil society).11 Cohen reminds the reader of the potential of the 
“China-centred” approach to “degenerate into a new form of parochialism”:  
 
As long as the experience of the Western intrusion remains fresh and resentment against it alive and 
warm, it will be difficult for Chinese to accept a scaled-down appraisal of imperialism’s role in the last 
century and a half of their history, and they may well view American efforts in this direction as ultimately 
self-serving, a new and more subtle form of foreign intellectual aggrandizement.12 
 
Cohen’s above comment signifies a common attitude among western historians’ writings on China: “a 
scaled-down appraisal of imperialism’s role in the last century and a half of” Chinese history. They 
continue to dismiss Chinese narratives of recent Chinese history as instilled by contemporary intellectual 
or political atmosphere in China even if they acknowledge the limitations of Western narratives. The 
result is ignorance or refusal of Chinese historians’ writings on China in the West. 
 
However, after the challenge of postmodernism to the history discipline, historians can no longer hold 
the naive position that historical facts are just there and wait for historians to discover and present them 
objectively. Most historians still strive for objectivity, but they nonetheless admit that historiography is 
interpretative, thus not free from distortions and omissions from different perspectives of historians. In 
the history discipline, subjectivity and objectivity are not in ultimate conflict. The only way to accredit 
or discredit the truth claim (or credibility if you prefer) of historiography, is to move back “from the art 
                                                
11 Ibid, xvii. 
12 Ibid, 195. 
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of writing to the research techniques and critical procedures”.13  Simple accusations of political or 
ideological bias are not adequate. 
 
Recently, Chinese historians are aware of the pitfalls of the revolutionary or the modernisation paradigm 
and are starting to explore other ways of writing Chinese history, though they still largely rely on Western 
theories, concepts and methodologies. The influence of postmodern theories in recent Chinese 
historiography is particularly strong. 14  However, compared to Chinese historians’ enthusiasm for 
Western methods, their efforts at rewriting Chinese history are rarely appreciated in the West. The first 
book which synthesizes in English the development of mainland Chinese historiography on the recent 
Chinese past was published as late as in 2012.15 Taiwan historians’ writings still await English synthesis.  
 
The recent shying away from grand narratives/paradigms in mainland Chinese historiography does not 
mean that the revolutionary or the modernisation paradigm have become irrelevant in historical writings. 
All historians writing on China will agree that revolution and modernisation are the two great themes in 
the recent Chinese past. A “China-centred” history as Cohen proposes, then, must engage or converse 
with one of these two themes or both of them, and thus wrestle with the revolutionary or/and the 
modernisation paradigm. The revolutionary narrative at its worst is a century’s national humiliation 
serving to glorify the ruling party as the saviour of China and the Chinese people. However, the 
humiliation is not a fantasy constructed by the ruling party; it was real. It was felt since the late Qing, 
especially after China’s defeat by Japan in 1895. The Chinese felt so humiliated in the world of nations 
as to see themselves as having been enslaved by the foreign powers.16 From 1895 to the early twentieth 
                                                
13 Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting (University of Chicago Press, 2004 first published in 2000), 278. 
14 Ibid 236-260. 
15 It is Li Huaiyin, Reinventing Modern China: Imagination and Authenticity in Chinese Historical Writing (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai'i Press, 2012). 
16 John Fitzgerald, ”The Slave Who Would Be Equal: The Significance of Liang Qichao's Australian Writings ". in Power 
and Identity in the Chinese World Order: Festschrift in Honour of Professor Wang Gungwu, eds. Billy K.L. So, John 
Fitzgerald, Jianli Huang and James K. Chin (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003), 353-354; John 
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century, Yen Fu, a Chinese thinker, translated and commented on the work of key western thinkers, such 
as Spencer, Huxley, Adam Smith, Mill, and Montesquieu in order to find out the reasons behind the 
West’s success in achieving wealth and power.17 The global force of imperialism certainly struck Chinese 
minds and Chinese lands.   
 
This accredits the revolutionary paradigm’s focus on imperialism. However, apart from Maoist anti-
imperialist narrative in the late 1960s and 1970s, and discussions on economic effects of imperialism and 
the relation of imperialism and nationalism,18 it was only in the 1990s and 2000s that imperialism re-
emerged as a theme in the writing of the recent Chinese past. Spurred by postcolonial studies in the past 
two decades and global history in the twenty-first century, scholars started to reassess imperialism in 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century China. 19  They also problematized the definition of imperialism. 
Imperialism is no longer merely military and economic but also cultural, intellectual and ideological. In 
English Lessons, Hevia talks about the pedagogy of Euro-American imperialism in nineteenth-century 
China and sees imperialism not as “a simple matter of conquest and administration”, but as a dynamic 
and complex process of “layering, imbrication, translation, and struggle”. From this perspective, pure 
form or complete colonization is always a goal of colonialists and never exists. All colonies are forms of 
semi-colonialism. China’s semi-colonial status is no longer seen as unique but as a part of the global 
colonial project of the new imperialism rising in the last years of the nineteenth century.20 The journal 
Positions founded in 1993 strives to apply post-colonial criticism to the study of East Asia, including 
                                                
Fitzgerald, ”Nationalism, Democracy and Dignity in Twentieth-Century China." in The Dignity of Nations: Equality, 
Competition, and Honor in East Asian Nationalism, eds. John Fitzgerald and Sechin YS Chien, 93-114 (Hong Kong 
University Press, 2006); John Fitzgerald, Awakening China: politics, culture and class in the Nationalist Revolution 
(Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1998), 106-116. 
17 Benjamin I. Schwartz, In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1964). 
18 Cohen, Discovering History in China, 97-147; Robert Y. Eng, Economic Imperialism in China: Silk Produciton and 
Export, 1861-1932 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). 
19 For example, in J. Y. Wong, Deadly dreams: opium, imperialism and the Arrow War (1856-1860) (Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).   
20 James L Hevia, English Lessons: The Pedagogy of Imperialism in Nineteenth-Century China (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2003). 
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China. Its founder, Tani E. Barlow criticizes the modernisation paradigm in postwar China Studies and 
relates modernity with colonialism. She proposes the use of the term “colonial modernity”, which is 
general enough and transcends the boundaries of “discrete units - nation states, stages of development, 
or civilizations” and “the strictly opposed pairs” such as self/other, colony/metropole, 
colonizer/colonized, and East/West.21 
 
While agreeing with Hevia and Barlow that imperial ventures in China were part of European empire-
building on a global scale, Bryna Goodman and David Goodman argue in the introduction of the 2012 
edited volume Twentieth Century Colonialism and China that more attention should be paid to China’s 
distinctiveness and the complex and ever-changing interactions in China’s ‘contact zones’ across 
different time and spaces. The operation of multiple imperialist powers on Chinese soil itself adds a 
layer of complexity: these colonial powers had different imperial ambitions and shifting relations. Their 
interactions with different localities at different historical moments add another layer of complexity. 
Following the historian of Africa, Frederick Cooper, the Goodmans speak of multiple colonialisms, 
emphasizing diversity and contingency. They aim to highlight the complex interaction between 
localities and forces of globalization on Chinese soil. All these kinds of complexity “may facilitate 
critical reflection about universal models or abstract theorization of the workings of colonialism across 
space and time, in China and elsewhere”. With the publishing of the Goodmans’ edited volume in 
2012, the current scholarship shifts to the mapping of “where, when, how and to what effect did which 
extraneous forces impinge” on Chinese life, as advocated by Osterhammel in 1986.22  
 
                                                
21 Tani E Barlow, "Colonialism's Career in Postwar China Studies." positions: east asia cultures critique 1, no. 1 (1993): 
224-67; Tani E Barlow, "Introduction: on “Colonial Modernity”," in Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia, ed. 
Tani E. Barlow (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997). 
22 Jürgen Osterhammel, “Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth-Century China: Towards a framework of 
Analysis”, 295. 
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In New Frontiers: Imperialism's New Communities in East Asia, 1842-1953, many scholars document 
the activities of diverse foreign communities – their ambivalent negotiations of daily life and identity - 
in China in the nineteenth and twentieth century, ranging from Baghdadi Jews to Sikhs to White 
Russian and Jewish refugees, working-class Scottish policemen, and Japanese shopkeepers etc.23 This 
volume contributes most in drawing our attention from colonizing elites to the marginal and 
subordinated foreign settlers and refugees. In doing so, the binaries of colonizer-colonized no longer 
hold and the complexities and ambiguities of colonialism in practice are revealed.  One of the New 
Frontiers’ editors, Robert Bickers, has also written several books about the experience of marginal 
British people in China’s contact zones, especially in Shanghai.24  
 
The New Frontiers’ and Robert Bickers’ focus on the marginal offspring of empire expands the 
discussion of imperialism from high-level military and political operations and large-scale economic 
exploitation to the realm of daily life – the experience on the ground. Their sources are largely personal 
records of those marginal foreigners, such as letters, diaries, photographs and memoirs. Those marginal 
foreigners’ experience and thoughts are surely valuable and open new doors in the scholarly field of 
imperialism in China. However, the New Frontiers’ and Robert Bickers’ dependence on foreign 
personal records restricts their understanding to only one side of the story. As Bryna Goodman points 
out, the Chinese are largely absent in the New Frontiers, and the foreigners again are portrayed as 
outsiders who remained in relative insularity in China. As shown by the foreigners’ personal records, 
the foreigners’ insularity might be the general picture, but no matter how insular they were or they felt 
they were, they were still within the asymmetrical power relationships between the colonizer and the 
                                                
23 Robert Bickers and Christian Henriot, eds., New Frontiers: Imperialism's New Communities in East Asia, 1842-1953 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000). 
24 Robert Bickers, Britian in China: community, culture and colonialism, 1900-1949 (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1999); Robort Bickers, Empire Made Me: An Englishman Adrift in Shanghai (New York: Columbia University, 
2003); Robert Bickers, Getting Stuck in for Shanghai: Or, Putting the Kibosh on the Kaiser from the Bund, The British at 
Shanghai and the Great War (Sydney, Penguin Books, 2014).  
Mu Zhang 23 
 23 
colonized. For example, they were still under the extraterritorial umbrellas. The global force of 
imperialism still played a part in the localities. The binaries of colonizer-colonized are to be blurred not 
to be erased. 
 
Robert Bickers’ recently edited books have abandoned the outsider view and showed various aspects of 
China’s colonial history, especially the power struggles between China and foreign powers in the treaty 
ports.25 Two recently published books, Anne Reinhardt’s Navigating Semi-Colonialism: Shipping, 
Sovereignty, and Nation-Building in China, 1860-1937 and Elisabeth Köll’s Railroads and the 
Transformation of China have considered the specificity of China’s experience in a semi-colonial 
framework as well as its links to the global force of imperialism. Focusing on the development of 
stream shipping in China, Anne Reinhardt shows how the global force of imperialism (represented by 
foreign shipping companies) tried to control Chinese waters and how local Chinese resisted this control 
and maintained partial Chinese sovereignty.26 Similarly, Elisabeth Köll turns her eyes to the 
development of railroads in China and shows the cooperation and tensions between Chinese and 
multiple foreign imperialist powers in the building of the Jin-Pu line.27 Their books also expand 
discussions of foreign presence in China to experience on the ground, illustrating the complex 
interaction between localities and forces of globalization on Chinese soil as the Goodmans advocate.  
 
Both books are focused on modern infrastructure, stream shipping networks and railroads respectively, 
since obviously, they were China’s “contact zones”. But the effect of imperialism was not only seen in 
China’s “contact zones”, such as in the treaty ports, in the steamship or the building of railroads, it was 
                                                
25 Robert Bickers and Jonathan J. Howlett, eds., Britain and China, 1840-1970: Empire, Finance and War (London: 
Routledge, 2018); Robert Bickers and Isabella Jackson, eds., Treaty Ports in Modern China: Law, Land & Power (London: 
Routledge, 2018). Robert Bickers also led a project named 'Colonialism in comparative perspective: Tianjin under nine 
flags' (2008-11). 
26 Anne Reinhardt, Navigating Semi-Colonialim: Shipping, Sovereignty, and Nation-Building in China, 1860-1937, 1-132. 
27 Elisabeth Köll, Railroads and the Transformation of China. Harvard studies in business history (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2019), 20-50. 
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also manifested in other areas. However, studies on imperialism in China mostly turn to China’s 
“contact zones” and neglect other areas. As discussed before, they also often focus on the economic, 
cultural or social impact of imperialism. Except the establishment of the treaty ports and foreign 
concessions, current scholarship rarely discusses the political impact of Euro-American and Japanese 
imperialism in China during this period, presumably because scholars assume that there were few since 
China preserved political independence. From the reading of my main primary sources: Zhang Zhidong 
quanji and Zhang Zhidong archives, I found that this is not the case. The global force of imperialism in 
the late nineteenth century affected Zhang Zhidong’s provincial government greatly. The central 
government and Zhang’s provincial government collided over many policy decisions facing intensive 
imperialist pressure, which resulted in the degradation of central-provincial relations during this period. 
 
On central-provincial relations in late Qing China 
 
Qing governors-general and governors acquired new power in the military, financial and administrative 
spheres after the Taiping Rebellion through the establishment of the Brave battalions, the collection of 
new taxes such as the internal transit (likin) and maritime customs revenue, and the appointment of 
officials for various newly established bureaus.28 However, the nature of their power in relation to the 
central government is still debated by scholars. 
 
The first scholar to discuss this issue was Luo Ergang.29 He highlighted that the Qing court’s reliance on 
Zeng Guofan’s Xiang Army after the fall of the Green Standard Army—the state-controlled army—
                                                
28 Kwang Ching Liu, “The Limits of Regional Power in the Late-Ch’ing Period” in China’s Early Modernisation and 
Reform Movement: studies in late nineteenth-century China and American-Chinese relations, eds., Chen Yung-Fa and Pan 
Kuang-Che (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academ Sinica, 2009), 355-358. 
29 Luo Ergang, Xiang jun xin zhi [The new history of Xiang Army] in Jin dai zhong guo shi liao cong kan 2, vol. 95 ed. 
Shen, Yunlong (Taipei: Wenhai chu ben she,1966-1987), 222-245; Luo Ergang, Qing ji bing wei jiang you de qi yuan [The 
origin of privately owned army in the Qing dynasty]. Zhongguo shehui jingjishi jikan [Bulletin of The social-economic 
history of China], vol 5. Issue 2 (Nanjing: Guo li zhong yang yan jiu yuan she hui ke xue yan jiu suo, 1937), 235-250. 
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during the Taiping Rebellion changed the relationship between the central government and provincial 
governors. Before the Taiping Rebellion, the central government provided funds for the Green Standard 
Army and appointed Green battalion officers. During the Taiping Rebellion, the Xiang Army replaced 
the Green Standard Army as the most effective fighting force. To ensure that the Xiang Army could 
obtain funds from the provinces to efficiently fight against the Taipings, the central government 
appointed Xiang Army officers as provincial governors, even though it knew that this was dangerous. 
With the Xiang Army as an example, provincial governors started to train their own troops—the Brave 
battalions and Lian battalions—to replace the Green Standard Army. From then, provincial governors 
controlled provincial finances and their own army, thus becoming powerful individuals who deprived 
the central government of power. Michael and Spector also agreed that increasing ‘regionalism’ was 
present during and after the Taiping Rebellion, in the form of governors-general and governors 
controlling the Brave battalions and the new commercial likin tax.30 
 
Luo’s, Michael’s and Spector’s view that provincial governors were challenging imperial authority after 
the Taiping Rebellion is generally well received but not without questions from other scholars. For 
example, Wang Ermin agreed that provincial governors—especially Li Hongzhang, the Governor-
General of Zhili—controlled their own armies (for Li, the Huai Army) and the finances of the province. 
However, Wang argued that Li’s unprecedented power was bestowed upon him by the central 
government because, from the 1860s, Beijing required a strong army in Zhili for protection against 
increasing security threats from within and without the empire. Therefore, increasing the Governor-
General of Zhili’s power was a central government decision and Li became the Governor-General of 
Zhili only because he was the right person (probably also the only one at that time) to lead a strong army 
                                                
30 Franz Michael, “Military Organization and Power Structure of China during the Taiping Rebellion,” Pacific Historical 
Review, 18 (1949): 469-83; “Franz Michael, “Reginalism in Nineteenth-Century China,” introduction to Stanley Spector, Li 
Hung-chang and the Huai Army: A Study in Nineteenth-century Chinese Regionalism (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1964); Stanley Spector, Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army: A Study in Nineteenth-century Chinese Regionalism 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964). 
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and negotiate with foreigners. Throughout Li’s life, Wang argued, Li served the interests of and remained 
loyal to the central government. Therefore, it is not correct to state that Li challenged imperial authority 
or to propose discussions regarding regionalism or decentralization in the late Qing.31 
 
Kwang Ching Liu studied regionalism in the late Qing in more detail, extending the study to other 
provincial governors beyond Li Hongzhang. Liu argued that the power of the governors-general and 
governors was limited both from below and from the central government, at least before 1900. The 
complex web of interests woven by personal relationships and patronage limited their control of the 
Brave battalions and bureaus and circumscribed their revenues from new taxes (likin and customs duties). 
The central government in Beijing controlled the governors-general and governors through means of 
appointment: most governors-general and governors were regular civil examination degree holders and 
their tenures were short, with 79 per cent of governors-general and 92.6 per cent of governors serving 
six years or less from 1885 to 1895. The exceptions were the great governors-general of the late 
nineteenth century, such as Liu Kunyi, Zuo Zongtang, Li Hongzhang and Zhang Zhidong.32 
 
The central government in Beijing also controlled the Brave battalions and new tax revenues. The Brave 
battalions in provinces were kept to a minimum (approximately a thousand soldiers) and the large Brave 
battalions (the Xiang Army and the Huai Army) were reduced after the war and distributed among several 
provinces. The appointment and dismissal of the Brave battalion commanders and officers was controlled 
by the Ministry of War in Beijing, since the commanders and officers were often also Green Standard 
Army officers. Customs receipts at each treaty port were submitted to Beijing through the foreign-
officered inspectorate and 40 per cent of maritime customs revenue was reserved for Beijing. The funds 
                                                
31 Wang Ermin, Huai jun zhi [The history of the Huai Army] (Beijing: Zhong hua shu ju, 1987), 376-394. 
32 Liu, “The Limits of Regional Power in the Late-Ch’ing Period”, 351-365; Liu, “Nineteenth-Century China: The 
Disintegration of the Old Order and the Impact of the West” in China in Crisis: China’s Heritage and the Communist 
Political System, eds. Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou (Chicago: The Univerity of Chicago Press, 1968), 110-113. 
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available in the provinces (the likin and the 60 per cent customs revenue) were also squeezed by various 
‘apportioning quotas’ from Beijing, such as the Beijing Fund.33 
 
Given the extent of financial control that Beijing exercised on the provinces, Liu argues that large armies 
could only be sustained with Beijing’s financial support. As such, Li Hongzhang could not maintain and 
support the Huai Army, the Beiyang Navy and his various ‘self-strengthening’ projects (e.g., arsenals) 
without imperial support. Similarly, Liu Kunyi’s and Zhang Zhidong’s power was also restrained by the 
central government. Moreover, most local officials in their provinces were appointed by the central 
government. Governors-general and governors could only appoint ten per cent of the total posts, mostly 
in areas related to likin collection, the new bureaus and self-strengthening establishments. Regarding 
territorial officials, they only had control over treaty port areas and the few places reserved for provincial 
nominations. Appointed officials were also subject to censure and could be replaced by the central 
government if they failed to demonstrate their loyalty or competence. The more typical governors-
general and governors who served three to six years in one area strove to become ideal Confucian 
administrators and remain in office for long periods. To achieve this goal, they would maintain local 
order and stability, and try to meet the increasing revenue quotas demanded by Beijing, not disregarding 
imperial authority.34 
 
Recently, Li Xizhu extended the discussion of central–provincial relations to the period after 1900.35 He 
argued that during the New Policy Reform after 1900, the Qing court tried to centralize power from the 
                                                
33 Liu, “The Limits of Regional Power in the Late-Ch’ing Period”, 365-372. 
34 Liu, “The Limits of Regional Power in the Late-Ch’ing Period”, 372-375. Direct quotes are from p. 373. 
35 Li Xizhu, “Wanqing difang dufu quanli wenti zai yanjiu: jianlun qingmo “nei wai jie qing” quanli gegu de 
xingcheng [Research on the power of provincial governors: comments on the formation of the concurrent weaknesses of 
central and provincial governments in the late qing dynasty],” Qing shi yan jiu [The Qing history journal], no. 3 (2012); Li 
Xizhu, “Xinhai dingge zhiji difang dufu de chuchu jueze: jianlun qingmo “nei wai jie qing” quanli gegu de yingxiang [The 
choices of provincial governors during the 1911 revolution: comments on the effect of the concurrent weaknesses of central 
and provincial governments in the late qing dynasty], ” Jin dai shi yan jiu [Modern Chinese History Studies], no. 3 (2012); 
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provincial governors. However, this attempt was not successful. Through the New Policy Reform, the 
Qing court limited the military and financial power of the provincial governors but could not transform 
itself into a strong central government that controlled both military and financial power throughout the 
whole country. This led to a powerless central government and powerless provincial governments. 
Consequently, the real power transferred to local military officers who controlled the local army. The 
weakness of the central government and the provincial governments paved the way to the 1911 revolution; 
Yuan Shikai, who controlled the most advanced army in China, emerged victorious. 
 
Sun Yanjing challenged Li’s view, asserting that Yuan Shikai’s power originated from his role as a 
provincial governor. As such, Sun argued that provincial governors were still powerful after 1900 and 
were able to defend the Qing dynasty; however, they were not willing to do so because they had lost faith 
in the dynasty.36 In response to Sun, Li argued that Yuan Shikai’s power stemmed from his control of 
the Beiyang New Army; therefore, after 1900, the real power was transferred to military officers rather 
than provincial governors. During the New Policy Reform, the Qing court established a series of central 
government offices, attempting to replace provincial governors to command the New Army. However, 
the newly established central government offices were incompetent at leading the New Army. Therefore, 
in the crisis of 1911, both the central government and provincial governors were unable to command the 
New Army, and military leaders of the New Army, such as Yuan Shikai, became the most powerful 
individuals in China.37 
                                                
Li Xizhu, Difang dufu yu qingmo xinzheng: wanqing quanli geju zai yanjiu [Provincial governors and the New Policy 
Reform: Research on the power structure of the late Qing] (Beijing: She hui ke xue wen xian chu ban she, 2012), 363-443. 
36 Sun Yanjing, “‘Nei qing wai zhong’ yihuo ‘nei wai jie qing’: ping Li Xizhu difang dufu yu qingmo xinzheng 
jianlun wanqing zhengzhishi yanjiu [Strong provincial government weak central government or both weak central and 
provincial governments: comments on Li Xizhu’s Provincial governors and the New Policy Reform and research on late 
qing political history]” Jin dai shi yan jiu [Modern Chinese History Studies], no. 2 (2014). 
37 Li Xizhu, “Zailun nei wai jie qing quanli gegu yu qingmo minchu zhengzhi zouxiang [Further study on the 
concurrent weaknesses of central and provincial governments and political trends in the late Qing dynasty and the early 
Republic of China],” Qing shi yan jiu [The Qing history journal], no. 2 (2017). We should not overemphasize Yuan Shikai’s 
control of the Beiyang army as his only means of success (that of Yuan the militarist), his reform activities, his wide 
connections with not only military officers but also civilians, and his vision of a strong China all contributed to his success. 
Mu Zhang 29 
 29 
 
Li Xizhu’s and Sun Yanjing’s discussions focus on the period after 1900, I think the situation before 
1900 still needs some clarification. To what extent could the central government control provincial 
governors? Luo Ergang, Franz Michael, Wang Ermin and Kwang Ching Liu disagree with each other. 
There are two ways to answer this question. The first is to survey all the provincial governors in the late 
Qing and generally study their relation to the central government like what Kwang Ching Liu did. The 
second is to pick one provincial governor and study his relation to the central government in detail, 
such as studies focusing on Li Hongzhang. My thesis follows the second way. Instead of studying Li 
Hongzhang, I choose Zhang Zhidong as a case study.  
 
On Zhang Zhidong 
 
I deliberately choose Zhang Zhidong as the object of my research because he was a prominent Chinese 
provincial governor in the late Qing, yet research about him in English scholarship is rare. Using Zhang 
Zhidong as a case study also enables me to study imperialism in China from a provincial perspective, 
linking the local to the national and the global. The first influential scholarly book about Zhang Zhidong 
written in English was William Ayers’s Chang Chih-tung and educational reform in China (1971).38 
Focusing on Zhang’s views about education and his role in the Western-inspired educational reform of 
the late Qing, this book traced Zhang’s career as a governor-general and adviser to the Manchu throne. 
Joseph W. Esherick’s Reform and revolution in China: the 1911 revolution in Hunan and Hubei (1976) 
touched on Zhang; however, the book mostly addresses the role that the later student force, the new 
                                                
See Ernest P. Young, The presidency of Yuan Shih-Kai: liberalism and dictatorship in early republican China (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1977). 
38 William Ayers, Chang Chih-tung and educational reform in China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1971). Both Zhang Zhidong and Chang Chih-tung refer to the same person. They are different Romanisations of the 
same Chinese characters.  
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Hubei Army, and the masses played in the 1911 revolution.39 Daniel H. Bays’ China Enters the twentieth 
century: Chang Chih-tung and the issues of a new age, 1895–1909 (1978) acknowledged Zhang’s 
significant role in Chinese politics in the final years of the Qing dynasty.40 However, Bays’ focus was 
Zhang’s role in reform and his position towards revolution. Bays also wrote an article about central–
provincial relations focusing on Zhang Zhidong;41 this is probably the only article using Zhang as a case 
study to discuss central–provincial relations in the late Qing dynasty. In the article, Bays examined 
Zhang’s activities as the Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi (1884–1889). He argued that 
Zhang worked in the interest of the central government and that it is not appropriate to discuss 
‘regionalism’ or ‘provincialism’ in Zhang’s case. After the few books and articles of the 1970s, literature 
about Zhang published in English was rare. Seungjoo Yoon’s thesis, The formation, reformation and 
transformation of Zhang Zhidong’s document commissioners, 1885–1909 (1999), is a rare addition to 
the selection of English scholarship.42 
 
 
Many more pieces of literature about Zhang exist in Chinese scholarship than in English; however, the 
focus is still much on his role in reforms, including educational reforms.43 The first scholarly book 
                                                
39 Joseph W. Esherick, Reform and revolution in China: the 1911 revolution in Hunan and Hubei (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1976). 
40 Daniel H. Bays, China Enters the Twentieth Century: Chang Chih-tung and the Issues of a New Age, 1895-1909 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1978). 
41 Daniel H. Bays, "The Nature of Provincial Political Authority in Late Ch'ing Times: Chang Chih-tung in Canton, 
1884-1889", Modern Asian Studies 4, no. 4 (1970): 325-347. 
42 Seungjoo Yoon, “Constitutional Change in the Lower Echelon of the Qing Bureaucracy: The formation, 
reformation and transformation of Zhang Zhidong’s document commissioners, 1885-1909” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 
1999). 
43 A Review of Chinese scholarship on Zhang Zhidong can be found in Li Renkai and Qiao Lirong, “Jin ershi 
nianlai Zhang Zhidong yanjiu gaishu [Research on Zhang Zhidong in the recent twenty years],” Jin dai shi yan jiu [Modern 
Chinese History Studies], no. 4 (1998); Ren Fang, “Jin bainian Zhang Zhidong Yanjiu Shuping [Research on Zhang 
Zhidong in the recent one hundred years],” Jin dai shi yan jiu [Modern Chinese History Studies], no. 2 (2003); The first 
scholarly book about Zhang Zhidong written in Chinese is Li Guoqi, Zhang Zhidong de waijiao zhengce [Zhang Zhidong’s 
foreign policy], 2nd ed. Bulletin of The Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica 27 (Taipei: The Institute of Modern 
History, Academia Sinica, 1984), in which Li discusses Zhang Zhidong’s views and actions in dealing with foreign powers. 
He points out that Zhang tended to play off one power against another and turned to ally with Britain and Japan later at the 
end of the nineteenth century. Su Yunfeng, Zhang Zhidong yu Hubei jiaoyu gaige [Zhang Zhidong and the educational 
reform in Hubei]. Bulletin of The Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica 35 (Taipei: The Institute of Modern History, 
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about Zhang Zhidong written in Chinese is Taiwanese scholar Li Guoqi’s Zhang Zhidong de waijiao 
zhengce [Zhang Zhidong’s foreign policy] published in 1970, in which Li discusses Zhang Zhidong’s 
views and actions in dealing with foreign powers. He points out that Zhang tended to play off one 
power against another and turned to ally with Britain and Japan later at the end of the nineteenth 
century.44 Taiwanese scholar Su Yunfeng’s Zhang Zhidong yu Hubei jiaoyu gaigei [Zhang Zhidong 
and the educational reform in Hubei] (1976) is another book about Zhang’s role in the educational 
reforms, but its focus is on Hubei province.45 Hong Kong scholar Zhou Hanguang’s Zhang Zhidong yu 
Guangya shuyuan [Zhang Zhidong and the Guangya Academy ] (1983) is also about Zhang Zhidong’s 
educational reforms with a focus on Guangdong province.46  
 
Feng Tianyu’s Zhang Zhidong pingzhuan [Critical biography of Zhang Zhidong] (1985) was the first 
detailed biography of Zhang Zhidong published in mainland China. This book sees Zhang as the later 
leader of the self-strengthening movement and emphasizes his role in late Qing reforms.47 Other Zhang 
Zhidong biographies include Ma Dongyu’s Zhang Zhidong dazhuan [Detailed Biography of Zhang 
                                                
Academia Sinica, 1976) is another book about Zhang’s role in the educational reforms, but its focus is on Hubei province. 
Zhou Hanguang, Zhang Zhidong yu Guangya shuyuan [Zhang Zhidong and the Guangya Academy] (Taipei: Zhong guo wen 
hua da xue chu ben bu, 1983) is also about Zhang Zhidong’s educational reforms with a focus on Guangdong province. 
Books about Zhang Zhidong and late Qing educational reforms also include Huang Xinxian, Zhang Zhidong yu Zhongguo 
jindai jiaoyu [Zhang Zhidong and education in modern China] (Fujian: Fujian jiao yu chu ben she, 1991) and Cai 
Zhensheng, Zhang Zhidong jiaoyu sixiang yanjiu [Research on Zhang Zhidong’s educational thought] (Liaoning: Liaoning 
jiao yu chu ben she, 1994). Feng Tianyu, Zhang Zhidong pingzhuan [Critical biography of Zhang Zhidong] (Henan: Henan 
jiao yu chu ben she, 1985) is the first detailed biography of Zhang Zhidong published in mainland China. This book sees 
Zhang as the later leader of the self-strengthening movement and emphasizes his role in late Qing reforms. Other Zhang 
Zhidong biographies include Ma Dongyu, Zhang Zhidong dazhuan [Detailed Biography of Zhang Zhidong] (Liaoning: 
Liaoning ren min chu ben she, 1989); Xie Fang, Zhongtixiyong zhimeng: Zhang Zhidong zhuan [Dream of Chinese 
Substance of Culture complemented with Western Technologies: Biography of Zhang Zhidong] (Sichuan: Sichuan ren min 
chu ben she, 1995); Li Renkai and Zhong Kangmo, Zhang Zhidong yu jindai zhongguo [Zhang Zhidong and modern China] 
(Hebei: Hebei da xue chu ban she, 1999). 
44 Li Guoqi, Zhang Zhidong de waijiao zhengce [Zhang Zhidong’s foreign policy], 2nd ed. Bulletin of The Institute of 
Modern History, Academia Sinica 27 (Taipei: The Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1984), 349. 
45 Su Yunfeng, Zhang Zhidong yu Hubei jiaoyu gaige [Zhang Zhidong and the educational reform in Hubei]. Bulletin of 
The Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica 35 (Taipei: The Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1976), 9. 
46 Zhou Hanguang, Zhang Zhidong yu Guangya shuyuan [Zhang Zhidong and the Guangya Academy] (Taipei: Zhong guo 
wen hua da xue chu ben bu, 1983), 557, 560, 564. 
47 Feng Tianyu, Zhang Zhidong pingzhuan [Critical biography of Zhang Zhidong] (Henan: Henan jiao yu chu ben she, 
1985), 265. 
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Zhidong] (1989), Xiefang’s Zhongtixiyong zhimeng: Zhang Zhidong zhuan [Dream of Chinese 
Substance of Culture complemented with Western Technologies: Biography of Zhang Zhidong] (1995), 
Li Renkai and Zhong Kangmo’s Zhang Zhidong yu jindai zhongguo [Zhang Zhidong and modern 
China] (1999).48 Books about Zhang Zhidong and late Qing educational reforms include Huang 
Xinxian’s Zhang Zhidong yu Zhongguo jindai jiaoyu [Zhang Zhidong and education in modern China] 
(1991) and Cai Zhensheng’s Zhang Zhidong jiaoyu sixiang yanjiu [Research on Zhang Zhidong’s 
educational thought] (1994).49 There are also a few books about Zhang Zhidong and the Hubei 
province since Zhang was a long-serving governor-general there. For example, Chenjun and Renfang’s 
Shijimo de xingshuai: Zhang Zhidong yu wanqing hubei jingji [Rise and fall at the end of the century: 
Zhang Zhidong and Hubei economy in the late Qing] (1991) and Chen Feng’s Zhang Zhidong yu 
wuhan zaoqi xiandaihua [Zhang Zhidong and the early modernisation of Wuhan] (2004).50 In 1997, a 
conference called ‘Zhang Zhidong and the modernization of China’ was held in Hebei, Zhang’s 
hometown, and a book including 36 articles about Zhang presented in this conference was published in 
1999.51 
 
Recently, research on Zhang in Chinese scholarship has extended beyond an emphasis on Zhang’s role 
in reforms and the modernization of China, exploring other aspects of Zhang as a governor-general, a 
political adviser, a scholar and thinker. Some literature has studied Zhang’s connections to other 
                                                
48 Ma Dongyu, Zhang Zhidong dazhuan [Detailed Biography of Zhang Zhidong] (Liaoning: Liaoning ren min chu ben she, 
1989), 261, 403; Xie Fang, Zhongtixiyong zhimeng: Zhang Zhidong zhuan [Dream of Chinese Substance of Culture 
complemented with Western Technologies: Biography of Zhang Zhidong] (Sichuan: Sichuan ren min chu ben she, 1995), 
295-296; Li Renkai and Zhong Kangmo, Zhang Zhidong yu jindai zhongguo [Zhang Zhidong and modern China] (Hebei: 
Hebei da xue chu ban she, 1999), 185, 196, 198-205. 
49 Huang Xinxian, Zhang Zhidong yu Zhongguo jindai jiaoyu [Zhang Zhidong and education in modern China] (Fujian: 
Fujian jiao yu chu ben she, 1991), 9; Cai Zhensheng, Zhang Zhidong jiaoyu sixiang yanjiu [Research on Zhang Zhidong’s 
educational thought] (Liaoning: Liaoning jiao yu chu ben she, 1994), 163-213. 
50 Chen Jun and Ren Fang, Shijimo de xingshuai: Zhang Zhidong yu wanqing hubei jingji [Rise and fall at the end of the 
century: Zhang Zhidong and Hubei economy in the late Qing] (Beijing: Zhongguo wen shi chu ben she, 1991), 361-362; 
Chen Feng, Zhang Zhidong yu wuhan zaoqi xiandaihua [Zhang Zhidong and the early modernisation of Wuhan] (Beijing: 
Zhongguo she hui ke xue chu ben she, 2004). 
51 Yuan shuyi and Qin Jincai, eds., Zhang Zhidong yu zhongguo jindaihua [Zhang Zhidong and the modernisation of China] 
(Beijing: Zhong hua shu ju, 1999), 6. 
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individuals, such as his private secretaries and literati circle. For example Li Renkai’s Zhang Zhidong 
mufu [Zhang Zhidong’s private secretaries] (2005) and Lu Yin’s Zhengjiao cunxu yu wenjiao zhuanxing: 
jindai xueshu shi shang de Zhang Zhidong xuerenquan [Constructing New Knowledge under the Old 
Regime: An Investigation of Zhang Zhidong’s Literati Circle] (2015).52 Li Xizhu and Mao Haijian 
deepened the range of studies by focusing on Zhang in relation to one particular historical event. For 
example, Li Xizhu’s Zhang Zhidong yu qingmo xinzheng [Zhang Zhidong and the New Policy Reform in 
the late Qing] (2003) studies Zhang’s role in the New Policy Reform in the early twentieth century and 
Mao Haijian’s Wuxu bianfa de lingmian: Zhang Zhidong dangan yuedu biji [The other side of the 
Hundred Day’s Reform: Notes of reading Zhang Zhidong archives ] (2014) reveals Zhang’s views and 
actions in the Hundred Day’s Reform (1898).53 
 
Compared the wealth of research on Zhang Zhidong in Chinese scholarship to the only three books in 
English scholarship, it is clear that Zhang Zhidong was a significant figure in the recent Chinese past 
and more research on him in English is needed. My thesis helps to fill in this gap. Moreover, I choose a 
topic that no Chinese scholars have covered – the relation between Zhang Zhidong and the central 
government in the period of high imperialism.  
 
As previously mentioned, studies regarding central–provincial relations in late Qing China often focus 
on Li Hongzhang or Yuan Shikai, since they exercised the most power on the central government. Li 
was the leader of the self-strengthening movement from the 1860s and initialised many of China’s self-
                                                
52 Li Renkai, Zhang Zhidong mufu [Zhang Zhidong’s private secretaries] (Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo dianshi chubanshe, 
2005); Lu Yin, Zhengjiao cunxu yu wenjiao zhuanxing: jindai xueshu shi shang de Zhang Zhidong xuerenquan 
[Constructing New Knowledge under the Old Regime: An Investigation of Zhang Zhidong’s Literati Circle] (Beijing: 
Beijing da xue chu ben she, 2015); For general discussions of mufu, see Kenneth E. Folson, Friends, Guests and 
Colleagues: the Mu-Fu System of the Late Ch’ing Period (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).  
53 Li Xizhu, Zhang Zhidong yu qingmo xinzheng yanjiu [Zhang Zhidong and the New Policy Reform in the late Qing] 
(Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe, 2003); Mao Haijian, Wuxu bianfa de lingmian: Zhang Zhidong dangan yuedu biji 
[The other side of the Hundred Day’s Reform: Notes of reading Zhang Zhidong archives] (Shanghai: Shanghai gu ji chu ban 
she, 2014). 
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strengthening projects, such as the Kiangnan Arsenal, the China Merchants’ Company and the Peiyang 
Navy. These projects were not provincial reserves but served national interests. Li also played a 
significant role in formulating and implementing nineteenth-century China’s foreign policy. As the 
commissioner of trade for the northern posts and the Governor-General of Zhili for more than twenty 
years, Li resided in the strategic city of Tianjin, the gateway to Beijing, and was often the first person 
foreign emissaries approached. As the leader of the Huai Army (one of the best forces of the time), Li 
was deeply involved in the Qing government’s military planning and was responsible for the defence of 
the capital and the coordination of military preparations in coastal and Yangtze provinces. However, Li 
should not be viewed as a proto-warlord, for although he was the leader of the Huai Army, he depended 
on the central government’s direction of revenue from richer southern provinces for the financing of the 
Huai Army. The central government also controlled the deployment of the Huai Army. Nevertheless, 
given his role as the leader of the Huai Army, the commissioner of trade for the northern posts and his 
location in Tianjin, Li was not merely a provincial governor-general but had many central government 
functions.54 
 
Yuan Shikai rose to power and was appointed Governor-General of Zhili and the commissioner of 
trade for the northern ports after the 1900 Boxer movement because of his military power, diplomatic 
power and close relation to the Empress Dowager. By the end of 1900, Yuan commanded one of the best 
forces in China, the Fifth Division of the Guards Army 武衛軍. Other divisions of the Guards Army 
were either defeated by the imperialist powers in the Boxer movement or disbanded due to the pressure 
from the powers. Since Yuan suppressed the Boxers and protected the foreigners in Shandong when he 
was the governor-general there during the Boxer movement, imperialist powers that allied with Britain 
                                                
54 Kwang Ching Liu, “Li Hung-chang in Chihli: The Emergence of a Policy, 1870-1875” in Li Hung-chang and China’s 
Early Modernisation, eds., Samuel C. Chu & Kwang Ching Liu (New York: M. E. Sharpe Inc, 1994), 50-57; Samuel C. 
Chu, “Li Hung-chang: An Assessment” in Li Hung-chang and China’s Early Modernisation, eds., Samuel C. Chu & Kwang 
Ching Liu (New York: M. E. Sharpe Inc, 1994), 265-278. 
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(the Germans, British, Americans and Japanese) favoured him and recommended him to the court for 
appointment to the Zhili posts (Yuan was especially on good terms with the Germans who were already 
in Shandong). After 1900, the Empress Dowager could not afford to reject the imperialist powers’ request; 
therefore, Yuan succeeded Li as the Governor-General of Zhili after Li’s death. Like his predecessor, 
Yuan also dealt with the imperialist powers and performed diplomatic functions for the court. Moreover, 
Yuan associated himself closely with the Empress Dowager’s ally, Manchu court politician Ronglu 榮
祿, and earned the Empress Dowager’s trust in the coup of 1898. He also contributed the most to the 
Empress Dowager’s treasury during her exile in Xi’an and paid the second largest share to the Boxer 
indemnity fund in 1901.55 
 
Both Yuan Shikai and Li Hongzhang served as Governor-General of Zhili and commissioner of trade for 
the northern ports. Both controlled the best forces in China, trusted and relied upon by the Empress 
Dowager for Beijing’s security. Both were also on good terms with the imperialist powers and were 
favoured by them as approachable diplomats. This distinguished them from other governors-general and 
governors in China; they also had far more influence in the central government than their contemporaries. 
In Yuan’s time, Beijing was only three or four hours by railway from Tianjin. As such, he could serve 
actively in Beijing as a central government official and in Tianjin as a governor-general simultaneously.56 
Therefore, when examining central–provincial relations in late Qing China, Yuan Shikai and Li 
Hongzhang are exceptional cases. Their situations are worth investigating, but it is also valuable to 
examine other provincial governors-general and governors. Unlike Li or Yuan, Zhang Zhidong was not 
a leader of any military forces and his political career began when he achieved third place in the civil 
service examination. Although Zhang was a prominent figure in the late Qing dynasty, previous studies 
                                                
55 Stephen R. MacKinnon, Power and Politics in Late Imperial China: Yuan Shikai in Beijing and Tianjin, 1901-1908 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif: University of California Press, 1980), 23-36. 
56 MacKinnon, Power and Politics in Late Imperial China: Yuan Shikai in Beijing and Tianjin, 1901-1908, 72-76. 
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on central–provincial relations rarely focus on him. By using Zhang Zhidong as a case study of central-
provincial relations in my thesis, I hope to add more details and clarify some of the issues in the study of 
central-provincial relations in late Qing China. 
 
The survival of a large body of Zhang Zhidong’s government archives also supports my study. The 
Zhang Zhidong archives held in the Institute of Modern History in Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences includes the official correspondences of Zhang Zhidong’s government between 1889 and 
1907, his personal letters and writings, and letters and writings of people related to him. These archives 
were only available to people who visit the Institute of Modern History before, so except one or two 
persons (for example Mao Haijian), scholars researching Zhang Zhidong rarely use them. However, the 
archives were recently made available to wider audiences and most of the archives were published in 
the 172 volume Jin dai shi suo zang qing dai ming ren gao ben chao ben, Di er ji (Zhang Zhidong 
archives, 2014). Besides Zhang Zhidong archives, I also use many other English and Chinese sources, 
including writings from various people related to Zhang Zhidong, the Qing official archives, British 
and American foreign documents and newspapers. 
 
The wealth of information regarding Zhang Zhidong enables me to study his ideas, actions and 
preoccupations in detail. Through systematically reading the Zhang Zhidong archives, I aim to 
reconstruct the changes in Zhang’s relations to the central government in the last decade of the 
nineteenth century. Seeing from a provincial perspective, limiting my research to a less than a ten-year 
period and utilizing Chinese sources that have not been fully explored by previous studies, my study of 
Zhang Zhidong’s government in late Qing China is a global microhistory following Tonio Andrade’s 
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call for microhistorical and biographical approaches.57 What is global in the study is that I question the 
effect of a global force, the high imperialism in the late nineteenth century, on local strutures. How did 
Euro-American and later Japanese imperialism change the political structures of late Qing China? I ask. 
What is micro in the study is my research method. From close reading of a set of archives from a short 
period of time, and other relevant primary sources, I have reconstructed the activities of Zhang Zhidong 
and his government officials. Their activities of negotiating military resources, treaties, reparations, 
loans, railway concessions, and their power struggles with other political bodies under increasing 
imperialist pressure reveal connections between the local, the central and the global.  
 
By following a global history approach and ask the question how imperialism affected late Qing 
central-provincial relations, I am aware that I have privileged connections and assumed the importance 
of external factors.58 This does not mean that I see the external factor in the thesis, imperialism, as the 
only factor or a decisive factor that changed late Qing political structure. Long-term genealogies and 
internal factors are also important. The specific organisation and power relationship of the central 
government, provincial governments and local governments in late Qing China were the premise of the 
structural changes brought by imperialism. However, the aim of highlighting imperialism’s effect is to 
bring imperialism to the study of political structure in late Qing China since previous studies about 
imperialism in China mostly focus on economic, social or cultural effects. I am also aware that a global 
history approach may privilege large scales and downplay local agency59 and this is why I choose to 
write a microhistory and a “history in the sense of historicity”, as advocated by Arif Dirlik facing the 
                                                
57 Tonio Andrade. "A Chinese Farmer, Two African Boys, and a Warlord: Toward a Global Microhistory." Journal of 
World History 21, no. 4 (12, 2010): 573-591; For discussions about global microhistory, see the articles in “Global History 
and Microhistory” Past and Present Vol. 242, Issue Supplement_14, November 2019. 
58 For limits of global history, see Sebastian Conrad. What Is Global History? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 
223-235. 
59 For limits of global history, see Conrad. What Is Global History?, 223-235.  
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challenge of postmodernism.60 By following a microhistory method and firmly situating the thesis in 
indigenous sources, specified time and place, the nuances of the connections are saved. There are 
activities of not only key historical figures like Zhang Zhidong, Sheng Xuanhuai and Weng Tonghe but 
also many historically obscure figures, such as Zhao Fengchang, Liang Dunyan, Gu Hongming, Fan 
Fen (Fan Shixun), Cai Xiyong, Wang Binen, etc. Their activities are rarely recorded in other sources, 
and some of them don’t have a biography or any writings survived. However, detail depiction of their 
activities in the thesis highlights their agency and significance. They didn’t just feel the impact of the 
global force of imperialism; they served as agency of structural change. It is due to their activities that 
the central-provincial relation ran into fragmentation facing increasing Euro-American and Japanese 
imperialism.  
 
This thesis contributes both to the scholarship on Zhang and on central–provincial relations in the late 
Qing dynasty. Daniel Bays discussed the nature of provincial political authority focusing on Zhang’s 
activities in Guangdong (1884–1889).61 This thesis extends the discussion to Zhang’s later political 
career. After analysing Zhang’s government in Hubei in 1893 and the effect of the First Sino-Japanese 
War on his government, it argues that Zhang’s power in his governing provinces was limited and that 
his relationship with the central government was deteriorating with increasing foreign aggressions on 
China in the final decade of the nineteenth century. Ironically, this process of political fragmentation 
did not result from the direct working of imperialism but Chinese struggle against imperialism. In the 
process of resisting imperialism, such as importing and transporting western weapons, seeking foreign 
loans, recruiting and transporting troops, manufacturing western weapons, negotiating treaties, 
reparations and loans, and railway concessions, Zhang Zhidong was in conflicts with local officials, 
                                                
60 Arif Dirlik, Postmodernity’s Histories: The Past as Legacy and Project (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 
112. 
61 Daniel H. Bays, "The Nature of Provincial Political Authority in Late Ch'ing Times: Chang Chih-tung in Canton, 1884-
1889", Modern Asian Studies 4, no. 4 (1970): 325-347. 
Mu Zhang 39 
 39 
other provincial governments and the central government, which in turn, damanged political relations 
of Zhang’s government to local governments, provincial governments and the central government. The 
thesis problematizes politics in the study of Euro-American and Japanese imperialism in China and 
problematizes imperialism in the study of Chinese politics, especially central-provincial relations. 
Seeing Euro-American and Japanese imperialism as an important factor affecting central-provincial 
relations in China in the last decade of the nineteenth century uncovers the dynamics of imperialism in 
China and leads one step towards a better understanding of the recent Chinese past and contemporary 
China. 
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Chapter Summaries  
 
Chapter 1 is the introduction of the thesis which includes literature review and summary of all the 
chapters. The chapters are arranged more or less chronologically: chapter 2 and chapter 3 cover the 
period before the first Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895); chapter 4 covers the time during the first Sino-
Japanese war; chapter 5 and chapter 6 are about the negotiations after the war; chapter 7 focuses on the 
period of the Hundred Days' Reform (1898) and chapter 8 covers the time during the Boxer movement 
(1900). By arranging the chapters chronologically, I hope to highlight the changes in Zhang Zhidong’s 
relation to the central government during the period of my study. I choose the first Sino-Japanese war 
as the first significant event that I deal with in my thesis because as I discussed before, China’s defeat 
in the first Sino-Japanese war changed China’s policy to a completely defensive posture. Japanese 
imperialism exemplified in the first Sino-Japanese war also embodies the high imperialism in the late 
nineteenth century. Moreover, the following chapters in my thesis will show that the first Sino-
Japanese war was a crucial moment in late Qing history and many things, including central-provincial 
relations, changed after the war. The thesis ends with the Boxer movement (1900) because “The 
Mutual Protection of Southeast China” during the Boxer movement indicates a big breakdown of 
central-provincial relations in the late Qing. Whether the broken central-provincial relations were 
restored or deteriorated after 1900 can be the topic of another research project.  
 
In order to study how imperialism (particularly in my thesis, the first Sino-Japanese war, the 
subsequent scramble of concessions and the foreign military pressures during the Boxer movement) 
changed Zhang Zhidong’s relation to the central government, it is necessary to study Zhang Zhdong’s 
government and its relation to the central government before the first Sino-Japanese war. In Chapter 2, 
I will first start with some background information, including Zhang Zhidong’s early life and career, 
his actions as the governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi during the Sino-French war (1884-
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1885), his view of liquan (sovereign right to profit), a central concept in his political thought which 
influenced his decisions and motivated him to establish many self-strengthening projects in 
Guangdong. The latter half of Chapter 2 is devoted to a case study of Zhang Zhidong’s actions in 
dealing with a missionary case in Hubei. The case study is to illustrate Zhang’s governmental principle 
– his determination to guard his “sovereign right to govern” from foreign influences.  
 
Chapter 3 is a structural analysis of Zhang Zhidong’s provincial government in Hubei, including his 
government’s organizational units and the sources and distribution of government revenues. The 
structural analysis of Zhang’s government will illustrate its relation, especially financial relation to the 
central government. The distribution of revenues between Zhang’s provincial government and the 
central government is an important issue in central-provincial relations and my subsequent chapters 
will touch on this issue from different aspects.  
 
During the first Sino-Japanese war, Zhang Zhidong moved from Hubei to Jiangsu and transferred from 
the governor-general of Hubei and Hunan to the governor-general of Jiangsu, Anhui and Jiangxi. This 
move resulted in him managing a critical logistic base in southeast China providing logistics support to 
the front line at the north during the war. Chapter 4 shows how his Jiangsu government operated during 
the war. By highlighting the difficulties that Zhang faced in Jiangsu and the conflicts between Zhang’s 
government and other governments (including the central government and other provincial 
governments) during the first Sino-Japanese war regarding importing and transporting weapons and 
ammunition, seeking loans to buy weapons, and transporting and recruiting troops, this chapter shows 
how the first Sino-Japanese war enlarged the divergence between Zhang Zhidong and the central 
government.  
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After the war, Zhang Zhidong returned to Hubei and became the governor-general of Hubei and Hunan 
again. In Chapter 5, I will discuss Zhang’s resistance in the opening of Suzhou and Shashi according to 
the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), in accepting the loan conditions for the 200, 000, 000 silver taels 
war indemnity and in the scramble for concessions followed by the German occupation of Kiaochow in 
late 1897. All his remarks and actions regarding post-war negotiations, treaties, reparations and loans 
reveal a deeper divergence between him and the central government after the war. The conflict between 
provincial governors and the central government was not accidental and was not confined to Zhang 
Zhidong and the central government. Liu Kunyi, the governor-general of Jiangsu, Anhui and Jiangxi, 
also resisted following the loan conditions for the 200, 000, 000 silver taels war indemnity. China’s 
defeat in the first Sino-Japanese war and the Treaty of Shimonoseki, as Zhang Zhidong pointed out, 
had undermined China’s basis for growth. Neither the provincial governments nor the central 
government wanted to bear the heavy war indemnity and other pressure brought by the defeat. 
Consequently, the divergence between Zhang Zhidong and the central government catalysed. 
 
Chapter 6 discusses the disagreement between Zhang Zhidong and the central government in the 
scramble for railway concessions after the German occupation of Kiaochow. In the negotiations of 
various railway loans, we could see that Zhang and the central government again disagreed on various 
matters. Although Zhang and the central government agreed that building railways was crucial in 
saving China, they had different plans regarding which railway to build and from which country to 
borrow money. By examining the negotiations of various railway loans, I will show that Zhang 
Zhidong had little influence on the central government’s policy especially after 1897, and as a result, 
Zhang started to withdraw to his governing provinces (why Zhang had lost influence on the central 
government will be discussed in chapter 7). Other prominent figures, such as Sheng Xuanhuai, Li 
Hongzhang, Zhang Yinhuan, Weng Tonghe and later Rong Lu had more say in building railways in 
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China. This chapter will also examine Zhang Zhidong’s relationship with these prominent figures to 
illustrate Zhang’s changing connection to the central government.  
 
Chapter 7 focuses on how Zhang Zhidong’s relations with the central government changed in the 
Hundred Days’ Reform (1898). China’s defeat in the first Sino-Japanese war and the subsequent 
scramble of concessions made Reform urgent. However, the central government’s reform priority was 
to centralize power in its own hand and undermine the power of provincial governors. The death of a 
few significant figures in 1897 and 1898 also made the situation more complex. Political power 
struggle tangled with reform needs in the Hundred Days’ Reform. The central government’s suspicion 
and reform of provincial politics and the political purges after the failure of the Hundred Days’ Reform 
led to Zhang Zhidong’s withdrawal from central government politics. 
 
Chapter 8 examines how Zhang Zhidong together with other provincial governors and Chinese officials 
dealt with foreign encroachment during the Boxer movement. The increasing foreign military pressure 
on China both to the north and the south made Zhang choose between his governing provinces and 
Beijing regarding allocating troops and military resources. The effective communication between 
Zhang and other provincial governors in the southeast sharply contrasts with the communication 
breakdown between Zhang and Beijing during the Boxer movement. In the end, in order to save his 
governing provinces from foreign encroachment, Zhang chose to disregard Beijing’s orders and unite 
the provincial governors in southeast China to sign a “Mutual Protection of Southeast China” contract 
with Euro-American and Japanese imperialist powers. This event signifies a big breakdown of central-
provincial relations in the late Qing. 
 
Chapter 9 is the conclusion of the thesis which will provide a summary of the thesis and restate my 
research questions, arguments and thesis statement. It will highlight the thesis’s contribution to the 
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current scholarship and link my thesis to present-day understanding of China, Chinese politics and 
China’s relation to the world. Finally, it will point out further possible research questions and directions 
of research. 
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Chapter 2: Zhang Zhidong as a provincial governor-general  
 
This chapter provides some background on Zhang Zhidong, including Zhang Zhidong’s early life and 
career, his actions as the governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi during the Sino-French war 
(1884-1885), his view of liquan (sovereign right to profit), a central concept in his political thought 
which influenced his decisions and motivated him to establish many self-strengthening projects in 
Guangdong. The latter half of the chapter is devoted to a case study of Zhang Zhidong’s actions in 
dealing with a missionary case in Hubei. The case study is to illustrate Zhang’s governmental principle 
– his determination to guard his “sovereign right to govern” from foreign influences. The information 
provided in this chapter helps to explain Zhang Zhidong’s choices and actions during and after the first 
Sino-Japanese war.  
 
Zhang Zhidong’s early life and career 
 
Zhang Zhidong was born in Xingyi, Guizhou in southwest China in 1837 when his father was serving 
as the Prefect of Xingyi. His family was a prestigious scholar-official family in Nanpi, Zhili (the 
province in north China where Beijing was). His cousin, Zhang Zhiwan (1811-1897) achieved the 
highest rank in the palace civil service examination in 1847, served in the Hanlin Academy, held 
various central and provincial posts, suppressed the Nian rebellion in 1860s and worked in the Grand 
Council for eleven years (1884-1894), serving in the Ministry of War in 1882, then in the Ministry of 
Justice and Ministry of Personnel.62 Zhang Zhidong passed his early years in Xingyi prefecture and 
went to Nanpi to attend the apprentice civil service examination according to Qing examination rules 
                                                
62 Xu Tongxin, Zhang wen xiang gong nian pu [Biograph of Zhang Zhidong] (Taipei: Taiwan shang wu yin shu guan, 
1969), 6; “Biography of Yan Jingming, Zhang Zhiwan and Lu Chuanlin” in Qing shi gao lie zhuan, vol. 225, ed. Zhao 
ErXun (Taipei; Ming wen shu ju, 1985), 12385-12387. 
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and became a government student in Nanpi in 1849 at the age of 13. Three years later in 1852, he 
attended the provincial civil service examination and achieved the top place.63 
 
The next year (1853), Zhang Zhidong returned to Xingyi. It is also in this year that the Taipings 
captured Nanjing and declared it the capital of Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. During his late teenage 
years from 1853 to 1855, Zhang Zhidong was with his father dealing with military affairs. Xinyi was 
once in great danger in 1854: his father, brothers and sister-in-law Lu Chuanlin fought three days and 
nights without intermission in order to save the city from rebels.64 In late 1855, Zhang Zhidong helped 
his father and sister-in-law Lu Chuanlin fighting against the Miao Rebellion in Duyun, east Guizhou. 
He was sent back to north China by his father in November or December 1855. The second year, his 
father died after fighting against the Miao Rebellion in sickness for months. Seven days after his 
father’s death, Duyun was captured by the Miao rebels. His wife’s brother and Lu Chuanlin’s father 
and mother all died in the battle of Duyun.65 Zhang Zhidong’s close experiences of war in his late 
teenage years in some ways shaped his political thought (see discussions on his writings below).  
 
After his father’s death, Zhang Zhidong was studing military works and organizing local armies from 
1857 to 1862. These years were turbulent years in Chinese history. The Arrow War started and British 
and French armies occupied Canton (Guangzhou) in 1857. The treaty of Tianjin was signed in 1858. 
The British and French armies occupied Beijing, burned the Summer Palace and the treaty of Beijing 
                                                
63 Xu Tongxin, Zhang Wen xiang gong nian pu, 1-4. 
64 Mei Yingjie, “Hu wen zhong gong nian pu [Biography of Hu Linyi],” in Hunan ren wu nian pu, vol. 3, ed. Xiong Zhiqi 
(Changsha Shi: Hunan ren min chu ban she, 2013), 42-50; Xu Tongxin, Zhang Wen xiang gong nian pu, 3-5; “Biography of 
Han Cao” in Qing shi gao lie zhuan, vol. 207, ed. Zhao ErXun (Taipei; Ming wen shu ju, 1985), 12139-12142. 
65 Xu Tongxin, Zhang wen xiang gong nian pu, 5-8; “Biography of Zhang Ying” in Da Qing Ji Fu Xian Zhe Zhuan, vol. 4, 
ed. Xu Shichang (Taipei, Ming wen shu ju, 1985), 45-46; “Biography of Yan Jingming, Zhang Zhiwan and Lu Chuanlin”, 
12387. 
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was signed in 1860.66 In his early twenties, Zhang was troubled by the current political situation and 
worried about the fate of the dynasty.67   
 
Zhang Zhidong’s political career started when he achieved the third-highest rank in the palace 
examination and became a member of the Hanlin Academy in 1863 at the age of 27. He then worked at 
various posts supervising education and civil service examinations in Zhejiang, Sichuan and Hubei.68 
In 1876, Zhang Zhidong returned to Beijing from Sichuan. In 1879, the Ili crisis broke out (the dispute 
between Russia and China over Ili, an area in Xinjiang at the northwest frontier of the Qing empire). 
His solutions to this crisis were 1) training troops, 2) raising funds for armies and 3) recruiting and 
promoting officers based on ability. He did not think that it was necessary to fight the Russians, but 
training troops and displaying the power of the Qing empire was necessary for a reasonable peace 
treaty between Russia and the Qing. The most crucial was recruiting and promoting talented 
individuals to train troops and raise funds. He suggested that the emperor should not follow 
conventional processes and should recruit officers with all kinds of ability (including officers who 
knew western technologies): even if some officers not always abided rules, they should still be put into 
use as long as they were exceptional in one area.69 
 
Like most Qing officials, Zhang fiercely criticized the Treaty of Livadia (1879, Treaty of Ili in 
Chinese) signed by Chonghou, disregarded its validity and requested the Qing court to abolish this 
treaty and make another treaty with Russia. Among all the treaty articles, he was especially sensitive to 
commercial affairs. He regarded Article 14, which allowed Russian businessmen to not only travel 
                                                
66 Xu Tongxin, Zhang wen xiang gong nian pu, 5-8; Wu Jianjie, Zhang Zhidong nian pu chang bian [Detail biography of 
Zhang Zhidong] (Shanghai Shi: Shanghai jiao tong da xue chu ban she, 2009), 20-25. 
67 Xu Tongxin, Zhang wen xiang gong nian pu, 7. 
68 Ibid, 14. 
69 Zhang Zhidong quanji [Complete works of Zhang Zhidong], vol. 1, ed. Zhao Dexin (Wuhan: Wuhan chu ban she, 2008), 
23-27; Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 1, 31-33; Direct quote is in Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 1, 27. 
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along the east trade route through Tianjin into Hankow (a very important commercial town in Hubei, 
central China, present day Wuhan see Figure 1) but also along the west trade route through Jiayuguan 
into Hankow, as the most harmful article in the treaty.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Hankow (Wuhan) in China 
Source: https://www.chinadiscovery.com/assets/images/wuhan/maps/wuhan-china-map-full.jpg 
 
 
Zhang knew very well that this article was related to Chinese tea exports. If Russian businessmen could 
go to Hankow through Jiayuguan, the cost price of exporting Chinese tea would be greatly reduced for 
them since Jiayuguan in the northwest China was much closer than Tianjin to commercial centres in 
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Russia. Russian businessmen had already dominated the East trade route. If they also dominated the 
west trade route, Chinese businessmen would have lost all their livelihood. It was also potentially 
harmful to let the Russians travel throughout northwest China into Hankow. Zhang agreed with Zuo 
Zongtang’s suggestion to set up Chinese companies bringing tea from Hankow to Jiayuguan and only 
allow Russian businessmen to buy tea there. In addition, he suggested giving Chinese tea transport 
companies tax deductions enjoyed by foreign companies in order to make their tea prices in Jiayuguan 
competitive. Zhang and Zuo’s suggestions were adopted. In the newly signed Treaty of St. Petersburg 
(1881), Article 14 only allowed Russian businessmen to travel through Tianjin along the east trade 
route.70 Zhang’s position in the Ili crisis shows that he had already developed the idea of economic 
competition with foreigners and was determined to support Chinese businessmen in the competition.  
 
In 1882, Zhang Zhidong became the governor of Shanxi. The first thing that he did was to shake up the 
bureaucracy: in four months, nine officials were impeached. The next year, another nine were 
impeached. During his two years and three months in Shanxi, in total 25 officials were impeached 
because of their corruption or inability. Then Zhang reduced many government expenses and set up a 
Qingyuan Bureau, with officials completely appointed by him, to clear up government debts. The 
Qingyuan Bureau later incorporated many fiscal-related bureaus and was basically in charge of all 
aspects of government finance.71 Through restructuring government financial institutions and 
establishing the Qingyuan Bureau, Zhang was able to concentrate power over fiscal issues in his own 
hands.  
                                                
70 For the importance of Hankow, see William T. Rowe, Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796-1889 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1984) and William T. Rowe, Hankow: Conflict and Community in a Chinese 
City, 1796-1895 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1989). For Zhang’s view on the west trade route, see Zhang 
Zhidong quanji, vol. 1, 33-34; Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 1, 39-41. For Treaty of Livadia (1879) and Treaty of St. 
Petersburg (1881), see Taipei National Palace Museum. “Ch’ing Dynasty Treaties and Agreements Preserved by the 
Ministry of Forign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan)”, accessed 8 October 2018, 
http://npmhost.npm.gov.tw/ttscgi/npmkm3/ttswebx?@0:0:1:npmcpkm@@0.05226543739069767.  
71 Chen Cungong, “Zhang Zhidong in Shanxi, 1882-1884,” Bulletin of The Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica 17, 
no. 2 (1988): 8-14; Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 5, 27-34. 
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He then went on to promote agricultural production for the livelihood of the people, build more 
schools, and train armies.72 His still stressed economic and military matters. Zhang wrote: “the way to 
govern a country is always about managing finance and training armies, and the two are related. 
Without enough wealth, armies cannot be sustained; without armies to defend frontiers, not enough 
food can be produced”.73 To use the well-known slogan, Zhang was in search of wealth and power.74 
 
As early as in 1881, Zhang paid attention to the self-strengthening movement and was keen to duplicate 
the Tianjin model (led by Li Hongzhang) in Shanxi.75 In April 1882, he wrote:  
 
self-strengthening is fundamental to jingguo (governing a nation) and the first step to self-
strengthening is training officers. … Dealing with foreign affairs is a top priority. … In 
relations between China and foreign countries, commercial affairs are fundamental, military 
affairs and warfare are the means, treaties are the regulations, knowing the resources, business, 
territory, government and laws, scholarship, armed forces and weaponry of all the countries, 
and the international law are the basics, and the path to knowing all of these is understanding 
foreign languages.76 
 
The above passage shows that Zhang had realized the importance of western learning, including 
western languages, western scholarship, geography, economy, politics, laws, military organization and 
                                                
72 Chen Cungong, “Zhang Zhidong in Shanxi, 1882-1884”, 15-24. 
73 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 1, 145. 
74 The slogan “fuqiang (wealth and power)” can be seen everywhere in late Qing literature. In English scholarship, it was 
first brought forward by Benjamin I. Schwartz’s famous book Benjamin I. Schwartz, In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen 
Fu and the West. 
75 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 12, 20; Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 5, 20. 
76 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 5, 20. Notice the difference between my translation and the translation in Ayers, Chang Chih-
tung and educational reform in China, 104. 
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technology, and the international law. In Shanxi, he issued a call for all people who knew Western 
knowledge to join his government. Fiscal and military issues still occupied his mind when he was in 
Shanxi. He planned to train armies to use western weapons. In order to support local iron production 
and sales, he suggested permitting iron export from Shanxi through the sea route (as with foreign 
iron).77 He also planned to set up coal mining and iron and steel works to compete with foreign iron in 
the market, a new bureau to cast copper coins and a Foreign Affairs Bureau.78 
 
Zhang Zhidong in Guangdong during the Sino-French war (1884-1885) 
 
Zhang Zhidong’s ambitious plan in Shanxi was interrupted in 1884 when he was promoted to be the 
governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi in the middle of the Sino-French war (1884-1885), the 
conflict between France and the Qing empire over Vietnam, the Qing empire’s major tributary state in 
the south.79 As soon as he arrived in Guangdong, Zhang was occupied with organizing defence against 
the French. On 5 August 1884, French gunboats attacked Keelung, Taiwan. Later, the French occupied 
the Keelung forts and started to blockade Taiwan. On 23 August, French gunboats bombarded 
Foochow (present day Fuzhou) shipyard in south-east China, destroying the Qing Southern-Sea fleet 
and the shipyard completely.80 During the Sino-French war, Zhang sent Tang Jingsong to get in contact 
with the Black Flag Army led by Liu Yongfu against the French in Vietnam, and supported Liu’s Black 
Flag Army with money, troops and weapons. Zhang also supported Qing armies in Vietnam and 
Taiwan with money and weapons.81 In addition, with Zhang’s support, Feng Zicai was able to take ten 
battalions from Guangxi into Vietnam against the French. Feng’s army later won the battle of 
                                                
77 Wu, Jianjie, Zhang Zhidong nian pu chang bian, 100, 109, 112. 
78 Chen Cungong, “Zhang Zhidong in Shanxi, 1882-1884”, 18-19, 37-30; Xu Tongxin, Zhang Wen xiang gong nian pu, 38-
41; Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 5, 20. 
79 Xu Tongxin, Zhang Wen xiang gong nian pu, 38-41. 
80 Eastman, Lloyd E, Throne and Mandarins: China's Search for a Policy during the Sino-French Controversy, 1880-1885, 
Harvard Historical Studies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), 145-158. 
81 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 12, 508-509; Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 7, 273-305; Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 4, 247-367; 
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Zhennanguan at the Chinese border on 24 March 1885 and marched further into Vietnam forcing the 
French to retreat from Lang-Son (Liang Shan), which brought the downfall of Jules Ferry on 30 March 
1885. Soon China and France agreed to start negotiations and the Sino-French War ended in early 
April.82  
 
However, Zhang was quite disappointed and troubled by the situation that he faced after the Sino-
French war. Against his wishes, all Qing armies had to retreat from Vietnam in ten days in exchange 
for France’s withdrawal from Taiwan according to the peace treaty negotiated by Robert Hart, 
Inspector-General of China's Imperial Maritime Customs Service (IMCS) and signed between China 
and France on 4 April 1885.83 The Qing court signed this treaty favourable to France because of the 
increasing Japanese aggression in Korea and the fear of a Franco-Japanese alliance.84 Thus despite of 
all Zhang’s effort fighting against the French, Vietnam was still lost to France. Zhang also argued in 
vain about the articles regarding the definition of the Sino-Vietnamese border and the Sino-French 
trade agreements in the formal treaty signed by Li Hongzhang in Tianjin.85 
 
Furthermore, in supporting Liu Yongfu, Feng Zicai and other Qing armies in Vietnam and Taiwan 
against the French, Zhang Zhidong constantly found himself in short of money. He needed lots of 
resources to sustain the operations of the armies and buy western weapons, yet the money left in the 
government of Guangdong was far from enough. In order to solve the problem, he suggested borrowing 
money from foreign banks. His suggestion was approved by the Qing court and in total his government 
borrowed nine million silver taels (two million had been borrowed by the previous governor-general). 
                                                
82 Lloyd E. Eastman, Throne and Mandarins, 171-189; Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 7, 284; Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 12, 
508-509; Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 12, 36-39. 
83 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 4, 367-369; Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 7, 305-308, 313, 317; For Hart’s role in the Sino-
French war, see Van De Ven, Hans, Breaking with the Past: The Maritime Customs Service and the Global Origins of 
Modernity in China (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2014), 112-116. 
84 Lloyd E. Eastman, Throne and Mandarins, 198-200. 
85 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 7, 319; Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 4, 370-380; 
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Among the nine million silver taels, five million was agreed to be repaid by his government and four 
million repaid by all the provincial governments.86 However, in May 1886, Zhang found out in 
astonishment that Ministry of Revenue required his government to repay all the nine million silver 
taels.87 At that time, the annual fiscal deficit of Zhang’s government was already more than three 
million. Even with all his proposed efforts to reduce the fiscal deficit, there was still more than one 
million deficit left.88  
 
Even worse was the Customs Service’s replacement of Qing provincial governments in collecting tax 
on foreign opium imports (both duty and likin, a transit tax on commodities). This was negotiated by 
Robert Hart and Campbell during the Sino-French war and became effective in early 1887. It was 
approved by the Qing court because all the foreign opium tax collected by the Customs Service would 
be transferred directly to the central government and Hart promised that the Foreign Opium tax would 
increase the central government’s revenue by seven to eight million taels annually. So Zhang had to 
submit the power of collecting Foreign Opium tax at barriers near Macao and Hong Kong in his 
governing provinces to the Customs. Hart later even demanded that the Customs replace Zhang’s 
government in collecting the regular tax on all the goods passing the barriers near Macao and Hong 
Kong.89 Zhang’s experience of war, and the post-war struggles over fiscal issues between China and 
Western countries in Guangdong greatly impacted Zhang’s political thought.  
 
Liquan in Zhang Zhidong’s political thought 
  
                                                
86 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 12, 508; Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 7, 327; Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 1, 324-325. 
87 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 12, 31.  
88 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 1, 407-411, 469-470. 
89 Circular No. 352, 356, 358 in Documents illustrative of the Origin, Development, and Activities of the Chinese Customs 
Service, vol. 1:  Inspector General's Circulars 1861 to 1892 (Shanghai: Statistical Dept. of the Inspectorate General of 
Customs, 1937-1940), 6512-527; Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 4, 397-398; Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 7, 391-392; Zhang 
Zhidong quanji, vol. 12, 60-62. 
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The concept of “liquan (sovereign right to profit)” was central in Zhang’s political thought. 
“Sovereignty” is a western concept but it began to intertwine with the Chinese concept of “liquan” 
during the 1870s and 1880s in China.90. I have already shown Zhang’s sensibility to economic issues 
and his knowledge of the connection between wealth and power. His experience during and after the 
Sino-French war, the difficult situations that he faced due to lack of money, only confirmed to him that 
fiscal issues were central and he needed to use every means possible to increase government revenues. 
This brought him into conflict with the Imperial Maritime Customs and he saw this conflict as a 
struggle between China and foreign powers over liquan. 
 
“Liquan” was not a new concept in Chinese: it had a long history that can be traced back to the 
Confucian classic Zuo’s commentary.91 Huang Zongxi (1610-1695) and Gu Yanwu (1613-1682), two 
great Confucian scholars during the Ming-Qing Cataclysm, had used this term to criticize the absolute 
power of the emperor over economic affairs. Huang wrote that not the emperor but tianxia (all under 
heaven) should enjoy liquan in Ming yi dai fang lu and Gu wrote that prefectures and counties should 
enjoy liquan in Ri zhi lu.92 These two scholars appeared as the first two jingji (generally means politics 
and economics) scholars in Zhang Zhidong’s Answers to Questions on Bibliography (1874) and their 
major jingji works were also listed.93 Therefore, Zhang was aware of the struggle between the emperor 
and tianxia (or prefectures and counties) over liquan discussed in Confucian scholarship. After the First 
Opium War (1839–1842), Chinese scholars realized that the players in struggles over liquan extended 
to include foreigners too. In Haiguo Tuzhi (Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms, 1843), also 
                                                
90 For the concept of sovereignty in China and how liquan became connected with the concept of sovereignty, see Stephen 
Halsey, Quest for Power: European imperialism and the making of Chinese statecraft (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2015), 5-11. 
91 “The 23rd year of Xianggong” in Zuo's Commentary. 
92 “Yuanjun” in Huang Zongxi, Ming yi dai fang lu; “Shouling” in Gu Yanwu, Ri zhi lu, vol 9. For the concept of “tianxia”, 
see Wang Ban, ed., Chinese Visions of World Order: Tianxia, Culture, and World Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2017); Wang Mingming, ““All under Heaven” (tianxia): Cosmological Perspectives and Political Ontologies in Pre-modern 
China,” HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 2, no. 1 (2012): 337-383. 
93 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 12, 264, 266, 303.  
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listed in the Answers to Questions on Bibliography, Weiyuan commented on the British Empire’s 
expansion into India: “liquan in the Indian Ocean has been mostly in its hands now”.94 The situation in 
China was even more complex. With the foreign-staffed Imperial Maritime Customs collecting taxes 
for the central government, the battle over liquan between China and foreign powers intriguingly also 
manifested the power struggle between provincial governments and the central government over 
control of taxation. The central government, no matter for what reasons, entrusted Chinese taxation to 
the Customs, but Zhang as the governor-general of a provincial government obviously did not trust the 
Customs. He bitterly opposed the Customs collecting foreign opium tax in Guangdong: “the Customs 
collecting duty and likin damages liquan.” Zhang reported to the Zongli Yamen and Li Hongzhang.95  
 
In 1885, two months after the end of the Sino-French war, Zhang Zhidong submitted a memorial to the 
throne regarding coastal defence. The first sentence in this memorial was “the basis of self-
strengthening is to have sovereign right and endless resources”. He then listed three things to achieve 
self-strengthening: 1) train officers to be proficient in western military technology, 2) manufacture 
arms, 3) establish coal, iron and steel works. Zhang believed that the three things were crucial in 
preserving sovereign right and they reinforced each other: “officers proficient in western military 
technology produce fine arms; coal, iron and steel support the production of abundant arms; military, 
coal, iron and steel works provide opportunities for those officers to make the best use of their ability”. 
A striking feature of this memorial was the amount of details that it displayed. Officers were to be 
trained in not only engineering subjects but also basic science, such as mathematics, physics and 
chemistry. Discussions on the advantage and disadvantage of various arms not only cover all kinds of 
guns and cannons, but also all types of sea mines, gunboats, gun powders and explosives, and strategies 
                                                
94 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 12, 255; Wei Yuan, Haiguo Tuzhi [Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms], vol. 52. 
in Wei Yuan quan ji [The complete works of Wei Yuan] (Hunan: Yue lu shu she, 2004), vol. 6. 
95 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 4, 397. 
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and tactics in using these arms. Discussions on iron and steel works covered many detail plans 
throughout the production process, from prospecting, to investigating the chemical constituents of coal 
to types of iron-smelting furnaces.96 These details shows that Zhang was prepared and ready to start up 
his own self-strengthening projects. 
 
Zhang Zhidong’s self-strengthening advisors and projects in Guangdong  
 
Where did Zhang Zhidong get this kind of very specialized knowledge? The memorial revealed that he 
sometimes telegraphed Qing diplomats in foreign countries to consult technical matters.97 In Shanxi, he 
cried for people who knew the West, and in Guangdong gradually he gathered some people specialized 
in western knowledge and technology. In June 1886, Zhang set up a Foreign Affairs Office just next to 
his government residence and demanded the officials in this office to read all kinds of books about 
foreign affairs, such as archives of treaties, Chinese and foreign maps, trade reports at the Treaty Ports 
published by the Imperial Maritime Customs, diaries of Qing diplomats, Wanguo Gongbao, etc. The 
director of this office was Cai Xiyong. Other officials in this office included Gu Hongming (the 
translator of German), Kuang Qizhao (the translator of English) and Zhang Maode (the translator of 
French).98 Cai Xiyong (1850-1897) had studied in Tongwen Guan, the government school teaching 
Western languages (founded in 1862 in Beijing), and worked as a translator in the Qing Embassy in the 
United States for three years.99 Gu Hongming (1857-1928) was born from a Malaysian Chinese family 
in Malaya, educated in several European countries since 13 years old, was fluent in many European 
languages (including Latin and Greek), and had a Master of Arts from Edinburgh University in 1877.100 
                                                
96 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 1, 295-298. 
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Kuang Qizhao (probably born in 1841) was educated in Hong Kong and was the English translator and 
instructor of the Chinese Educational Mission to the United States (1872-1881).101 Little information 
can be found about Zhang Maode. Liang Dunyan (1858-1924) also joined the Foreign Affairs Office in 
1887. Liang studied at the Government Central School in Hong Kong and was one of the first Qing 
students to the United States in the Chinese Education Mission (1872-1881). In the United States, he 
then studied one year in Hartford West Middle Grammar School and five years in Hartford Public High 
School from 1874 to 1878. He became a Bachelor of Arts student in Yale University in 1878 but had to 
return to the Qing empire in 1881 with still one year of study left when the Chinese Education Mission 
ended.102 Furthermore, Zhang also recruited some foreign experts while he was in Guangdong.103 The 
presence of foreign experts provided opportunities for foreign affairs officials to learn first-hand 
Western knowledge and technology directly from the foreign experts. Since foreign affairs officials 
knew both Chinese and foreign languages, Zhang could also consult them about any Western 
knowledge and technology that he was interested fairly easily. 
 
With the help of foreign affairs officers and experts, Zhang inaugurated many self-strengthening 
projects and set up Western-style schools in Guangdong. He founded iron and steel works, an arsenal, 
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copper and silver coins casting works, textile works, Torpedo School, School of Telegraphy, Naval and 
Military Officers’ School, and School of Western Arts between 1885 and 1889.104  
 
Zhang’s self-strengthening projects in Guangdong were interrupted when he was transferred from the 
governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi to the governor-general of Hubei and Hunan in 1889, 
because of his proposal to build the Lu-Han railway (the Beijing-Hankou line), a railway across north 
and south China starting from Lugou Qiao (just outside Beijing) to Hankow (a very important 
commercial town in Hubei, central China, discussed before).105 He suggested building the Beijing-
Hankou line to transport native goods so that native goods could compete with foreign goods and the 
Qing empire could regain liquan. He noticed a trade deficit in recent years of the Qing empire of more 
than twenty million silver taels, and he believed that the only remedy was to promote the sales of native 
goods - “this is the Kingly Way to nourish the people and establish a country”.106 Moreover, he saw the 
establishment of coal, iron and steel works as the first step to railway building because he insisted on 
protecting Chinese liquan and rejected the use of foreign iron.107  
 
Zhang Zhidong’s actions in dealing with missionary cases 
 
Zhang Zhidong not only strived to protect liquan (sovereign right to profit) from foreign encroachment 
as discussed before, but also determined to keep his sovereign right to govern in his provinces by 
minimising foreign influence. Zhang’s actions in the 1891 missionary riots show this priority. 
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In 1891, rumors and pamphlets about missionaries killing Chinese people and Chinese babies were 
spread all over China, especially along the Yangtze river where the missionaries were quite active. 
They did not come out of nowhere but from years and years of circulation. Wei Yuan’s Haiguo Tuzhi 
(Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms), published in 1843, says that “in foreign markets, 100 
catties of Chinese lead will yield 8 catties of silver; the other 92 catties can still be sold in their original 
price. But only Chinese eyes will make the lead silver; eyes of foreigners will not do the trick, just as 
the fact that opium was only sold in China, not in foreign countries”.108 In 1862, anti-missionary 
placards and pamphlets already appeared in Hunan.109 In May and June 1891, properties of French 
Roman Catholic missions and other foreign properties in Wuhu, Danyang, Wuxi,  Jinkui, Yanghu, 
Jiangyin, Rugao, etc. were burnt down.110 These were not the first wave of riots nor the last one. Anti-
missionary and anti-foreign riots broke out in China as early as in 1847 and continued throughout the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century, culminating at the Boxer movement in 1900.111  
 
 
On 6 June 1891, at 3:40 pm, the British Consul in Hankow, G. T. Gardner, received a telegram informing 
him that a riot broke out in Wuhsueh on 5th of June. Wuhsueh was a port but not a treaty port which was 
112 miles from Hankow on the Yangtze river (see Figure 2). Two foreigners had been killed and the 
American gunboat Palos was going to the port. Gardner immediately passed this message by telegram 
to Commander Burr of the British gunboat Porpoise which was in Hankow and notified the Hankow 
Customs Taotai Kong Qinfu.112 He asked Commander Burr to stay in Hankow since Palos was on her 
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way to Wuhsueh, and learned from Kong at 7 pm that a Chinese warship and two officials were going to 
Wuhsueh to quell the riot.113 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Wuhsueh and its distance from Hankow, Wuchang and Kiukiang 
Source: Created by the author using Google Map 
 
The next day around noon, Gardner received three English ladies and their children who survived from 
the riot, and two Chinese eye-witnesses whose “clothes were still stained with the blood of the murdered 
men”. The English ladies had been badly beaten. From them he knew that the foreigners killed were both 
British, Mr. Argent, a Wesleyan missionary, and Mr. Green, a British Customs officer in Hankow, on 
duty at Wuhsueh. Gardner also learned that the local officials in Wuhsueh were not very helpful in 
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rescuing the foreigners and quelling the riot. Only one local official, Tso Pai-ching was trying to save 
Mr. Green. He was beaten too and his official residence had been burned down by the mob. Another 
local official, Chen Peizhou, had "turned out the ladies and children when they tried to enter his premises 
for protection". The Prefect of Wuhsueh had refused Tso Pai-ching twice to send men to suppress the 
riot. The Chinese Customs officer, Hua Pingsan, had "refused to take steps to have the corpses brought 
to the "Te Ching" to be brought to Hankow to be buried". 
 
The next day, Gardner visited Commander Burr on the Porpoise to ask him to get the gunboat “ready to 
steam at a short notice”. Then he took the depositions of the English ladies and the two Chinese men at 
7 am. According to the depositions, the riot started because a Chinese man was carrying four Chinese 
female babies. Some people questioned him and suspected that these babies were taken to the 
missionaries to be made into medicine. So they took him to Tso Pai-ching’s official residence and 
attacked him when he came out of the residence. They attacked the Wesleyan Mission which was next 
to Tso Pai-ching’s official residence and broke into Mrs. Protheroe’s and Mrs. Boden’s house too. Mr. 
Argent and Mr. Green came to help but were killed.114 Zhang Zhidong soon learnd of the riot from Taotai 
Kong Qinfuthe. He immediately sent a commission, consisting of Yu Geng and Li Fangyu, to Wuhsueh 
to investigate the riot.115  
 
At 10:40 am, Gardner went to see Taotai Kong Qinfu who was with one of Zhang’s secretaries. He called 
the riot a “murder”, a “criminal design” of the man with four babies, blamed the Chinese officials in 
Wuhsueh, and urged Taotai Kong Qinfu to ensure the safety of the British subjects in the province, 
especially those in Kwang-chi. Taotai Kong Qinfu assured Gardner that there was no danger in Kwang-
                                                
114 “No. 17” in China No. 3 (1891), 17-20. 
115 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 5, 251. 
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chi since the Magistrate in Kwang-chi was confident enough to leave Kwang-chi to Wuhsueh to quell 
the riot.  
 
Gardner then suggested going to Wuhsueh in the “Porpoise”. Taotai Kong Qinfu and Zhang’s secretary 
“both strenuously objected”. Gardner then wanted to send a deputy to Wuhsueh. Taotai Kong Qinfu 
rejected his request again. Gardner was angry and said to Taotai Kong Qinfu: “we must secure the safety 
of my countrymen and women. If by an unobjectionable -  well, if an unobjectionable - scheme could 
not be found, then I must adopt one open to objection”. Gardner and Taotai Kong Qinfu finally agreed to 
send a Chinese official accompanying David Hill, the head of the Wesleyan missionary, to Wuhsueh. At 
the end of the meeting, Gardner told Taotai Kong Qinfu that he had asked the “Palos” to stay at Wuhsueh 
and he added: “there are now in the river gun-vessels of four nations. Suppose four of the captains in 
their anger burnt a Chinese town down, China could not fight four European nations. … It would sacrifice 
lives in the present to save them in future”. Taotai Kong Qinfu and the secretary assured Gardner again 
that they would do everything in their power to protect the Europeans. 
 
Gardner’s message had to be passed to Zhang Zhidong very quickly by Taotai Kong Qinfu. On the next 
day, Zhang wrote a letter to Kwang-chi Magistrate, Peng Guangxin, sending two more generals with 
more troops and ships to quell the riot. Zhang also urged Peng to catch the chief rioters within a month.116 
At this moment, it was already four days after the riot. The mob had dispersed long ago. Zhang’s decision 
to send more troops and ships to Wuhsueh was probably not because of fear of further riots but fear of 
Gardner’s further actions”.117 
 
                                                
116 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 5, 251-252. 
117 “No. 17, p. 23, No. 19” in China No. 3 (1891), 24. 
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The riot was caused by a mob stirred by suspicions of missionaries killing Chinese babies to make 
medicine, and Mr. Argent and Mr. Green were probably both stoned to death by many people. The 
Chinese local official Kwang-chi Magistrate, Peng Guangxin, and Zhang’s commission, Yu Geng and Li 
Fangyu reported similar stories.118 However, there were important details on which Gardner’s deputy, 
Hill, Kwang-chi Magistrate and Zhang’s commission did not agree. Tso Pai-ching caught three rioters on 
the spot and Kwang-chi Magistrate Peng arrested another seven when he arrived Wuhsueh.119 Peng was 
one of the first Chinese officials who had interrogated the rioters and witnesses. On the 10 June, Peng 
told Hill that Mr. Argent was carrying a sword according to one witness, Tai Lin-Yu.120 In Peng’s report 
to Zhang on 12 June, he also mentioned that Mr. Argent was carrying a sword and Mr. Green was carrying 
a stick, which provoked the mob. The information must come from the initial interrogation of the rioters 
and witnesses. Hill, in his report to Gardner, was strongly against the “false fabrication” that Mr. Argent 
and Mr. Green were armed. He insisted that Mr. Argent “had nothing else” except a small black bag in 
his hand and Mr. Green “had nothing in his hand, not even a walking-stick”, according to several eye-
witnesses.121 Yu Geng, the commissioner from Zhang disagreed with Peng and informed Hill that “there 
was no truth in the statement that either Mr. Green or Mr. Argent carried swords”.122 
 
Surprisingly, the dispute between Peng and Yu was rapidly settled. The next day, Yu and Peng 
immediately submitted a joint report to Provincial Surveillance Commissioner in Hubei with the arrested 
ten rioters’ depositions, in which Guo Liushou confessed that he had killed Mr. Green with a sword and 
Dai Yanyu admitted that he had killed Mr. Argent with a sword.123  
 
                                                
118 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 5, 252-53; The Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Jiao wu jiao an dang 
[Archives of missionary cases], vol. 5 (Tai bei shi: The Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1974), 1111-1118. 
119 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 5, 252-53. 
120 “Inclosure 3 in No. 22” in China No. 3 (1891), 30. 
121 “Inclosure 4 in No. 22” in China No. 3 (1891), 32. 
122 “Inclosure 3 and 5 in No. 22” in China No. 3 (1891), 30, 32. 
123 For the rioters’ confessions, see Jiao wu jiao an dang, vol. 5, 1111-1118. 
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What is intriguing is that the witness, who saw Mr. Argent was carrying a sword, was Tai Lin-Yu. The 
name of this witness only appears in Hill’s report to Gardner in English as “Tai Lin-Yu”; it was not 
mentioned in any Chinese sources. In Chinese sources after 13 June, the chief rioter who killed Mr. 
Argent with a sword was Dai Yanyu. The pronunciation of these two names is very similar. Tai Lin-Yu 
and Dai Yanyu are obviously one person. The name of the chief rioter in Chinese characters in the joint 
report is also very obscure. The middle character “yan” is a variant character which cannot be found in 
any Chinese dictionaries. So actually, we do not even know if it is pronounced as “yan”. As a result, the 
chief rioter became 戴严鱼 (Dai Yanyu) or 戴鲶鱼 (Dai Nianyu) or 戴酽鱼 (Dai Yanyu) in later Chinese 
accounts of the riot.124 Guo Liushou’s and Dai Yanyu’s confessions in the report were also extremely 
similar with only a few words different. They were so neat and similar that they must have been edited 
by others.       
 
Tai Lin-Yu was executed later as one of the chief rioters. On 14 June, Zhang Zhidong sent another letter 
to Yu and Peng, requiring them to arrest the chief rioters within five days instead of one month125 because 
an Imperial Edict, which was the result of two joint notes from nine foreign representatives,126 had been 
issued on 13 June, calling on the authorities to immediately arrest the chief rioters of the recent anti-
missionary riots along the Yangtze river.127 
 
Hill returned to Hankow on 15 June and reported all he found to Gardner.128 Gardner was still not 
satisfied with the result of the trial. He called this riot a conspiracy and asked to interrogate the witnesses 
                                                
124 For example, in Huanggang Diqu difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui bangongshi, Edong renwuzhi (Huanggang: Huanggang 
Diqu difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui bangongshi, 1994); Hubeisheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, Hubei Sheng zhi 
(Wuhan: Hubei renmin chubanshe, 1990[2002]).  
125 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 5, 253. 
126 One was on 20 May and another on 8 June. The nine foreign countries were Belgium, France, the German Empire, Great 
Britain, Japan, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, and the United State. 
127 Zhu Jinfu, ed., Qing mo jiao an, vol. 2, 479. 
128 “Inclosure 7 in No. 22” in China No. 3 (1891), 32. 
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and rioters again to find out all the people who had involved in the riot, especially those who had robbed 
the Mission premises, who had beaten the English ladies, and who had refused to help Mr. Argent, Mr. 
Green and the English ladies. He insisted on Hill being presented in the rehearing of the rioters and told 
Zhang that he planned to let Hill and Miles to go back to Wuhsueh in an English gunboat. He accused 
Prefect of Wuhsueh and Chen Peizhou of being accessories to murder since they refused to send men to 
quell the riot and provide refuge for the English ladies. “I was surprised that they haven’t been disavowed 
and punished. I was surprised again that Yu and Peng had arrested more than twenty persons but freed 
almost all of them without thoroughly interrogating them. And I was surprised again that the 13 June 
Imperial Edict hasn’t been made public in the provinces”, wrote Gardner in his letter to Zhang Zhidong. 
 
Zhang Zhidong was furious. From the depositions and reports that he got, the Chinese officials were 
taking their jobs very seriously, whether at the riot or after the riot when questioning the witnesses and 
rioters. He did not understand why Gardner was always accusing Chinese officials of non-action or even 
murder. He stated in his letter to Gardner several times that there were fixed rules about trials in China. 
These rules cannot be exactly the same as in foreign countries. It was better not to rush for results in case 
innocent people were punished and the real criminals run away. The result of that would have been not 
to protect missionaries and foreigners but to disturb the locals and provoke more hatred to the 
missionaries and foreigners, especially at this time when rumors about burning churches were spreading 
in the province. He insisted that Hill and Miles should go to Wuhsueh with Chinese officials sent by 
Taotai Kong Qinfu, not in English gunboats.129    
 
Zhang believed that the riot was not planned by anyone but suddenly broke out due to suspicions of 
missionaries killing Chinese babies whereas Gardner worried that the riot was a conspiracy. Gardner’s 
                                                
129 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 5, 256-59. 
Mu Zhang 66 
 66 
worry was reasonable from his point of view because he noticed that anti-missionary and anti-foreign 
placards and pamphlets were spreading in Hankow and in the province.130 Zhang was also aware of the 
present situation and tried not to provoke the locals too much. Regrettably, Gardner disagreed with Zhang 
on how to deal with the situation. His distrust of Chinese officials was stubborn. He demanded or even 
threatened Zhang to let his men be involved in the trials, to investigate the riot according to his wishes 
and the rules of justice. His demand was unreasonable or even an insult to Zhang who insisted on doing 
things according to Chinese rules.  
 
Zhang was also keen to find evidence unfavourable to the foreigners. On 24 June, he asked Kwang-chi 
Magistrate, Peng Guangxin, to investigate where and why the Chinese Christian Ngo Yang got four 
babies.131 On 28 June, he appointed another person to secretly find out if Mr. Argent and Mr. Green were 
carrying swords.132 He might not believe the rumor that missionaries were killing Chinese babies to make 
medicine, but he saw the missionaries as sources of trouble on Chinese land. After hearing the Wuhsueh 
riot, he suggested the Christian orphanages at the moment not to receive Chinese children. He also made 
this suggestion to the Zongli Yamen to pass to the foreign countries. Nine foreign representatives in 
Beijing rejected this suggestion and saw it as “a certain desire to hold foreign missionaries and Christian 
converts, to a certain extent at least, responsible for what has been going on in the valley of the Yangtze 
during the last five weeks”.133  
 
In the end, Chen Peizhou was disavowed and the Prefect of Wuhsueh was transferred to another province 
though Zhang insisted in his final report to the Zongli Yamen that “it is not a punishment”. In total, 65, 
000 silver dollars were paid to the victims’ family and the Wesleyan Mission as compensation. Gardner 
                                                
130 “No. 17” in China No. 3 (1891), 16. 
131 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 5, 254. 
132 Ibid, 255. 
133 “Inclosure in No. 1328” in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1891 China, 412. 
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had his justice though he thought that it was somewhat discounted. Zhang succeeded in protecting 
officials below him and in asserting his sovereign right to govern in his provinces, preventing foreign 
military intervention.  
 
Later in July, Zhang expressed his atttitude to foreign missionalries and gunboat diplomacy through Gu 
Hongming, Zhang’s trusted private secretary. Gu, under the name “a Chinaman”, published an anti-
missionary article titled “Defensio Populi Ad Populos” (people defence for the people) in English in the 
North China Herald (later named North China Daily News), the most influential English newspaper in 
China. In this article, Gu argued that the cause of these anti-missionary riots was the missionary enterprise 
in China itself and concluded that it was time now to withdraw or, at least, modify the missionary 
enterprise in China, in the interest of both Chinese and foreigners.134  
 
However, foreign government officials and media seemed to believe that the problem was not the 
missionary enterprise but the Chinese government and the Chinese literati associated with it. Gu’s 
newspaper article triggered more than four months of debate in the form of readers’ correspondence in 
the North China Herald. Sadly, among the nineteen readers’ letters, only one agreed with Gu. Sixteen 
were against him and two were neutral.135 The North China Herald obviously did not agree with Gu. 
There was no response from Gu to the readers’ letters published in the North China Herald. Maybe Gu 
did not write a response or maybe his response had been censored by the North China Herald. Anyway, 
his relationship with the North China Herald had worsened since the publication of this article.136 In a 
                                                
134 “Defensio Populi Ad Populos” in North China Herald, 24th of July 1891.  
135 Li Shuai, “Study on the Relationship between Ku Hung-ming and The Foreign Language Paper in China (1883-1928)” 
(Master diss, Shangdong University, 2014), 20-22; The debate on Gu’s article in the North China Herald is also recorded in 
North China Herald, The anti-foreign riots in China in 1891: with an appendix (Shanghai: North China Herald, 1892), 104-
170. 
136 Li Shuai, “Study on the Relationship between Ku Hung-ming and The Foreign Language Paper in China (1883-1928), 
31-43. 
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letter written in 1916 to his friend, James Stewart Lockhart, Commissioner of British colonial Weihaiwei 
in China, Gu complained that the North China Herald had an unspoken rule not to publish his writings.137  
 
The Anti-Foreign Riots in China in 1891 (published in 1892) assembled all the leading articles on this 
subject in the North China Herald in June and July 1891. Except Gu’s article, most of the other articles 
either attributed the causes of these riots to “rebellion” or “government incapacity” or “ignorance or 
calumnies of the literati”. As an article published in the North China Herald under the name “a layman” 
claimed:  
 
It is no use to discuss whether it is right to send the missionary or not. The western world believes that it 
is right, and therefore the missionary will be sent whatever the Chinaman may think on the subject. … 
Moral worth and material power are with Christendom. Immorality, stupidity and weakness are with the 
non-Christian world. Christianity has made its home among strong and stern people. Can the issue be for 
a moment doubted? A non-Christian nation cannot organize a military force to contend with a military 
force of a Christian power, and perhaps the greatest of the many reasons of this is that a non-Christian 
nation cannot get honest officials and honest military officers.138 
 
Compare the above to what Gu wrote at the end of his article:  
 
All silly and sentimental hatreds ought, of course, to be put down. But the hatred that is just in the core 
of it, I am convinced, no amount of shells and grape shot can put down. Those who will try to do it will 
only demoralize and in the end injure themselves. The missionaries are now clamorous for gunboats, and 
would lead the foreign public to believe that the officials are merely selfish in asking foreigners not to 
make a display of gunboats in these missionary riots. But those who know the temper of the people ought, 
                                                
137 Ibid, 48. 
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I think, to tell the foreign public that the first shot from a foreign gunboat fired in a missionary cause will 
be the signal of a war not against the Government - as our foreign wars have hitherto been - but a war 
against the Chinese people. The missionaries have been loud in their denunciation of the “opium war”; 
but what will they say to a “missionary war,” of which we are now on the eve…139 
 
 
Chinese official attitudes (represented by Zhang Zhidong and Gu Hongmin) and foreign officials’ 
attitudes to missionary riots were so different that the two sides could not even communicate. Foreign 
officials accused Chinese officials of inability as a justification for foreign intervention to save the 
Chinese people from “immorality, stupidity and weakness”. Chinese officials, on the other hand, tried to 
resolve the riots as soon as possible to avoid foreign intervention, protecting Chinese sovereignty. 
 
Now I have depicted Zhang Zhidong as a Chinese official before the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-
1895) in full light. Like many Chinese officials, he dreamed of a wealthy and powerful China. He was 
determined to protect Chinese sovereign right to profit (liquan) and sovereign right to govern against 
foreign encroachment. He realized that the key to self-strengthening was recruiting officers with Western 
knowledge and technology and he started to recruit this kind of officers and set up western-style 
industries and schools in his governing provinces. All of these show that Zhang Zhidong was a Chinese 
official sensible to foreign encroachment on Chinese sovereignty in the late nineteenth century and he 
was bitterly resentful of foreign influence on Chinese economics and politics. From as early as the 1870s, 
he was trying to make China stronger through various self-strengthening projects so that China could 
protect itself from foreign encroachment.  
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As the governor-general of Hunan and Hubei, the imperialist powers’ influence on the central government 
and the Zongli Yamen troubled him since the decision that the Zongli Yamen made affected his governing 
provinces. With pressures from the imperialist powers, missionary cases that occurred locally in Zhang’s 
provinces had to be dealt with according to the imperialist powers’ wishes. This shows that the imperialist 
powers started to intervene in politics of a Chinese inland province (Hubei) in the late nineteenth century, 
and they achieved this through the agent of the central government (the Zongli Yamen). As a consequence, 
determined to protect his sovereign right to govern against foreign influences in his governing provinces, 
Zhang Zhidong would not agree with the Zongli Yamen’s decisions. Even if he could not refuse to carry 
out the Zongli Yamen’s decisions, he tried to minimize the impact of the decisions on his provinces as 
much as possible. Provincial governors no longer fully agree with nor follow the central government’s 
decisions since these decisions were perceived as being affected by pressures from the imperialist 
powers. This is how imperialism damaged central-provincial relations. In the following chapters, I will 
examine in more detail how imperialism in the last five or six years of the nineteenth century affected 
Zhang Zhidong’s relation to the central government. Before I do that, a sketch of Zhang Zhidong’s 
provincial government is necessary.   
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Chapter 3: Zhang Zhidong in Hubei 
 
This chapter provides a structural analysis of Zhang Zhidong’s provincial government in Hubei before 
the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). I will describe the various organizational units in his 
government in Hubei and examine the sources and distributions of the government revenues to 
illustrate the functions of these units. At last, I will use the Bureau of Iron Affairs as a case to expose 
more the distributions of government revenues in Zhang Zhidong’s government. Understanding the 
workings of Zhang Zhidong’s provincial government is necessary because this is the first step to 
understand the impact of a central government’s decision on Zhang’s provincial government. A 
detailed study of Zhang Zhidong’s government structure and the sources and distributions of 
government revenues also helps to clarify some issues in the debate on central-provincial relations in 
the late Qing.  
 
Zhang Zhidong’s government structure 
 
In 1889, Zhang transferred from being the Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi to the 
Governor-General of Hubei and Hunan. The iron and steel works, textile works and arsenal that Zhang 
founded in Guangdong were moved to Hubei.140 In his journey to Hubei, he was accompanided by five 
persons, four of whom were Cai Xiyong, Gu Hongming, Liang Dunyan and Zhao Fengchang.141 In 
Zhang’s government, these persons played significant roles, especially in dealing with foreign affairs and 
                                                
140 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 8, 35-38; Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 2, 409-410. 
141 Another person among the five was Ling Fupeng, see Zhao Fengchang, “Guo xue Gu Tangsheng zhuan”, renwen 
[humanites] 2, no. 4 (1931); Li Zhiming, Muliao yu shibian: “Zhao Fengchang cangzha” zhengli yanjiu chubian [Private 
secretaries and worldly changes: a preliminary study of the letters collected by Zhao Fengchang] (Shanghai: Shanghai ren 
min chu ban she, 2017), 58-59. 
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western-style projects. In the subsequent years, Zhang inaugurated more Western-style works and 
schools in Hubei. The organization of Zhang’s government in Hubei is presented in the Table 1: 
Table 1: Zhang Zhidong’s government in Hubei in 1893 
First administrations The Governor-General of Hubei and Hunan and the Governor of Hubei 
Secondary 
administrations 
The Provincial Administration Commissioner  
The Provincial Surveillance Commissioner  
HanHuangDe Taotai (Superintendent of Hankow Customs)142 
AnXiangYunJing Taotai  
JingYiShi Taotai (Superintendent of Ichang Customs) 
Salt Intendant, also Prefect of Wuchang  
Grain Intendant  
Bureaus Bureau of Rehabilitation  
Bureau of Brokerage and Likin  
Bureau of Community Self-Defence  
Bureau of Shunzhi Disaster Relief  
Bureau of Huai Salt Sales (in Hankow)  
Bureau of Chuan Salt (in Ichang)  
Bureau of Native Opium Tax  
Bureau of Atlas  
Bureau of Iron Affairs, including Mineral and Chemistry school, Self-
Strengthening Academy (with mathematics, science, language and business 
schools) 
                                                
142 For information about Taotai see Liang Yuansheng, The Shanghai taotai: linkage man in a changing society, 1843-90 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990). 
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Bureau of Guns and Artillery143 
Bureau of Arms  
Bureau of Anti-Smuggling fees  
Bureau of Textiles, including textile factory and silk factory 
Bureau of Transport (in Hunan, to transport coal from Hunan for 
ironmaking) 
Bureau of Silver Coin Casting  
Education units 
 
Academy of Hunan and Hubei  
Hubei Publishing House  
Private secretaries Including Zhao Fengchang, Gu Hongming, Liang Dunyan, Cai Xiyong, etc.  
Green Standard 
Army (Hubei 
Provincial Military 
Commander in 
charge) 
The governor-general’s command, designation of the total forces of the 
Green Standard Army controlled by a governor-general (200 troops were 
sent to suppress smuggling) and other Green Standard Army troops 
controlled by the governor, the provincial military commander and prefects 
(23 battalions in total) 
After disarmament, in 1893, there were 15,676 troops (1487 cavalry, 4298 
infantry, 9642 guards, 249 others) 
Brave battalions144 
 
Three Hong battalions (Left, Middle and Right, three companies, about 300 
troops suppressing smuggling) 
Two Sheng battalions (Left and Middle) 
Three Feng cavalry battalions (Left, Middle and Right, suppressing 
smuggling) 
                                                
143 The Bureau of Guns and Artillery later became the Hanyang Arsenal which produced the famous Hanyang Type 88 
Rifle, one of the standard rifles of the Chinese Nationalist Army during the second Sino-Japanese war. 
144 Originally these battalions rarely had Western weapons and often used old-style Rifles. In 1893, Zhang required them to 
practice using Breech-loading rifles and bought 10, 000 Western Muzzle-loading rifles to arm the battalions. 
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One Ding battalion (Middle, suppressing smuggling) 
One Defence battalion (in Wuchang) 
Five Xianghe Navy battalions and a gun boat fleet in the AnXiangYunJing 
district 
Three Tie battalions  
18 battalions in total 
Battleships Cehai Battleship (1891 disarmament from Nanyang and accepted in Hubei) 
Jinling Battleship (1891 disarmament from Nanyang and accepted in 
Hubei) 
Chucai Battleship (1891 transferred from Guangdong to Hubei) 
Note 1: The Governor-General of Hubei and Hunan and the Governor of Hubei both resided in Hubei. Power 
struggles between the two often occurred during the Qing dynasty. For example, Hu Linyi, the Governor of 
Hubei, had more power over Hubei than the Governor-General of Hubei and Hunan during the Taiping 
Rebellion. However, during Zhang’s time in Hubei, Zhang had more power over Hubei than the Governor of 
Hubei. 
Note 2: The central government required provincial governments to cut off all kinds of bureaus in 1889, but 
Zhang insisted that the three bureaus in his government (the Bureau of Rehabilitation, the Bureau of Brokerage 
and Likin and the Bureau of Community Self-Defence) were all important. Therefore, he did not cut them off. 
 
Information in the Table 1 comes from two sources: Qin ding da Qing hui dian, the largest jurisdictional 
corpus on administrative matters compiled during the Qing period, and Zhang’s administrative archive, 
especially his memorials to the throne and his communications to his subordinates in the government of 
Hubei.145 His communications demonstrate that he relied mostly on the various bureaus and the Brave 
                                                
145 Sources of the table: For Zhang Zhidong’s power in Hubei, see Su Yunfeng. Zhongguo xian dai hua de qu yu yan jiu: 
Hubei sheng, 1860-1916 [Modernisation in China: A Regional Study of Social, Political and Economic Change in Hupeh, 
1860-1916]. Bulletin of The Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica 41 (Taipei: The Institute of Modern History, 
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battalions for administrative and military matters. Bureaus and Brave battalions were new organizational 
units appearing in the provinces to strengthen the power of the governors-general or governors during 
the Taiping Rebellion. Bureaus reported directly to the governor-general or governor (thus to Zhang), 
and commanders of Brave battalions were also appointed by the governor-general or governor. A 
commander had charge of several battalions, each of which normally consisted of 500 troops and 
approximately 100 laborers, recruited and held responsible by the battalion officer. The battalions under 
a commander rarely exceeded a dozen (6000 troops)—commanders appointed by Zhang often had three 
battalions (1500 troops).146 With the exception that the newly recruited Tie battalions had regular military 
training, the rest of the battalions were busy suppressing bandits and smuggling. Zhang increased the 
battalions suppressing smuggling from one to more than three, demonstrating his determination to crush 
smuggling and increase government revenues. 
 
                                                
Academia Sinica, 1987) 12-13; Information about secondary administrative agencies is from Kun Gang, ed., Qin ding da 
qing hui dian, vol 4. Xu Xiu Si Ku Quan Shu (Shanghai gu ji chu ban she, 1995); Kun Gang, ed., Qin ding da qing hui dian 
shi li, vol 24, 25, 26. Xu Xiu Si Ku Quan Shu (Shanghai gu ji chu ban she, 1995); for the Bureau of Rehabilitation, the 
Bureau of Brokerage and Likin and the Bureau of Community Self-defence, see Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 2, 347-348; For 
the Bureau of Brokerage and Likin, see Yu Heping, ed. Zhang Zhidong archives (Jin dai shi suo zang qing dai ming ren gao 
ben chao ben, Di er ji). Guo jia qing shi bian zuan wei yuan hui. wen xian congkan (Zheng zhou: Da xiang chu ban she, 
2014), vol 42, 549; for the Bureau of Shunzhi Disaster Relief, see Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 5, 179; for the Bureau of Huai 
Salt Sales, see Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 5, 180; for the Bureau of Chuan Salt, see Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 5, 180; 
Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 2, 395; for the Bureau of Native Opium Tax, see Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 5, 168-169，
186，203-204，245, 317, 349-351; Zhang Zhidong archives, vol 41, 501; for the Bureau of Atlas, see Zhang Zhidong 
quanji, vol. 5, 192-193; Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 2, 511-512; for the Bureau of Iron Affairs, see Zhang Zhidong quanji, 
vol. 2, 386-388, 526-528; Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 5, 175-176; for the Mineral and Chemistry school, the Self-
strengthening Academy, see Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 5, 289, 363；Zhang Zhidong archives, vol 42, 462; for the Bureau 
of Guns and Artillery, see Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 2, 409-410, 413; Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 5, 313; for the Bureau of 
Arms, see Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 5, 335-336; for the Bureau of Anti-smuggling fees, see Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 5, 
349; for the Bureau of Textiles, see Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 8, 35-38; Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 5, 347-348，357-358, 
378, 381, 402-404, 448; for the Textile factory and Silk factory in the Bureau of Texttiles, see Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 5, 
443-445; for the Bureau of Transport, see Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 5, 438-439; for the Bureau of Silver coin casting, see 
Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 5, 443; for the Academy of Hunan and Hubei, see Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 5, 169, 225-226, 
238; for the Hubei Publishing House, see Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 5, 319; for Zhang Zhidong’s private secretaries, see Li 
Renkai, Zhang Zhidong mufu; for the Green Standard Army, see Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 5, 379; Zhang Zhidong quanji, 
vol. 2, 314; and Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 3, 157-158; for the Brave Battalions, see Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 5, 289, 
321, 323, 331-333, 353, 435-436, 442; Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 2, 185, 317, 458, 478, 498-499, 512-514; for the Battle 
ships, see Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 5, 333-334, 378; Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 2, 389. 
146 Liu, “The Limits of Regional Power in the Late-Ch’ing Period”, 356. 
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Sources and Distribution of Zhang Zhidong’s Government Revenues 
 
The overall fiscal organization of the late Qing dynasty after the Taiping Rebellion is presented in Figure 
3. 
 
Figure 3: Fiscal organization in the late Qing dynasty 
Source: Wang, Yeh-chien. Land Taxation in Imperial China, 1750-1911. Harvard East Asian Series 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973), 14. 
 
With the help of local governments, provincial governments (led by a governor-general or governor) 
collected likin and salt tax. Provincial governments and central governments coordinated the collection 
of land tax and grain tax (tribute grain) by local magistrates. The central government collected native 
customs (levied shipping dues and commodity taxes) and, together with the Inspectorate General of 
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Customs (under the Inspector-General, Robert Hart), collected maritime customs. Governors-general or 
governors only supervised the collection of native customs and maritime customs. Provincial 
governments and local governments also collected various miscellaneous taxes and levies not presented 
in Figure 1. Generally, provincial governments had the most control of likin and salt tax. Likin and salt 
tax also constituted a large portion of provincial government income.147 
This fiscal structure was manifested in Zhang’s government in Hubei. The administrations that 
generated government income are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Fiscal structure of Zhang Zhidong’s government in Hubei 
                                                
147 For detailed explanation of land tax, likin, salt tax, native customs, maritime customs, and miscellaneous taxes and 
levies, including their origins, sources, operations and distributions, see Wang, Yeh-chien. Land Taxation in Imperial 
China, 8-19.  
Revenue Administrations in Zhang 
Zhidong’s government 
Diding (land tax), including 
levies 
Provincial Administration 
Commissioner (fiscal 
commissioner) and local 
governments 
Caoliang (grain tax), 
including levies  
Provincial Administration 
Commissioner (fiscal 
commissioner), Grain Intendant 
and local governments 
Maritime customs: Hankow 
customs 
HanHuangDe Taotai 
(Superintendent of Hankow 
Customs) 
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Maritime customs: Ichang 
customs 
JingYiShi Taotai (Superintendent 
of Ichang Customs)  
Native customs: Jing 
customs (levied shipping 
dues, mainly on bamboo and 
wood shipping) 
JingYiShi Taotai and customs 
barriers 
Native customs: Wuchang 
customs (levied shipping 
dues) 
Prefect of Wuchang and customs 
barriers 
Native customs: Hanyang 
New Customs (levied 
shipping dues and 
commodity taxes on bamboo 
and wood) 
Prefect of Hanyang and customs 
barriers 
Native customs: Jingzhou 
Prefect Customs 
(commodity taxes levied at 
the marketplace) 
Prefect of Jingzhou and customs 
barriers 
Salt likin: Chuan salt  Salt Intendant (Prefect of 
Wuchang), Bureau of Chuan Salt 
(in Ichang) and likin stations 
across Hubei 
Salt likin: Huai salt sales Salt Intendant (Prefect of 
Wuchang), Bureau of Huai Salt 
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Sources: Taipei National Palace Museum, Gong zhong dang guang xu chao zou zhe [Palace Midrange Rescript 
Memorials of the Guangxu Reign], vol. 8 (Taipei: Taipei National Palace Museum, 1973), 394-396, 437-438; 
Yang Chengxi, ed., Hubei tong zhi (Shanghai: Shang wu yin shu guan, 1921), vol. 34; Su Yunfeng. Zhongguo 
xian dai hua de qu yu yan jiu: Hubei sheng, 1860-1916, 216; The First Historical Archives of China, Guangxu 
chao zhu pi zou zhe [Palace Midrange Rescript Menorials of the Guangxu Reign], vol. 75 (Beijing: Zhong hua 
shu ju, 1995), 664-665, 686-687, 698-699; Archives of Grand Council in Taipei National Palace Museum, No. 
132670, No. 135945, No. 134897; The First Historical Archives of China, Guangxu chao zhu pi zou zhe, vol. 77, 
615-616, 619; Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 2, 427-429; Luo, Yudong, Zhongguo likin shi [History of likin in 
China]. Jin dai zhongguo shi liao cong kan xu bian. (Taipei: Wen hai chu ban she, 1979), 542-543, 547; Zhang 
Zhidong quanji, vol. 3, 156-157. 
 
 
The distribution of these revenues is displayed in Figure 4.  
Sales (in Hankow) and likin 
stations across Hubei 
Salt tax: Hubei well salt 
produced in Yingcheng and 
Zhushan  
Salt Intendant (Prefect of 
Wuchang) 
Native opium tax Bureau of Native Opium Tax and 
likin stations across Hubei 
Likin Bureau of Brokerage and Likin 
and likin stations across Hubei 
Miscellaneous taxes and 
levies 
Provincial government and local 
governments 
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Figure 4: Distribution of revenue in Zhang Zhidong’s government (created according to the sources 
from Table 2) 
 
Among the administrations shown in Figure 2, the Provincial Administration Commission Treasury, the 
Grain Intendant Treasury and the Bureau of Rehabilitation were all provincial administrations. However, 
governors-general and governors only had direct control over the Bureau of Rehabilitation, a new 
provincial administrative body created during the Taiping Rebellion to strengthen the power of 
governors-general and governors. The Provincial Administration Commissioner controlled the 
Provincial Administration Commission Treasury and the Grain Intendant controlled the Grain Intendent 
Treasury. Although Provincial Administration Commissioners and Grain Intendants were under the 
command of governors-general and governors, they were also accountable to the central government. 
Therefore, Zhang, as the Governor-General of Hubei and Hunan, only had free access to the funds saved 
in the Bureau of Rehabilitation. 
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Regarding the distribution of revenues, most land tax went to the central government, some was left in 
the local government treasury as withheld taxes and the rest, if there was any, was saved in the Provincial 
Administration Commission Treasury. Most grain tax also went to the central government, some was 
sent to other provinces or other bodies and the rest was saved in the Grain Intendant Treasury. The 
distribution of land tax and grain tax is indicated in Figure 3 by the two different arrows. 
 
Figure 5: Distribution of land and grain tax in Zhang Zhidong’s government 
 
In 1893, the collected land and grain taxes were only sufficient to cover the assigned central government 
fund, the assigned fund for subsidies and the local government fund. They were not enough to cover the 
assigned provincial administration fund quota, let alone left any fund saved in the Provincial 
Administration Commission Treasury or Grain Intendant Treasury.148 Even if some funds remained in 
                                                
148 For the actual collected amount of land tax and grain tax, see National Palace Museum in Taiwan, Gong zhong dang 
guang xu chao zou zhe, vol. 8, 394-396. For the assigned quota of central government fund, local government fund and 
provincial administration fund, see Kun Gang, ed., Qin ding da qing hui dian shi li, vol. 169-171. 
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other years, the funds were saved in the Provincial Administration Commission Treasury and Grain 
Intendant Treasury. Zhang had no direct access to the fund. 
 
As demonstrated in Table 2, native customs were collected by local government officials in Hubei, 
namely in JingYiShi Taotai, Wuchang Prefect, Hanyang Prefect and Jingzhou Prefect, and saved in local 
government treasuries. Maritime customs were allocated to the central government, other provinces, the 
Provincial Administration Commission Treasury and the Bureau of Rehabilitation. The distribution of 
native customs and maritime customs is indicated in Figure 4 by the two different arrows. 
 
 
Figure 6: Distribution of maritime customs and native customs in Zhang Zhidong’s government 
 
In 1893, revenue from most maritime customs in Hubei was sent to the central government and other 
provinces, with only 150,000 silver taels sent to the Bureau of Rehabilitation as provincial military funds. 
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This was approximately 6.4 per cent of the total maritime customs of Hankow and Ichang, according to 
the Chinese Imperial Customs’ Decennial Report, 1892–1901, which reported a total figure of 2,337,994 
silver taels.149 Conversely, according to figures calculated based on the Archives of Grand Council in 
Taipei National Palace Museum (159,410 silver taels for Ichang customs and 3,361,228 silver taels for 
Hankow customs—a total of 3,520,638 silver taels), this was only approximately 4.3 per cent of the total 
maritime customs. According to the Archives of Grand Council in Taipei National Palace Museum, 
approximately 190,524 silver taels in Hankow customs and approximately 80,983 silver taels in Ichang 
customs were saved after paying all the funds. Of the 80,983 silver taels saved in Ichang customs, 67,833 
were saved in the Provincial Administration and 13,150 were saved in Ichang customs. It is not certain 
where the 190,524 silver taels saved in Hankow customs were kept. If they went to the Bureau of 
Rehabilitation, the percentage of the maritime customs fund directed to the Bureau of Rehabilitation 
would rise to 9.7 per cent (still a small figure).150 
 
Except for maritime customs, revenues that were directed to the Bureau of Rehabilitation largely came 
from salt likin and tax, native opium tax, likin and miscellaneous taxes and levies, as illustrated by the 
arrows in Figure 10. 
 
                                                
149 Su Yunfeng. Zhongguo xian dai hua de qu yu yan jiu: Hubei sheng, 1860-1916, 216; Chinese Imperial Customs, 
Decennial Report 1892-1901, vol 2, 301. 
150 For the transactions of Hankow Customs, see Archives of Grand Council in Taipei National Palace Museum, No. 
132736; for the transactions of Ichang Customs, see Archives of Grand Council in Taipei National Palace Museum, No. 
130040. 
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Figure 7: Revenues that were directed to the Bureau of Rehabilitation in Zhang Zhidong’s government 
 
Part of the salt likin and tax went to the central government, part went to other provinces, part went to 
the Provincial Administration Commission Treasury for the provincial government administration fund 
and the remainder went to the Bureau of Rehabilitation.151 Zhang obtained permission from the Qing 
court to use approximately 200,000 silver taels of the native opium tax to fund the Bureau of Guns and 
Artillery (in 1893, only 170,000 silver taels was left to the Bureau after deducting administration 
expenses).152 Part of the likin was allocated to the Yangtze Navy; the remainder went to the Bureau of 
                                                
151 For salt likin levied on Chuan salt in 1893, see The First Historical Archives of China, Guangxu chao zhu pi zou zhe, vol. 
75, 664-665, 686-687, 698-699; Archives of Grand Council in Taipei National Palace Museum, No. 132670; For salt likin 
levied on Huai salt in 1893, see Archives of Grand Council in Taipei National Palace Museum, No. 135945. For Hubei well 
salt produced in Yingchang and Zhushan in 1893, see Archives of Grand Council in Taipei National Palace Museum, No. 
134897.  
152 For native opium tax collected in Hubei in 1893 see The First Historical Archives of China, Guangxu chao zhu pi zou 
zhe, vol. 77, 615-616; Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 2, 427-429. 
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Rehabilitation.153 Likin constituted a large portion of the money sent to the Bureau of Rehabilitation. In 
1893, 1,202,712 silver taels were sent from the Bureau of Brokerage and Likin to the Bureau of 
Rehabilitation for military expenses—approximately 78 per cent of the total likin collected.154 This 
accounted for roughly 60 per cent of all new funds sent to the Bureau of Rehabilitation in 1893.155 
However, of the total of 1,999,214 silver taels from 1983 plus the 140,071 silver taels saved in 1892, 
approximately 22 per cent was sent to Beijing as central government funds and approximately 45 per 
cent to other provinces. The rest was used to cover various military expenses in Hubei, such as military 
pay and provisions, ship maintenance and servicing fees, and Western weapon purchase fees. After 
sending funds to the central government and other provinces and covering all the military expenses in 
Hubei, only 37,145 sliver taels were saved in 1893.156 In 1893, Zhang had already established a series of 
self-strengthening projects, including the Bureau of Iron Affairs, the Bureau of Guns and Artillery, the 
Bureau of Arms, the Bureau of Textiles, the Bureau of Transport, the Bureau of Silver Coin Casting and 
the Academy of Hunan and Hubei. Except for the Bureau of Guns and Artillery, which had its own yearly 
fund of 200,000 silver taels from the Bureau of Native Opium Tax, all these projects relied on Hubei 
provincial revenues. The 37,145 silver taels saved in the Bureau of Rehabilitation in 1893 were surely 
not enough. Zhang estimated that the Bureau of Iron Affairs alone would cost approximately 2,000,000 
silver taels per year.157 
 
                                                
153 For likin collected in Hubei in 1893, see Luo, Yudong, Zhongguo likin shi, 542-543, 547; The First Historical Archives 
of China, Guangxu chao zhu pi zou zhe, vol. 77, 618-619; National Palace Museum in Taiwan, Gong zhong dang guang xu 
chao zou zhe, vol 8, 437-438; Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 3, 156-157. 
154 Luo, Yudong, Zhongguo likin shi, 543. 
155 This is calculated by subtracting the money saved in the Bureau of Rehabilitation in 1892 from the total in 1893. For 
transactions of the Bureau of Rehabilitation in 1893, see The First Historical Archives of China, Guangxu chao zhu pi zou 
zhe, vol. 88,107-109; for transactions of the Bureau of Rehabilitation in 1892, see National Palace Museum in Taiwan, 
Gong zhong dang guang xu chao zou zhe, vol 8, 782-784. 
156 For transactions of the Bureau of Rehabilitation in 1893, see The First Historical Archives of China, Guangxu chao zhu 
pi zou zhe, vol. 88, 107-109. 
157 Hubei sheng dang an guan, ed., Han ye ping gong si dang an shi liao xuan bian (Beijing: Zhongguo she hui ke xue chu 
ban she, 1992), vol. 1, 74.  
Mu Zhang 86 
 86 
Sources of funding for the Bureau of Iron Affairs 
 
Zhang established the Bureau of Iron Affairs according to his vision for self-strengthening advocated in 
the memorial to the throne regarding coastal defence in 1885, two months after the end of the Sino-
French war. As discussed before, the three things that he listed to achieve self-strengthening in that 
memorial to the throne were 1) train officers to be proficient in western military technology; 2) 
manufacture arms; 3) establish coal, iron and steel works. Zhang believed that the three things were 
crucial in preserving sovereign right and they reinforced each other. Particularly, establishing coal, iron 
and steel works built the foundation for self-strengthening, providing unlimited source materials for 
western arms manufacturing and grounds for training officers proficient in western technology. The 
organizational units of Zhang’s provincial government in Hubei represented this vision. In Hubei, 
Zhang set up a Mineral and Chemistry school and a self-strengthening Academy (with mathematics, 
science, language and business schools) in the Bureau of Iron Affairs in order to train more people to 
become proficient in western knowledge and technology. 
 
In 1890, the Bureau of Iron Affairs was founded in Wuchang. Zhang nominated the Provincial 
Administration Commissioner, Provincial Surveillance Commissioner, Grain Intendant and Salt 
Intendant (Prefect of Wuchang) to manage the Bureau and placed Cai Xiyong in charge of it. Cai served 
in the Bureau of Iron Affairs as the chief executive and managed its daily operations.158 Zhang nominated 
many high officials in Hubei, especially officials dealing with fiscal matters, to manage the Bureau of 
Iron Affairs with Cai to provide more support—especially financial support—to the Bureau of Iron 
Affairs. 
 
                                                
158 Hubei sheng dang an guan, ed., Han ye ping gong si dang an shi liao xuan bian, vol. 1, 74.  
Mu Zhang 87 
 87 
Upon Zhang’s request, the Ministry of Revenue agreed to grant 2,000,000 silver taels every year to cover 
the cost of the Bureau of Iron Affairs.159 However, the Ministry of Revenue only fulfilled this promise 
once.160 Ending in 1896, the Bureau of Iron Affairs used 5,586,415 silver taels in total. Table 3 presents 
its funding sources. 
Table 3: Sources of funding for the Bureau of Iron Affairs, ending in 1896 
Sources                 Funding in silver taels 
Funds from the Ministry of Revenue 2,000,000 
Requested funds from salt likin  300,000 
Requested funds from the Grain Intendant 
Treasury 
400,000 
Borrowed new maritime defence levies 28,552 
Borrowed funds from the Bureau of Guns and 
Artillery 
1,564,622 
Borrowed funds from the Bureau of Textiles 
capital 
278,762 
Steel and iron sales 24,825 
Borrowed funds from the Bureau of Jiangnan 
Defence  
500,000 
Donations from salt merchant in two Huai 500,000 
Total 5,596,761 
 
                                                
159 Ibid.  
160 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 5, 424-426, 430-432. 
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Sources: The table is from Zhang Houquan, Han ye ping gong si shi [The History of Hanyeping Corporation] 
(Beijing: She hui ke xue wen xian chu ban she, 2014), 28; the data is from Hubei sheng dang an guan, ed., Han 
ye ping gong si dang an shi liao xuan bian, vol. 1, 138; Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 3, 478-479; Zhang Zhidong 
quanji, vol. 5, 447. 
 
Except for the 2,000,000 silver taels from the Ministry of Revenues, the largest amount was borrowed 
from the Bureau of Guns and Artillery. However, the funds for the Bureau of Guns and Artillery, 
according to Zhang’s report, were 200,000 silver taels from the native opium tax, 100,000 silver taels 
from salt likin levies and miscellaneous taxes, levies and borrowings every year. From 1889 to 1896, the 
funds received for the Bureau of Guns and Artillery were approximately 3,673,668 silver taels, far more 
than the total of the 200,000 silver taels from the native opium tax and 100,000 silver taels from salt likin 
levies every year (in total, only 2,400,000 in eight years). Therefore, miscellaneous taxes, levies and 
borrowings constituted at least 1,000,000 silver taels of the funding of the Bureau of Guns and Artillery, 
thus also comprising a large part of the funding for the Bureau of Iron Affairs.161 Borrowed funds from 
the Bureau of Jiangnan Defence and donations from salt merchants in two Huais came from Jiangsu 
when Zhang was transferred from Hubei to Jiangsu as the Governor-General of Jiangsu, Anhui and 
Jiangxi during the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895).162 During the First Sino-Japanese War, Zhang 
still sent 1,000,000 silver taels from Jiangsu to the Bureau of Iron Affairs in Hubei, demonstrating that, 
in his mind, the Bureau of Iron Affairs had at least the same priority as military pay and provisions in the 
war. The remaining funding for the Bureau of Iron Affairs was mainly sourced from salt likin, the Grain 
Intendant Treasury and the Bureau of Textiles. In summary, salt likin, native opium tax, profit from the 
Bureau of Textiles and obscure miscellaneous taxes, levies and borrowings constituted the funding for 
                                                
161 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 3, 479; Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 2, 427-429. 
162 For the fund for iron and stell works see Sun Yutang, ed., Zhongguo jin dai gong ye shi zi liao, 1840-1895 
[Source Materials on the History of Industry in Modern China, 1840-1895]. Zhongguo jin dai jing ji shi can kao zi liao 
cong kan. (Beijing: Ke xue chu ban she, 1957), 885-887. 
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the Bureau of Iron Affairs. Profit from steel and iron sales was only 24,825 silver taels, less than 0.5 per 
cent of total expenses. From 1889 to 1896, the Bureau of Iron Affairs cost 5, 596, 761 with almost no 
return. 
  
Since establishing the Bureau of Iron Affairs, Zhang was accused by his political enemies of spending 
too much funding and failing to do anything meaningful. Some scholars, such as Quan Hansheng, also 
thought that the Bureau of Iron Affairs was a failure enterprise.163 In 1893, Xu Zhixiang accused Zhang 
of “keeping huge amount of funding, believing people on their bare word, wasting a lot of money and 
amassing money by all means” in a memorial to the throne. He also accused Hubei Provincial 
Administration Commissioner Wang Zhichun of “amassing money by all means” and Zhang Zhidong’s 
trusted private secretary Zhao Fengchang of “having a bad reputation”. The Qing court sent Liu Kunyi, 
the governor-general of Jiangsu, Anhui and Jiangxi and Li Hanzhang, the governor-general of 
Guangdong and Guangxi to investigate Zhang Zhidong, but Liu and Li didn’t find any evidence 
supporting Xu’s accusation and decided to sacrifice Zhao Fengchang’s career in order to end the 
investigation. Zhao was dismissed and sent back to his birth-place.164 Although Xu’s memorial to the 
throne was not completely true, saying that Zhang Zhidong and Wang Zhichun were “amassing money 
by all means” was also not a complete lie. The Iron and steel industry is an extractive industry that 
needs a lot of funding in early stages and normally only starts to make a profit after quite a few years’ 
continuing investment. Without funding from the Board of Revenues, and being un-willing to borrow 
foreign fund in order to protect Chinese liquan, Zhang Zhidong had to “amass money by all means”. 
Zhang’s escape from Xu’s accusation in 1893 also shows Zhang’s good political connections to the 
central government, to governors-general of other provinces, such as Liu Kunyi and Li Hanzhang, and 
                                                
163 Quan Hansheng, Hanyeping gongsi shilue [The history of the Hanyang Iron and Steel works] in Jin dai zhong guo shi 
liao cong kan 2, vol. 93, ed., Shen, Yunlong (Taipei: Wenhai chu ben she, 1966-1987). 
164 Zhang Shi, Cang liang de bei ying: Zhang Zhidong yu zhongguo gang tie gong ye (Beijing: Shang wu yin shu guan, 
2010), 326-341, direct quote in 327; Li Zhiming, Muliao yu shibian: “Zhao Fengchang cangzha” zhengli yanjiu chubian 
[Private secretaries and worldly changes: a preliminary study of the letters collected by Zhao Fengchang], 59-66. 
Mu Zhang 90 
 90 
high officials in his governing provinces, such as Wang Zhichun. After this incident, Zhang’s trusted 
private secretary Zhao Fengchang also didn’t end his close relation to Zhang and served as Zhang’s 
crucial informant in Shanghai (Zhao’s role will be discussed in Chapter 4).  
 
At the end of 1893, the Hanyang iron and steel works were established in Hubei, occupying 280 to 360 
thousand square meters and employing 3000 workers and staff.165 However, insufficient coal works 
were established for the support of the Hanyang iron and steel works. In order to make steel, Zhang had 
to buy coke from overseas, therefore the production of iron and steel was limited. In June 1894, the No 
1. Furnace in Hanyang iron and steel works started to make 50 tons of iron a day. The Hanyang iron 
and steel works were the first western-style iron and steel works in Asia, seven years earlier than 
Yahata iron and steel works in Japan.166 From 1890 to 1894 with only 2, 000, 000 silver taels support 
from the central government, Zhang Zhidong spent less than four years to establish the Hanyang iron 
and steel works, a building speed similar to iron and steel works in foreign countries at that time.167 The 
Hanyang Iron and Steel works laid the foundation for China’s heavy industry. After Japanese 
exploitation in the 1930s, it was transported to Chongqing during the second Sino-Japanese war. A new 
iron and steel complex, the Huazhong Iron and Steel works was established in Wuhan, Hubei at the old 
site in 1948 and came into large-scale operation in the 1950s.168 
 
In 1894, the Hanyang iron and steel works still relied on overseas coke because most of the firebricks 
to build coke furnaces were broken during overseas transportation and China was not able to make 
firebricks by itself, and therefore was not able to make coal in Hunan to coke.169 People who don’t 
                                                
165 Zhang Houquan, Han ye ping gong si shi, 47-48. 
166 Zhang Houquan, Han ye ping gong si shi, 47-48; Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 3, 133-134. 
167 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 2, 387. 
168 Zhang Houquan, Han ye ping gong si shi, 443-525. 
 
169 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 3, 188-190. 
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know steel making may think firebricks are just a small problem, but the problem of firebricks 
continued to trouble Chinese iron and steel industry until 1970s.170 Apart from coke supply, finance 
issues also troubled the Hanyang iron and steel works. Zhang could not ask for more money from the 
Board of Revenues, but he still submitted a memorial to the throne, explaining all kinds of expenses in 
the early stage of the Hanyang iron and steel works and requested the Board of Revenues to permit him 
to use 100, 000 silver taels from Hubei likin and salt likin.171 He even asked to borrow 500, 000 silver 
taels from Guangdong.172  
 
In November 1894, Zhang Zhidong was transferred to Jiangsu from Hubei as the governor-general of 
Jiangsu, Anhui and Jiangxi after the start of the first Sino-Japanese war in 1894. Even with funds from 
Jiangsu, the Hanyang iron and steel works were deeply in trouble. In 1895, the Treaty of Shimonoseki 
was signed and a huge amount of the war indemnity was passed on to the provinces. Hanyang iron and 
steel works had insufficient funds to carry on with its normal operation.173 The failure of the Bureau of 
Iron Affairs was due to many factors at that time. Blaming Zhang Zhidong spending too much money 
and failing to do anything meaningful was too harsh. For China, Zhang’s vision of a self-sufficient iron 
and military industry was indeed a crucial step to self-strengthening. Zhang tried his best to realize this 
vision but failed.174 
 
Through analysing Zhang’s provincial government structure in Hubei, its sources and distribution of 
revenues, and sources of funding for the Bureau of Iron Affairs, this article has demonstrated that Zhang 
had limited funds to use freely in his governing provinces. Most of his government revenues went to the 
central government or were sent to other provinces or bodies. These findings support Kwang Ching Liu’s 
                                                
170 Zhang Shi, Cang liang de bei ying, 359-363. 
171 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 3, 190-191. 
172 Ibid, 200-202. 
173 Zhang Shi, Cang liang de bei ying, 363-396. 
174 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 3, 201. 
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argument that the power of the governors-general and governors was limited by the central government 
before 1900. The survey of military units in Zhang’s government reveals that Zhang only kept 18 Brave 
battalions—approximately 9000 troops (500 troops per battalion). This was not a large army and most 
of these Brave battalions were engaged in suppressing bandits and smuggling in the provinces. Therefore, 
as Liu argues, the central government exercised strong financial and military control on the provinces: 
the Brave battalions in Zhang’s provinces were kept to a minimum (in the thousands) and the provincial 
income that was left for Zhang to use was also restricted. 
 
However, given increasing imperialist pressure and sometimes even foreseen threat of foreign invasion, 
such as the British demonstration of military power by sending gunboats to the Yangtze river in the 1891 
missionary riots, Zhang was keen to establish a series of self-strengthening projects in his provinces. 
Foremost among these was the Bureau of Iron Affairs, which he considered the most important 
foundational project to strengthen China. All these projects cost money and, with the limited funds at his 
disposal, Zhang experienced a constant shortage of funding to support them. The study of the Bureau of 
Iron Affairs reveals that, at times, Zhang was prepared to sacrifice central government interests in 
exchange for financial support for his self-strengthening projects in the provinces (e.g., using the funds 
for the First Sino-Japanese War to support the Bureau of Iron Affairs). Money was a key issue affecting 
central–provincial relations; this issue would become more serious with the First Sino-Japanese War and 
the subsequent large amount of war indemnity. 
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Chapter 4: Negotiating military resources during the first Sino-Japanese War 
 
This chapter highlights the difficulties that Zhang Zhidong faced in Jiangsu and the conflicts between 
Zhang’s government and other groups during the first Sino-Japanese war regarding the importation and 
transportation of weapons and ammunition, seeking loans to buy weapons, and transporting and 
recruiting troops. All these show that the first Sino-Japanese war enlarged the divergence between 
Zhang’s government and other Chinese governments (including the central government and other 
provincial governments), and thus damaged central-provincial relations.  
 
On 10 October 1894, two months after the First Sino–Japanese War began, the Qing court ordered 
Zhang Zhidong, the Governor-General of Hubei and Hunan, to visit the emperor in Beijing. However, 
Zhang was reluctant and, by the end of October, he had remained in Hubei preparing for his journey.175 
On 2 November 1894, the Qing court instead ordered Liu Kunyi, the Governor-General of Jiangsu, 
Anhui and Jiangxi, to visit the emperor in Beijing. After this visit, Liu was appointed as an imperial 
envoy residing in Shanhaiguan to lead all troops at the frontline. Zhang departed Hubei on 5 November 
and arrived in Nanjing, Jiangsu’s capital, on 8 November to replace Liu as the governor-general.176 
Figure 8 depicts the location of Jiangsu, Anhui and Jiangxi in reference to Hubei, Hunan, Beijing and 
Shanghai. 
                                                
175 Zhao Dexin, ed. Zhang Zhidong quanji [Complete works of Zhang Zhidong] (Wuhan: Wuhan chu ban she, 2008), vol. 3, 
213-214. 
176 Ibid. 
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Figure 8: Jiangsu, Anhui and Jiangxi in China with respect to Hubei and Hunan and to Beijing and 
Shanghai 
Source: Created by the author using Google Map 
 
Zhang was relieved to fulfil this esteemed position, as it was second only to the Governor-General of 
Zhili. In this new role, he provided logistical support to the frontline in the north during the First Sino–
Japanese War due to the Yellow Sea’s blockade by Japanese gunboats. His daily tasks included buying 
and making weapons, transporting weapons and troops, raising funds and seeking loans, as well as 
defending Jiangsu against the Japanese to prevent this critical logistic base from falling into Japanese 
hands. 
 
Mu Zhang 95 
 95 
In order to fulfil these tasks, Zhang took many unusual measures trying to mobilize resources in other 
provinces and centralize then in his hands. The Qing court also invested Zhang with great power 
beyond his own governing provinces. However, Zhang encountered many difficulties in organizing and 
maintaining an efficient logistical base supporting the operation of the war. These difficulties brought 
him into conflict with government officials in Jiangsu, with the literati and businessmen, with other 
provincial governments and with officials at the front line in the north. Facing the war, each group had 
its own priorities. Neither the Qing court nor Zhang Zhidong was able to unite all these different groups 
and the power struggle within a provincial government, and between provincial governments only 
catalysed by the war. 
 
Importing and transporting Western weapons 
 
At the beginning of the First Sino–Japanese War, Jiangsu, Anhui and Jiangxi sent approximately 32 
battalions to the frontline, and Liu travelled with approximately 20 battalions and a large amount of 
weapons to the north. Zhang complained to Liu that there were no troops nor weapons in Jiangsu. 
Zhang newly recruited 60 battalions, but they had no weapons to use. Supporting troops moving to the 
frontline at the north cost Jiangsu more than 200,000 silver taels per month, and when the newly 
recruited 60 battalions’ maintenance costs were added to this total, the monthly cost soared to 500,000 
silver taels.177 
 
Zhang bought many foreign weapons for both the defence of Jiangsu and the frontline, as Japanese 
gunboats blocked the Yellow Sea and foreign weapons could only land in China through Shanghai. 
Zhang was new to Jiangsu and did not trust any subordinate officials; therefore, he entrusted the 
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important task of buying and transporting weapons to his private secretaries—Gu Hongming, Liang 
Dunyan, Zhao Fengchang and Fan Fen (the manager of Shanghai’s Yichangcheng Hardware).178 
From the beginning of the First Sino–Japanese War, Zhao Fengchang bought weapons in Shanghai 
through H. Mandl & Co.179—a trading house founded by weapons dealer Hermann Mandl, which 
became the exclusive distributor of German Krupp products in China at the end of the nineteenth 
century. H. Mandl & Co. also sold various types of cannons to the Beiyang Fleet. Philip Lieder was the 
Shanghai contact for H. Mandl & Co.180 and he had a very good relationship with Zhao Fengchang. In 
late October 1894, Zhao asked Lieder to transport weapons bought by Zhang Zhidong through 
Germany’s Chinese ambassador Xu Jingcheng, together with the weapons bought through H. Mandl & 
Co., from German Krupp to China. Zhao telegraphed Lieder to allow Hu Ermei in H. Mandl & Co. to 
forge his signature and use his seal to receive funds for these weapons.181 
 
Zhang Zhidong arrived in Nanjing on 8 November and Liang Dunyan (who was fluent in English) 
joined Zhao Fengchang to purchase foreign weapons for Zhang. Zhang wished to keep the purchase 
confidential and Liang asked H. Mandl & Co. to only reveal that Fan Fen, the manager of 
Yichangcheng Hardware, bought weapons.182 Subsequently, Fan Fen became a very important 
accomplice in helping Zhao buy weapons for Zhang in Shanghai. When Zhang established the 
Hanyang Iron and Steel Works in the early 1890s, Fan was responsible for importing many 
                                                
178 For an overview of Zhao Fengchang’s role during the first Sino-Japanese war, See Li Zhiming, Muliao yu shibian: 
“Zhao Fengchang cangzha” zhengli yanjiu chubian [Private secretaries and worldly changes: a preliminary study of the 
letters collected by Zhao Fengchang], 69-84. 
179 Zhao Dexin, ed. Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 8, 153; Zhang Zhidong archives, vol. 69, 328. 
180 Huang Guangyu, ed., Waiguo zai hua gongshang qiye cidian [The universal dictionary of foreign business in modern 
China] (Sichuan: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1992), 500; Tang Bo, “Deguo Kelubo kelubo gongsi yu wanqing junshi caigou 
[German Krupp and weapon purchase in late Qing China],” Qing Shi Jing Jian 4, accessed 16 February 2019, 
http://www.qinghistory.cn/qsjj/qsjj_dwgx/388179.shtml; Li Hongzhang quanji [Complete works of Li Hongzhang], eds. Gu 
Tinglong and Daiyi (Hefei: Anhui jiao yu chu ban she, 2008), vol. 23, 12; Qiao Wei, Deguo Kelubo yu Zhongguo de jin dai 
hua [German Krupp and the modernisation of China], trans. Li Xisuo and Liu Xiaoqin (Tianjin: Tianjin gu ji chu ban she, 
2001), 368-369. 
181 Weapon purchase see Zhang Zhidong archives, vol. 43, 294, 305, 421-422, 429-430, 434-435, 437, 442-443, 448, 495, 
517; Imitating Zhao Fengchang’s handwriting see Zhang Zhidong archives, vol. 43, 434-435. 
182 Zhang Zhidong archives, vol. 70, 329, vol. 43, 528. 
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machines.183 Figure 9 depicts the weapon purchasing link in Zhang’s provincial government, based on 
telegrams between Zhang Zhidong, Zhao Fengchang, Xu Jingcheng, Liang Dunyan, Fan Fen and Philip 
Lieder.184 
 
Figure 9: Weapon purchasing links in Zhang Zhidong’s provincial government 
 
However, in the process of buying and transporting foreign weapons, more parties became involved 
and unforeseen difficulties and conflicts emerged. The H. Mandl & Co. ships transporting large amount 
of weapons planned to land in Zhenjiang on 29 November, but they arrived in Shanghai on 30 
November and did not intend to then travel to Zhenjiang.185 Fan Fen and Zhao Fengchang asked for the 
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(Heifei: Huang shan shu she, 2007), 91, 197-198; Ningbo shi zhenxie wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui, ed., Ningbo wenshi ziliao 
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China Merchants Steam Navigation Company’s assistance, as they shipped weapons from Zhenjiang to 
the north’s frontline. However, the company insisted on checking the weapons in Shanghai and refused 
to borrow ships to transport the weapons to Zhenjiang; therefore, the weapons remained in Shanghai 
until 9 December. Shanghai newspapers reported the shipping of these weapons, which meant that the 
Japanese could send warships to confiscate them at any time. Zhao Fengchang telegraphed Zhang 
Zhidong and encouraged him to contact Li Hongzhang regarding the matter, and only upon Li 
Hongzhang’s request did the company agree to transport the weapons to Zhenjiang.186 
 
The weapons transportation incident reveals the difficulties that governors-general such as Zhang 
Zhidong faced in the First Sino–Japanese War. After decades of the Self-Strengthening Movement, 
Qing China still could not manufacture advanced weapons such as breech-loaders, breech-loading 
cannons and rapid-fire cannons, and relied on imported weapons. Conversely, Japan had already 
achieved mass production of breech-loaders. It was no wonder that at the beginning of the war, Britain 
predicted that China would be defeated.187 Due to their interests, Western countries (especially the 
superpower Britain) chose to maintain neutrality and did not openly sell weapons to Qing China.188 
Germany, as a new imperialist power, was eager to join the imperialist game in the far east and, thus, 
chose to sell weapons to Qing China. However, the Japanese blockade of the Yellow Sea prevented 
Western weapons from being transported directly to the frontline in the north through the sea route. 
Instead, they could only arrive in Shanghai because Britain intervened, and Shanghai had been declared 
neutral. Western countries had to maintain neutrality in public and could only transport weapons to 
Shanghai, which is why H. Mandl & Co. did not originally transport the weapons to Zhenjiang.189 
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In addition to transportation issues, the weapons shipped by H. Mandl & Co. were very disorganised, as 
they contained various parts of different weapons and were bought by various parties. The weapons 
were not only guns, bullets, gunpowder, cannons and machines (ordered by Zhang Zhidong), but also 
various weapons and ammunition ordered by Li Hongzhang, Liu Kunyi and the Chinese ambassadors 
of Germany, the US and Britain. In total, there were 13,283 boxes of weapons and ammunition to be 
transported to the frontline in the north, which were transferred from H. Mandl & Co.’s ships to the 
China Merchants Steam Navigation Company’s ships in Shanghai. However, no Chinese inventory 
existed besides an English inventory provided by Lieder, and even he could not be sure if his inventory 
was correct. Black powder, ordered by Henan province, was not in his inventory but was shipped to 
Shanghai as well.190 
 
Conflicts also emerged when Zhang Zhidong shipped weapons to the north. There were no existing 
railways from the south to the north and travelling by boat was not possible because the rivers were 
frozen. The 13,283 boxes of weapons and primary troops could only travel to the north by horses, carts, 
wheelbarrows or foot. Despite Zhang Zhidong establishing a series of transporting bureaus from the 
south to the north to buy and rent horses and carts, more transportation methods were still required and 
battalions often quarrelled about allocating means of transportation. Ultimately, the boxes of weapons 
and ammunition had to travel for several months before arriving at the north’s frontline and weapons 
purchased later arrived at the frontline after the end of the war.191 
 
Seeking foreign loans 
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Zhao Fengchang and Fan Fen ordered four batches of weapons and ammunition from H. Mandl & Co. 
through Lieder, with later batches ordered by credit—H. Mandl & Co. loaned approximately RM$1 
million to Zhang Zhidong.192 Zhang Zhidong’s private secretary Gu Hongming used his German 
fluency and strong communication skills to join contract negotiations with Lieder later. In late 
November 1894, Gu accompanied foreigners and Chinese officials as an interpreter examining forts 
along the coast and the Yangtze River. In mid-December, Gu travelled to Shanghai and joined Zhao 
Fengchang to negotiate with Lieder in person.193 Subsequently, Gu negotiated purchasing weapons on 
credit and revised a series of articles in the contract, including reducing loan interest rates, 
transportation fees and war insurance, as well as changing the shipping destination to be Zhenjiang.194 
In addition to H. Mandl & Co., Zhao Fengchang, Fan Fen, Liang Dunyan and Gu Hongming contacted 
other foreign trading houses for arms importation—namely, Malcampo & Co., Schultz & Co., 
Buchheister & Co. and Carlowitz & Co.—to compare pricing and conditions. Based on H. Mandl & 
Co.’s conditions, Schultz & Co. and Buchheister & Co. agreed to sell on credit. After negotiations, all 
loans were secured on coupon bonds to Chinese businessmen (the Ministry of Revenue innovation 
during the First Sino–Japanese War) and not on Chinese Maritime Custom Service coupons.195 
Notably, these foreign trading houses were German, which demonstrates the size of Germany’s arms 
export to Qing China during the First Sino–Japanese War.196 
                                                
192 Zhang Zhidong archives, vol. 72, 58, 91-92, 121-122, 302-303. 
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Conflicts between Zhang Zhidong and Liu Linxiang (Shanghai Taotai and Jiangnan General 
Manufacturing Bureau’s Chief Manager) emerged from purchasing weapons negotiations. Before 
Zhang Zhidong became the Governor-General of Jiangsu, Anhui and Jiangxi, Liu was responsible for 
purchasing weapons from foreign trading houses. However, Zhang Zhidong did not trust Liu and was 
angry because he allowed Liu Kunyi to take all the available weapons and ammunition in the Jiangnan 
General Manufacturing Bureau to the north. Zhang asked Liu Linxiang for weapons that the newly 
recruited battalions in Shanghai could use and ordered him to send the rapid-fire guns and mountain-
breaking howitzers to the battalions remaining in Shanghai instead of being transported elsewhere.197 
It was also speculated that Jiangnan General Manufacturing Bureau had run into great debt; Zhang sent 
his private secretary Wang Bingen to investigate this matter secretly.198 Liu Linxiang often intervened 
when Zhao Fengchang negotiated with Lieder regarding purchasing weapons. Zhao complained to 
Zhang that all foreign trading houses were not willing to deal with Liu, as he was a hateful, corrupt 
official who asked for and accepted many bribes.199 Zhao asked Zhang not to believe Liu’s contract and 
instead send Wang Bingen to Shanghai to negotiate contracts, as Wang could negotiate lower prices.200 
As the war developed, loans secured on coupon bonds to Chinese businessmen were not enough and 
the Qing court finally decided to borrow foreign money. They borrowed £5 million from the Hong 
Kong and Shanghai Bank Corporation through China’s Maritime Customs Service Inspector-General 
Robert Hart. They also allowed Zhang Zhidong to borrow foreign money,201 and, with the Qing court’s 
permission, Zhang immediately asked Zhao Fengchang and Gu Hongming to seek foreign loans in 
Shanghai and use the terms of Hart’s loan for reference.202 However, Zhao Fengchang and Liu 
Linxiang disagreed. Foreign loans required Chinese Maritime Custom Service coupons as security and, 
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thus, needed Liu’s seal of approval because he was the Superintendent of Shanghai Customs. Liu 
insisted that foreigners had to sign the loan contract first before he affixed seals, whereas Zhao’s 
agreement with the foreign trading house was that Liu would affix seals first before foreigners were to 
sign the contract. Urgently, Zhao sent a telegram to Zhang Zhidong, who ordered Liu to affix seals to 
the coupons immediately.203 
 
Based on these conflicts, it is obvious that Zhang Zhidong did not trust or rely on local officials in 
purchasing weapons and seeking foreign loans. He also did not trust the local officials enough to leave 
them responsible for the defence of his provinces. Soon after Zhang became the Governor-General of 
Jiangsu, Anhui and Jiangxi, he ordered Gu Hongming and Hankow Customs Commissioner R B 
Moorhead to accompany local officials and examine the forts along the coast and the Yangtze River. 
Later, Moorhead and Shen Dunhe (who was recommended to Zhang Zhidong by Zhao Fengchang) 
oversaw the forts.204 Previously, Shen Dunhe had studied in America and Britain and was familiar with 
coastal defence.205 
 
Zhang Zhidong usually assigned the most important matters in the First Sino–Japanese War—such as 
purchasing weapons, seeking foreign loans and maintaining coastal defence—to his trusted private 
secretaries Zhao Fengchang, Gu Hongming, Liang Dunyan, Wang Bingen and Shen Dunhe. This small 
circle operated without Shanghai local officials and, thus, became Zhang Zhidong’s informants and 
assistants in Shanghai. 
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Recruiting and transporting troops 
 
Most local troops travelled with Liu Kunyi to the north’s frontline, which meant that Zhang Zhidong 
required more troops to defend Jiangsu, Anhui and Jiangxi. Unlike Li Hongzhang and Liu Kunyi, who 
advanced their political careers during the Taiping rebellion and had their military forces (Li controlled 
the Huai Army and Liu controlled the Xiang Army),206 Zhang Zhidong advanced his career through the 
civil service examination and had limited military forces at his disposal. There were few troops in 
Hubei and Hunan, and the most capable troops had already travelled to the north to support the 
frontline. On 31 December 1894, Liu Kunyi ordered a further 20 battalions in Jiangsu to travel to 
Shanhaiguan in the north. Zhang had no choice but to recruit new troops and rely on the commanders 
of battalions whom he knew during the Sino–French War in Guangdong.207 Zhang’s most important 
contact in Guangdong was Wang Bingen, who’s role in negotiating foreign loan contracts in Shanghai 
was previously discussed. Before Wang moved from Guangdong to Shanghai, he assisted Zhang in 
recruiting and transporting Guangdong battalions to Shanghai. 
 
Wang and Zhang first met in 1873, when Zhang was supervising education in Sichuan and was the 
examining official of the provincial civil service examination that Wang attended; therefore, it could be 
said that Wang was Zhang’s student. In 1884, when Zhang became the Governor-General of 
Guangdong and Guangxi, he asked Wang to become an official of the Foreign Affairs Bureau in 
Guangdong. In 1887, Zhang appointed Wang to be a manager of the newly established Guangya 
Publishing House. In late 1889, when Zhang left Guangdong and became the Governor-General of 
Hubei and Hunan, Wang was impeached for corruption and deprived of his official post. Zhang fought 
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against this impeachment and Wang’s official post was restored.208 Clearly, Zhang trusted Wang and 
viewed him as a close private secretary. 
 
In November 1894, Wang Bingen was appointed manager of Guangdong Battalions Office and was 
responsible for bringing Li Xianyi and Feng Zicai’s battalions from Guangdong to Jiangsu at the 
request of Zhang Zhidong to the Qing court. Li Hanzhang, the Governor-General of Guangdong and 
Guangxi did not want to release his troops but could not prevent it because Zhang had the Qing court’s 
permission.209 However, Li did not follow Zhang’s request to pay for the military expenditures of these 
battalions and Zhang had to pay 175,000 silver taels instead.210 Although the Qing court tried to 
coordinate and concentrate resources in different provinces to the north’s frontline, governors-general 
such as Li Hanzhang still possessed the power to resist the court order. The struggles between Zhang 
Zhidong and Li Hanzhang regarding Guangdong troops in the First Sino–Japanese War demonstrates 
that Qing China was not only limited in weapons and money, but also trained troops. Qing China had a 
long coastline and governors-general all wanted to protect their provinces from the Japanese; therefore, 
conflicts of interest easily emerged (as established with Zhang and Li’s disagreement). 
 
Zhang held high expectations of the Guangdong battalions and wanted them to travel to Jiangsu even if 
he had to pay for their military expenses. During the Sino–French War, Zhang had supported 
Guangdong battalions to fight against the French and saw Feng Zicai’s success in the battle of 
Zhennanguan. Zhang telegraphed Wang Bingen and reminded him that battalion officers must be those 
who had fought the French in Vietnam, and said ‘Only Guangdong battalions could fight against the 
foreigners’.211 Feng Zicai was already 76 years old, yet Zhang still asked him to travel to Jiangsu. In 
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total, Wang assisted Zhang in recruiting 22 battalions from Guangdong: 10 battalions led by Feng 
Zicai, six battalions led by Li Xianyi, three battalions led by Lin Bao and three battalions led by Huang 
Shouzhong.212 In addition to infantry, Wang Bingen recruited navy officers from Guangdong, 
particularly students from the Guangdong Navy Academy, as Zhang complained that captains and navy 
artillery officers in Jiangsu were incapable of fighting in the war.213 
 
Despite Zhang Zhidong holding high expectations, the Guangdong battalions created many issues in 
Jiangsu. When Li Xianyi’s battalions arrived in Zhenjiang in January 1895, they burned down houses 
and attacked the local people. Zhenjiang Taotai Lü Haihuan was afraid that Zhenjiang would be 
destroyed by strife; he asked Zhang to transfer Li Xianyi’s battalions to the frontline and appoint other 
battalions to defend Zhenjiang. After some delay, Zhang agreed and moved Li Xianyi’s battalions to 
guide the forts.214 This particular incident demonstrates the potential problems and dangers that arose 
when troops recruited in one province were moved to another during the war. Due to the large number 
of troops that were transported to the north, conflict between troops and the locals was common; 
usually because troops travelled from other provinces and were not supervised by the local 
government, disrupting the relationship between armies and locals. 
 
Li Xianyi’s battalions arrived in Jiangsu in late January 1895. Feng Zicai’s battalions were still 
travelling because he refused to let them leave Guangdong until he received the money from Zhang 
Zhidong. Moreover, Feng’s battalions travelled to Jiangsu using the nearly 60-day land route because 
they did not want to travel by ship for 10 days and they were worried about storms and Japanese 
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gunboats. They were still travelling to Jiangsu until March 1895—nearly the end of the war.215 Seeing 
this, Zhang must have been very disappointed; he had paid 175,000 silver taels for the troops to travel 
to Jiangsu, but they made little contribution of defence. The Japanese defeated the Huai and Xiang 
armies at the frontline and the Guangdong battalions could not be relied on—there was no single army 
that Qing China could use for defence. It was no wonder that Zhang decided to train the self-
strengthening army according to Western methods after the First Sino–Japanese War.216 
 
Manufacturing Western weapons 
 
Despite that Zhang Zhidong transferred to the position of Governor-General of Jiangsu, Anhui and 
Jiangxi in October 1894, he still controlled various self-strengthening projects in Hubei. His key 
contacts in Hubei were Cai Xiyong and Yun Zuyi. Cai Xiyong was the chief manager of almost all 
Zhang’s self-strengthening projects in Hubei, such as the Hanyang Iron and Steel Works, the Bureau of 
Textiles, the Bureau of Guns and Artillery, and the Bureau of Silver Coin Casting. Cai was also 
Zhang’s foreign affairs secretary and assisted Zhang in managing the Bureau of Atlas, Bureau of 
Cotton Yarn Spinning and Silk Thread Reeling, the Self-Strengthening Academy and the Foreign 
Affairs Publishing House. In late October 1894, Cai attempted to resign from all these posts. However, 
Zhang Zhidong did not accept his resignation and only permitted him to stop helping other bureaus. 
Zhang appointed Yun Zuyi to assist Cai in managing the Hanyang Iron and Steel Works and the 
Bureau of Guns and Artillery.217 In choosing late October to submit his resignation, Cai was 
considering his situation after Zhang left Hubei. Appointing Yun Zuyi to assist Cai can be viewed as 
Zhang’s assurance of Cai’s power, as Yun Zuyi was an important figure in Hubei. 
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When Zhang became the Governor-General of Jiangsu, Anhui and Jiangxi in early November 1894, the 
Qing court allowed for the Hanyang Iron and Steel Works, the Bureau of Textiles, the Bureau of Guns 
and Artillery and the Bureau of Silver Coin Casting to remain under Zhang’s control.218 Cai no longer 
insisted on his resignation after hearing this information and reminded Zhang that the Hanyang Iron 
and Steel Works required the profits from the Bureau of Textiles. Cai suggested to Zhang that he 
should manage the Bureau of Textiles and Zhang later followed this suggestion, allowing Cai to 
manage the Bureau of Textiles exclusively.219 
 
During the First Sino–Japanese War, Zhang Zhidong became the Governor-General of Jiangsu, Anhui 
and Jiangxi, whereas Tan Jixun became the Governor-General of Hubei and Hunan. However, through 
Qu Tingzhao and Chen Baozhen, Zhang was able to remotely control most Hubei bureaus from 
Jiangsu, such as the Hanyang Iron and Steel Works, the Bureau of Guns and Artillery, the Bureau of 
Textiles, the Bureau of Silver Coin Casting and even the staffing of the Bureau of Brokerage and Likin 
and the Bureau of Rehabilitation.220 
 
Through Zhang Zhidong’s political influence, Hubei and Jiangsu had been closely connected during the 
First Sino–Japanese War, and the relation between these provinces is intriguing. It is not clear as to 
whether Zhang Zhidong used Jiangsu’s resources to support Hubei or used Hubei’s resources to 
support Jiangsu during the war. However, it is most likely that Zhang would have used Hubei’s 
resources to support Jiangsu, as Jiangsu was at the frontline whereas Hubei was inland, and Zhang was 
the Governor-General of Jiangsu, Anhui and Jiangxi. Indeed, Zhang ordered the Bureau of Guns and 
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Artillery in Hubei to experiment and manufacture different kinds of guns, cannons and ammunition for 
Jiangsu and the frontline in the north.221 However, Zhang also attempted to use Jiangsu’s resources to 
support Hubei even if it may have been counterintuitive. Zhang knew of the importance of rapid-fire 
cannons and, at the beginning of the war, ordered Cai Xiyong and Yun Zuyi to import the machines to 
produce rapid-fire cannons for Hubei’s Bureau of Guns and Artillery. It was clear that Zhang would 
rather use Jiangsu’s money to import new machines for Hubei than buy old machines for the Jiangnan 
General Manufacturing Bureau. 
 
At the end of the war, Zhang paid more than 300,000 silver taels to import a complete series of 
machines to manufacture rapid-fire cannons,222 a large portion of which was from coupon bonds issued 
to Chinese businessmen in Jiangsu.223 Zhang also shipped gunpowder from Jiangsu to Hubei for bullet 
manufacturing and told Liu Linxiang to reimburse these expenses, as it was also for the battalions at the 
frontline.224 Zhang also requested to Liu Linxiang that iron materials bought for Hubei’s Bureau of 
Guns and Artillery from overseas be exempt from tax when passing through Shanghai customs.225 
Moreover, during the war, Zhang transferred 1,000,000 silver taels from Jiangsu to Hubei’s Bureau of 
Iron Affairs.226 These actions demonstrate that Zhang Zhidong valued his self-strengthening projects in 
Hubei much more than those in Jiangsu and that he viewed Hubei as his most important political base 
despite being in Jiangsu during the war. 
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In negotiating military resources during the first Sino-Japanese war, Zhang Zhidong was brought into 
conflicts with various groups. Compared to the almost complete control over everything in Hubei even 
if he was not there, Zhang had limited trust on the local officials in Jiangsu, probably also limited 
control over them, and had to rely on his close private secretaries to carry out most of the important 
tasks. Zhang’s awkward position in Jiangsu and his determination to support Hubei during the war 
shows that it was difficult to balance provincial interests and central-government interests when facing 
intensive imperialist aggressions. Governors-general and governors would have to choose between 
provincial interests and central-government interests. As a result, the first Sino-Japanese war had 
further increased tension between provincial governors and the central government. Because of 
Zhang’s strong connections with Hubei, he chose to continue to support Hubei even if he was in 
Jiangsu in charge of organising military resources for the front line in the north during the war. This 
reveals a dangerous path that he trod – advancing his own political bases regardless of the Qing court’s 
wishes. 
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Chapter 5: Negotiating treaties, reparations and loans after the first Sino-Japanese war 
 
In this chapter, I will discuss Zhang Zhidong’s resistance in the opening of Suzhou and Shashi, in 
accepting the loan conditions for the 200, 000, 000 silver taels war indemnity and in the scramble for 
concessions followed by the German occupation of Kiaochow in late 1897. All his remarks and actions 
regarding post-war negotiations, treaties, reparations and loans reveal a deeper divergence between him 
and the central government after the war. The conflict between provincial governors and the central 
government was not just only between Zhang Zhidong and the central government. Liu Kunyi also 
resisted following the loan conditions for the 200, 000, 000 silver taels war indemnity. China’s defeat 
in the first Sino-Japanese war and the Treaty of Shimonoseki, as Zhang Zhidong pointed out, had 
undermined China’s basis for growth. Neither provincial governors nor the central government wanted 
to bear the heavy war indemnity and other pressure brought by the defeat. Consequently, the 
divergence between Zhang Zhidong and the central government catalyzed. Zhang disagreed with but 
was unable to influence the decisions made by the central government regarding his governing 
provinces. Yet, he still resisted fully following the policies made by the central government about his 
governing provinces. With increasing imperialist pressure, the central-provincial relationship in late 
Qing China had deteriorated further.   
 
The first Sino-Japanese war ended disastrously in Qing China and in April 1895, the treaty of 
Shimonoseki was signed between China and Japan. I will list all the articles in the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki because the details are important in understanding the Qing court’s and Zhang Zhidong’s 
later choices and actions. There were eleven articles in the treaty:227 
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1. China recognized the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea. 
2. China ceded Liaodong Peninsula (later Japan returned it to China, forced by the Triple 
Intervention by Russia, France and Germany), Taiwan and the Pescadores group to Japan. 
3. Sino-Japanese border delimitation shall be completed within one year. 
4. China agreed to pay 200, 000, 000 silver taels to Japan as a war indemnity in eight instalments 
within seven years after the exchange of the notifications of this treaty. From the due date of the 
first instalment, the annual interest rate on all unpaid indemnity was 5%. If China paid the 
whole amount of the indemnity within three years after the exchange of the notifications of the 
treaty, all interest shall be waived.  
5. Chinese inhabitants of the territories ceded to Japan shall leave within two years. Those who 
didn’t leave those territories within two years became Japanese subjects. The final transfer of 
Taiwan to Japan shall be completed within two months after the exchange of the notifications of 
this treaty.  
6. All previous treaties between China and Japan became invalid. China and Japan shall conclude 
a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation and a Convention to regulate Frontier Intercourse and 
Trade according to the Treaties, Conventions and Regulations between China and European 
powers. Japanese government, its officials, commerce, navigation, frontier intercourse and 
trade, industries, ships and subjects shall in every respect be accorded by China most favoured 
nation treatment. In addition, the following conventions shall take effect within six months after 
the date of the treaty:  
1st: China opened Shashi (in Hubei), Chongqing (in Sichuan), Suzhou (in Jiangsu), 
Hangzhou (in Zhejiang) to the trade, residence, industries and manufactures of Japanese 
subjects under the same conditions and with the same privileges and facilities as exist in 
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the present open cities, towns and ports of China. The Japanese government shall have 
the right to station Consuls in these named places.  
2nd: Steam navigation for vassals under the Japanese flag shall be extended to the Upper 
Yangtze river from Ichang to Chongqing, to the Wusong river and the Canal from 
Shanghai to Fuzhou and Hangzhou. The navigation of the inland waters of China by 
foreign vassals shall be enforced in respect of the above-named routes until new Rules 
and Regulations are agreed to.  
3rd: Japanese subjects purchasing goods or producing in the interior of China or 
transporting imported merchandise into the interior of China shall have the right 
temporarily to rent or hire warehouse without the payment of any taxes or exactions.  
4th: Japanese subjects shall be allowed to import into China all kinds of machinery 
paying only the stipulated import duties, and engage in all kinds of manufacturing 
industries in all the open cities, towns and ports of China. In respect of inland transit and 
internal taxes, duties, charges and exactions of all kinds and also in respect of 
warehousing and storage facilities in inland China, all articles manufactured by Japanese 
subjects in China shall enjoy the same privileges and exemptions as merchandise 
imported by Japanese subjects into China. Additional Rules and Regulations are 
provided in the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation.  
7. With three months after the exchange of the notifications of the treaty, the evacuation of China 
by the armies of Japan shall be completed. 
8. Japan temporarily occupied Weihaiwei and shall evacuate from Weihaiwei, provided the 
Chinese government paid the first two instalments of the war indemnity, pledged the Customs 
Revenues of China as security for the payment of the principal and interest of the remaining 
instalments of the indemnity, and exchanged the notifications of the Treaty of Commerce and 
Navigation. 
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9. All prisoners of war, Japanese subjects accused of being military spies or charged with any 
other military offences shall be restored and not be punished.  
10. All offensive military operations shall cease upon the exchange of the notification of this treaty 
11. The present treaty shall be notified by their majesties the Emperor of China and the Emperor of 
Japan and the notifications shall be exchanged at Yantai on 8 May 1895.  
 
The autonomy of Korea, the loss of Liaodong Peninsula, Taiwan and the Pescadores group to Japan, 
and the 200, 000, 000 silver taels war indemnity affected China greatly and caused astonishment and 
resentment among the Chinese people at that time. They were harsher than any previous unequal treaties 
between China and European powers. Upon hearing the details of the treaty, Zhang was furious and 
horrified. He highlighted that the cession of territories and the occupation of Weihaiwei by Japanese 
armies were a tiger at the door and that the 200,000,000 silver taels in war indemnity would undermine 
China’s basis for growth. 
 
However, Zhang Zhidong also paid attention to treaty articles related to treaty ports and commerce and 
accused those articles of poisoning China.228 Zhang’s attention to articles related to commerce in this 
treaty was not only because the concept of “liquan (sovereign right to profit)” was central in Zhang’s 
political thought, but also because these articles touched his interest in his governing provinces. 
Suzhou, one of the ports to be opened, was in Jiangsu and Shashi, the other port, was in Hubei. After 
the first Sino-Japanese war, he immediately became involved in the negotiations over the opening of 
the four treaty ports. 
 
                                                
228 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 3, 256-262. 
Mu Zhang 114 
 114 
The opening of Suzhou and Shashi 
 
As early as July 1895, Zhang Zhidong had reminded Kui Jun, the governor of Suzhou to quickly make 
a detailed map of Suzhou and purchase the land in convenient locations before the Japanese came to 
Suzhou (Figure 10).229 At this stage, the Qing court also asked for advice from governors-general and 
governors regarding opening new treaty ports (Article 6) stipulated in the Treaty of Shimonoseki.230 
Zhang Zhidong suggested using Ningbo as a model for the new treaty ports. Unlike Shanghai, 
foreigners in Ningbo lived in places called commercial fields in which Chinese officials built all the 
infrastructure, set up the police and had jurisdiction over the inhabitants.231 The Qing court and the 
Zongli Yamen agreed with Zhang and insisted on setting up commercial fields instead of concessions in 
the new treaty ports. Zhang Zhidong also insisted that the regulations about the four new treaty ports 
should be the same. He telegraphed the governors and prefects of those new treaty ports and asked 
them not to sign regulations with the Japanese individually but to wait for Suzhou’s regulations. Huang 
Zunxian, representing Zhang, was in charge of the negotiations in Shanghai. He clearly stated that there 
were three kinds of regulations regarding treaty ports in China: 1) foreign concessions in Shanghai with 
extraterritorial jurisdiction; 2) isolated foreign concessions in Guangzhou with only foreign inhabitants; 
3) commercial field in Ningbo with foreign and Chinese inhabitants. The Treaty of Shimonoseki did 
not stipulate which regulations the new treaty ports should follow. Huang pointed out that the 
concessions in Shanghai were abnormal since they were set up during the Taiping Rebellions when the 
Qing court had no means to protect Shanghai. It was better to use the regulations in Ningbo since they 
were similar to the treaty regulations in Japan and were beneficial to business. If Japan insisted on 
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following the Shanghai regulations and on gaining extraterritorial jurisdiction in those new treaty ports, 
China had to isolate foreign inhabitants as happened under the Guangzhou regulations. Through 
interpreters in the Consulate-General of Japan in Shanghai, Huang reminded the Japanese that it was 
better to assign the Japanese Consul of Shanghai as a plenipotentiary representative to negotiate the 
regulations with Zhang Zhidong, the governor-general of Jiangsu, Anhui and Jiangxi. Although the 
Ambassador of Japan to China could negotiate the regulations with the Zongli Yamen in Beijing, 
without the support from the governor-general, Japan would still find it difficult to carry out the 
regulations.232 
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Figure 10: Suzhou with respect to Shanghai and Nanjing 
Source: Created by the author using Google Map 
 
 
From Huang’s message to the Japanese, we can see that Zhang Zhidong took a hard line in the 
negotiations with Japan and tried to protect China’s sovereign right as much as possible. He explained 
to the Zongli Yamen: Since Chinese criminals would attempt to seek foreign protection in the treaty 
ports, it was crucial to isolate foreigners and prevent Chinese from living in these treaty ports 
concessions where foreigners had extraterritorial jurisdiction.233 At this stage, the Zongli Yamen 
supported Zhang, let him take the lead in the negotiations and preferred the Japanese to negotiate with 
Zhang not with the Zongli Yamen in Beijing.234  
 
Because of Zhang’s hardline position and Japan’s determination to set up exclusive Japanese 
concessions with extraterritorial jurisdiction in China, the negotiations over the new treaty ports had 
reached an impasse in late 1896. The Japanese government disapproved of the agreement reached 
between Huang Zunxian and the Japanese Consul of Shanghai in 1895.235 Zhang Zhidong also returned 
to Hubei in 1896, became the governor-general of Hubei and Hunan again, and could no longer 
dominate the negotiations on regulations about Suzhou. In late 1896, Robert Hart, the Inspector-
General of China’s Imperial Maritime Customs Service, requested the Zongli Yamen not to assign 
exclusive foreign concessions to any countries and only set up an international concession in the new 
treaty ports for all the countries. Zhang seized this opportunity and insisted that Shashi (Figure 11), the 
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new treaty port in Hubei, should also set up an international concession in which Chinese police had 
control.236 
 
 
Figure 11: Shashi with respect to Wuhan 
Source: Created by the author using Google Map 
 
 
However, seeing Zhang’s hardline position, Japan decided to bypass Zhang and turned to put pressure 
on the Zongli Yamen in Beijing. In October 1896, the Japanese Ambassador to China delivered an 
ultimatum to the Zongli Yamen, asking for exclusive Japanese concessions with extraterritorial 
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jurisdiction. Otherwise Japan and China would be at war again and the Treaty of Shimonoseki 
abrogated. Fearing Japan’s military power, the Qing court accepted Japan’s request and even agreed to 
set up exclusive Japanese concessions in existing treaty ports, such as in Shanghai, Tianjin, Xiamen 
and Hankou in exchange of 10% tax on Japanese products manufactured in China.237 Considering that 
there were still Japanese troops in Weihaiwei, a port near the Yellow Sea, the Zongli Yamen’s choice 
was not surprising.  
 
Since Japan had acquired the Zongli Yamen’s permission and the support of an Imperial Edict, Zhang 
Zhidong had to agree to Japan setting up exclusive Japanese concessions in Shashi no matter how 
unwilling he was. The Zongli Yamen also asked Zhang to follow the regulations about Hangzhou for 
details when setting up the concessions in Shashi. Zhang Zhidong notified Yu Taotai who was in 
charge of the opening of Shashi and asked him to follow the Zongli Yamen’s decision.238 He also 
reminded Yu that local officials should not build any infrastructure for the Japanese since Japan 
enjoyed extraterritorial jurisdiction in the concessions. Therefore, it was Japan’s responsibility to build 
any needed infrastructure.239 
 
However, Zhang Zhidong quickly changed his mind because he was not happy with the regulations 
regarding the new treaty port of Hangzhou. He decided not to follow the Hangzhou regulations in 
Shashi and insisted that Japan should build the infrastructure by itself and that only Japanese could live 
in the concessions. No Chinese inhabitants were allowed. He requested Yu Taotai to use the regulations 
about the English and German concessions in Hankou as a model in setting up regulations about Shashi 
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since inland treaty ports were different from coastal ports.240 Zhang Zhidong was furious and 
determined not to follow the Hangzhou regulations because the Japanese not only asked for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction but also required that China build all the infrastructure in the concessions for 
them according to Hangzhou regulations. He said to Yu: “the regulations were neither following the 
Ningbo regulations nor the Shanghai regulations; no treaty ports had such regulations before. If all the 
new treaty ports and other foreign powers requested the same regulations, what could we do?”.241  
 
Despite the pressure from the Zongli Yamen and the Japanese representatives in Shashi, Zhang Zhidong 
argued that the Treaty of Shimonoseki did not ask the Chinese government to provide infrastructure in 
the concessions. Shashi was also different from Hangzhou since concessions in Shashi were near the 
Yangtze river and it was necessary to spend over 200, 000 silver teals to build an embankment to keep 
the water from flooding. Considering the pressure Yu faced in the negotiations regarding Shashi, Zhang 
Zhidong sent his close private secretary Liang Dunyan to help Yu. Zhang told Yu and Liang to hold on 
to the Treaty of Shimonoseki and Hankou regulations and not to agree to any articles that were not in 
the treaty or Hankou regulations. In the end, Zhang was so angry at the arrogant attitude that Japanese 
representatives exhibited in the negotiations that he even instructed Yu and Liang to back out of any 
given promises if they were not in the Treaty of Shimonoseki and Hankou regulations. He said to Yu 
and Liang: “Japan will not rupture Sino-Japanese relations; even if it does, I don’t care”. Moreover, 
Zhang Zhidong telegraphed the governor of Hangzhou and the governor of Suzhou, asking them also 
not to promise the Japanese anything more than what was provided for in the Treaty of Shimonoseki 
and according to the most favoured nation treatment..242 
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From Zhang’s active involvement in the negotiations regarding the new treaty ports, we can see that 
Zhang Zhidong and the Zongli Yamen sometimes could not agree with each other. Zhang Zhidong must 
have been very disappointed when he heard that the Zongli Yamen had agreed to assign exclusive 
concessions with extraterritorial jurisdiction to Japan. At the beginning of the negotiations, the Zongli 
Yamen had accepted his suggestions and entrusted the negotiations to him. However, facing Japanese 
pressure and the nearby Japanese army, the Zongli Yamen easily yielded to Japanese power whereas 
Zhang was still trying hard to negotiate with the Japanese even after the Zongli Yamen gave up. This 
kind of disjunction between Zhang Zhidong and the Zongli Yamen in dealing with imperialist pressure, 
such as Japanese demands for extraterritorial jurisdiction, appeared not occasionally and would occur 
more and more with increasing imperialist pressure in the last years of the nineteenth century.  
 
Seeking loans to pay the 200, 000, 000 silver taels war indemnity 
 
According to Article 4 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, if China could pay the whole 200,000,000 silver 
taels’ indemnity within three years of the exchange of the treaty notifications, the five per cent annual 
interest would be waived.243 Therefore, after the First Sino-Japanese War, the Qing court actively sought 
foreign loans to repay the indemnity. In 1895, the Qing court borrowed 400,000,000 francs from Russia 
and France to pay the first instalment of the indemnity and the ransom for the Liaodong Peninsula. In 
1896, it borrowed 16,000,000 pounds from Britain and Germany to pay the second instalment of the 
indemnity. Both the Russo–French loan and the British–German loan were secured by maritime customs 
revenues.244 
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In 1897, when the third instalment was due, the Qing court would have liked to pay off the remaining 
100,000,000 silver taels so that China was not required to pay the five per cent yearly interest. However, 
China had no more customs revenue to use as security to obtain foreign loans. Foreign banks were 
reluctant to lend money to China. Li Hongzhang, Zhang Yinhuan and Weng Tonghe, who oversaw the 
seeking of foreign loans in the Zongli Yamen (the government body responsible for foreign policy), also 
sometimes disagreed with each other. In June, Li started to negotiate loans from the Hongkong and 
Shanghai Bank Corporation (HSBC), which had provided the British–German loan in 1896. However, 
this time, HSBC, under the influence of Robert Hart, the Inspector-General of China’s Imperial Maritime 
Customs Service, asked to bring likin under customs control.245 HSBC demanded that the Qing court use 
salt likin in southeast provinces as security for the loan and that the likin be collected under the 
supervision of Hart. Li did not want Hart involved in salt likin collection and thought that the Inspector-
General of China’s Imperial Maritime Customs Service intervening in salt likin collection contravened 
national regulations. Weng also disapproved of the use of salt likin as security for the loan. The 
negotiations between the Zongli Yamen and HSBC had reached a deadlock.246 
 
Given HSBC’s harsh loan conditions, Li and Weng turned to other foreign banks and actively sought 
loans from other channels. Unfortunately, no foreign banks could provide such a large amount as 
100,000,000 silver taels. The banks that contacted Li all turned out to be fraudulent companies.247 Until 
November 1897, Li and Weng could not find a suitable loan. When Zhang Yinhuan returned from the 
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celebration of the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Victoria in London, he disapproved of Li’s actions and 
insisted that China contact the British Ambassador to China and HSBC for loans. Weng also agreed with 
Zhang’s suggestion at that time.248 
 
While Li, Weng and Zhang disagreed upon foreign loans, Germany occupied Kiaochow in Shangdong 
on 13 November 1897, capitalizing on the murder of two German missionaries in Shangdong. This 
incident encouraged the imperialist powers demanding concessions in China and a new push for 
concessions began. Li still played one power against another and contacted both Russia and Britain for 
loans, although he tended to borrow money from Russia. However, given China’s weak position facing 
the new push for concessions, both Russia and Britain demanded harsher loan conditions, such as using 
grain tax and salt likin as security and hiring people from their country as Inspector-General of China’s 
Imperial Maritime Customs Service. The Russian ambassador to China and the British ambassador to 
China both pressed China fiercely. The Qing court proposed to borrow 50,000,000 silver taels from each 
country but was refused by both. 
 
In mid-January 1898, Weng Tonghe and Zhang Yinhuan contacted Hart secretly, without notifying Li 
Hongzhang. They quickly signed a loan contract with HSBC in February: China borrowed 100,000,000 
silver taels form HSBC with a 4.5 per cent interest rate, 83 per cent discount (HSBC only provided 83 
per cent of 100,000,000 silver taels—only 83,000,000 silver taels—but China had to pay principal and 
interest based on 100,000,000 silver taels) and 2.5 per cent fee, using salt likin in two places in Jiangsu 
and one place in Zhejiang as security. Weng was not pleased with Hart intervening in salt tax and likin 
collection and knew that this loan condition would attract fierce objections from governors-general, since 
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salt tax and likin constituted a large portion of provincial revenues. However, Weng and Zhang still 
accepted this condition and used salt tax and likin as security to obtain the HSBC loan.249 
 
Hearing the news about the HSBC loan in late December 1897, Zhang Zhidong in Hubei was troubled. 
He heard that Britain requested harsh conditions for the loan, including the opening of Port Arthur (on 
the Liaodong Peninsula), Xiangtan (in his governing province Hunan) and Nanning (in Guangxi near the 
Vietnam border) as treaty ports, extending the Burma railway from Yunnan to Hankou (in his governing 
province Hubei), forbidding assigning concessions along the Yangtze river to any country except Britain 
and revising likin regulations. In the meantime, Russia also requested to station troops in Port Arthur if 
China required its help to drive out German troops in Kiaochow. Zhang feared that China was in danger 
of disintegration if the Zongli Yamen agreed to Britain’s conditions for the HSBC loan.250 
 
Zhang did not understand why the Zongli Yamen hurried to borrow money from Britain to repay the war 
indemnity. He argued with the Zongli Yamen that the war indemnity could wait, according to the Treaty 
of Shimonoseki, since there were no other conditions attached to it. ‘Why obtain a loan with harsh 
conditions to pay another loan which was not urgent and had no additional conditions?’ Zhang asked. He 
highlighted that if the Burma railway extended to Hankou and only British concessions along the Yangtze 
river were allowed, the 12 provinces in the south of the Yangtze river would be lost to Britain overnight. 
He urged several times that the Zongli Yamen not obtain the HSBC loan and telegraphed Chen Baozhen 
(the Governor of Hunan), Sheng Xuanhuai (Ministry of Imperial Railway), Wang Wenshao 王文韶 (the 
Governor-General of Zhili) and Liu Kunyi (the Governor-General of Jiangsu, Anhui and Jiangxi) for 
support to prevent the loan.251 
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Despite Zhang’s objection, Weng Tonghe and Zhang Yinhuan signed the contract for the HSBC loan in 
February 1898. Their considerations were different from Zhang’s. As officials in the Zongli Yamen and 
the Ministry of Revenues, the security of Beijing was their priority and they were keen to repay the war 
indemnity within three years so that Japanese troops would withdraw from Weihaiwei as soon as possible. 
They also preferred to pay off the war indemnity at once and save the interest, since they knew that it 
would be difficult for the Ministry of Revenues to apportion the war indemnity to the provinces without 
governors-general and governors resisting the payments.252 
 
According to Zhang Yinhuan’s diary, the HSBC loan used salt likin in Yichang and other southeast 
provinces as security, not only the salt likin from two places in Jiangsu and one place in Zhejiang as 
previously proposed.253 It was March 1898 that Zhang learned that salt likin in Yichang was being used 
as security. He was furious and resisted giving up the right to collect salt likin to customs. He instructed 
the Taotai in Yichang to collect salt likin for customs and only to submit regular salt likin, not additional 
salt likin. He told the Taotai that other provinces, such as Anhui, were doing the same. Liu Kunyi, the 
Governor-General of Jiangsu, Anhui and Jiangxi, also resisted giving up all the salt likin to customs. He 
planned to only submit 5,000,000 silver taels as security for the HSBC loan, divided among the likin of 
all the provinces mentioned in the loan conditions.254 Because of the resistance from governors-general 
and governors, customs was not able to collect likin in the provinces. However, likin was still collected 
by Chinese local officials and submitted to customs to pay the HSBC loan.255 Salt likin from Yichang 
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equalled only approximately 740,000 silver taels each year (including additional likin) but was used to 
pay 1,000,000 silver taels for the HSBC loan. Zhang did not know how to obtain more money and asked 
the Ministry of Revenues to reduce the allocated loan payment for Hubei. The Ministry of Revenues 
refused his request on 29 August 1898.256 However, Zhang could not find any other revenues in his 
governing provinces to add to salt likin from Yichang to pay the loan and until October 1898, he was 
still paying 40,000 silver taels per month less than required, despite the Zongli Yamen requesting that he 
pay the full amount several times.257 
 
The scramble for concessions 
 
In terms of responding to the crisis of scramble for concessions which started in late 1897, Zhang 
Zhidong was also not able to influence the policy of the central government. Shortly after German 
occupation of Kiaochow on 13 November 1897, Russia asked for Port Arthur to station troops if China 
required its help to drive out German troops in Kiaochow.258 Russia also asked for Port Arthur as a 
reward for pressing Japan to return the Liaodong Peninsula to China. Under Russian pressure, and also 
in hope of Russian intervention in the Kiaochow incident, China agreed Russian occupation of Port 
Arthur. With newly created German concession and Russian concession on Chinese land, other 
imperialist powers also started to demand Chinese concessons. The scramble for concessions was 
related to the scramble for railway concessions in China. 
 
Since Russia had already occupied Port Arthur, Britain decided to give up Port Arthur in order to avoid 
conflict with Russia. Zhang Zhidong predicted that Britain would demand another port in the north.259 
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As Zhang expected, Britain occupied Weihaiwei by force after Russia leased Port Arthur from China. 
Weihaiwei and Port Arthur controlled the entrance to the Bohai Gulf, the seaward approaches to 
Beijing.260 He also predicted that Britain would ask for the port of Wusong, the entrance to Shanghai, 
and France would ask for Guangzhou Bay. This was a horrible situation in Zhang’s eyes. Zhang 
telegraphed urgently to Sheng Xuanhuai, Ministry of Imperial Railway, who was in Beijing at that 
time, and begged him to suggest the Zongli Yamen giving Zhoushan islands instead of Wusong to 
Britain. He complaint to Sheng that the Zongli Yamen had prejudice against him and would not listen to 
his advice. So he had to ask for Sheng’s help. He wrote to Sheng distressingly: “No nation in the world 
could survive with coast ports all lost to others. Now the ports in the north had lost. If the ports in the 
south were also lost to others, China would face a situation unprecedented in four thousand years. 
China would be suppressed by other countries and lose its autonomy forever”.261 
 
Zhang Zhidong also resisted to open Xiangtan (in Hunan) according to the HSBC loan conditions. 
After occupying Weihaiwei in the north, Britain was keen to open more ports in the south, especially in 
inland China along the Yangtze river. However, Zhang Zhidong was very cautious in opening ports in 
Hunan since people in Hunan were conservative and impulsive. They did not like foreigners and there 
were lots of anti-foreign placards circulating in Changsha (capital of Hunan). Zhang suggested opening 
Yuezhou instead of Xiangtan since Yuezhou was more isolated in Hunan. The British consul asked to 
open more ports in Hunan, including Changsha, Xiangtan and Changde in order to foster a culture of 
openness. Zhang telegraphed the Zongli Yamen and argued that it was just because Hunanese were 
conservative that only one port could be opened. Otherwise, anti-foreign incidents would occur and 
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Britain could demand more concessions.262 Zhang also insisted on opening Yuezhou by China itself 
and not to set up any concessions.263  
 
During this time, Liu Kunyi, the governor general of Jiangsu, Anhui and Jiangsu, opened Wusong as a 
self-opening port too in order to avoid British occupation. He even modified the previous year’s local 
records to establish the fact that all the lands in strategic locations had been bought by the 
government.264 Li Hongzhang also asked and got permission to open Qinhuang Island, another port 
along the Bohai Gulf, by China itself before the foreigners noticed its value. All these self-opening 
ports followed the Ningbo regulations, and only allowed foreigners to live and do business in assigned 
commercial fields without extraterritorial jurisdiction.265 
 
After the first Sino-Japanese war, although Zhang Zhidong was not able to change the policy of the 
Zongli Yamen when it yielded to foreign powers, he tried his best to resist foreign influence and 
maintain Chinese autonomy in his governing provinces. He ensured that the Japanese concessions in 
Shashi were isolated and no Chinese were allowed to live in there. He refused to let the Customs 
collect salt likin in Yichang and only agreed to hand over part of the salt likin to cover the HSBC loan. 
He also only agreed to open Yuezhou in Hunan by China itself and not to set up any foreign 
concessions in Yuezhou. In his governing provinces, Zhang Zhidong was determined to defend his 
rights and interests, and was even prepared to discount the contract decided between the central 
government and foreign powers. This chapter shows that postwar negotiations between the central 
government and the imperialist powers touched on provincial interests. The opening of treaty ports and 
concessions, and the 200,000,000 silver taels’ war indemnity significantly affected Zhang’s governing 
                                                
262 Ibid, 462-465. 265-266. 
263 Ibid, 471-472, 504-506, 522-523, 536-539. 
264 Sheng Xuanhuai, Yu zhai cun gao [Survived works from Yu zhai]. Jin dai zhong guo shi liao cong kan. ed. Shen Yunlong 
(Taipei: Wenhai,1966-1987), 756. 
265 Yang Tianhong, Kouan kaifang yu shehui biange: Jindai zhongguo zikai shangbu yanjiu. 
Mu Zhang 128 
 128 
provinces. However, as a provincial governor-general with limited power, he could not influence 
central government decisions. He could only exercise his power in the provinces to minimize the 
effects of, or even refuse to follow, those decisions. This further supports Kwang Ching Liu’s argument 
that the power of governors-general and governors was limited. However, the discussions also 
demonstrate that provincial governors such as Zhang still could disregard central government decisions 
if they saw those decisions as harmful to provincial interests. Although Zhang’s influence on the 
central government was weak and his power was limited, preventing financial or military autonomy, he 
still had significant control over provincial matters (e.g., customs was unable to collect likin in the 
provinces because of Zhang’s resistance). This is the nature of provincial power in the late Qing 
dynasty. Long-serving governors-general such as Zhang Zhidong had no power to nor wished to 
overpower the central government, but were attached to their governing provinces and saw their 
provinces as their most important political bases. Consequently, they were prepared to sacrifice central 
government interests for provincial interests, especially when they perceived a weak central 
government facing increasing imperialist pressure. In Zhang Zhidong’s case, he preferred to stand up 
and deal with the imperialist powers by himself regarding provincial matters rather than follow the 
decisions made by the Zongli Yamen. This led him eventually into conflict with central-government 
policies.   
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Chapter 6: The scramble for railway concessions 
 
In the negotiations of railway loans, we could see that Zhang Zhidong and the central government 
again disagreed on various matters. Although Zhang and the central government agreed that building 
railways was crucial in saving China, they had different plans regarding which railway to build and 
from which country to borrow money. By examining the negotiations of various railway loans, I will 
show that again Zhang Zhidong had little influence on the central government’s policy especially after 
1897, and as a result, Zhang Zhidong started to withdraw to his governing provinces more. Other 
prominent figures, such as Sheng Xuanhuai, Li Hongzhang, Zhang Yinhuan, Weng Tonghe and later 
Rong Lu had more say in building railways in China. Thus this chapter will also touch on Zhang 
Zhidong’s relationship with these prominent figures and the relationship between these figures. 
Understanding their relationship is crucial in understanding Chinese-central-provincial relations in the 
late nineteenth century. 
 
The Beijing-Hankou railway 
 
From the early 1860s to late 1880s, Chinese officials had been arguing over whether China needed 
railways. People who objected to the building of railways in China argued that railways would benefit 
China’s enemies, making them arrive in China’s important cities (such as Beijing) from Chinese 
borders quicker. Railways would also disturb the locals and deprive them of their means of living. 
Moreover, railways would damange the geomancy of local tombs. People who support the building of 
railways argued that railways would benefit the domestic economy by making the transportation of 
domestic goods much easier. Far from benefiting China’s enimies, railways would support China’s 
national defence by making the transportation of Chinese troops easier. Because of many objections, up 
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to the 1880s, only a few track miles of railways had been built in China with support from Li 
Hongzhang and Prince Chun (Yihuan).266 In 1889, the Tianjin-Dagu railway had been built and Li 
Hongzhang planned to extend it to Tongzhou (near Beijing) for defence reasons. This caused a new 
round of debate on building railways in China among Chinese officials. The Qing court asked many 
governors-general and governors, including Zhang Zhidong, to provide advice on this matter. Seizing 
this opportunity, Zhang Zhidong proposed to build the Beijing-Hankou line, a railway across north and 
south China starting from Lugou Qiao (just outside Beijing) to Hankou in Hubei as a means to promote 
domestic trade. Zhang Zhidong was not the first person who suggested the building of a Beijing-
Hankou railway. Xue Fucheng and Liu Mingchuan had suggested it in 1878 and 1880 respectively. But 
Zhang Zhidong was the first person who explained the significance of this railway comprehensively 
and provided a detailed plan for building this railway. In order to build the railway without relying on 
foreign iron and steel, Zhang Zhidong even planned to establish the Hanyang Iron and Steel works to 
produce the rails for the railway. The Qing court took Zhang’s advice and tranfered Zhang Zhidong 
from Guangdong to Hubei in order to build the Beijing-Hankou railway.267  
 
Zhang Zhidong’s experience in the first Sino-Japanese war in charge of logistics made him realize the 
importance of a railway across north and south China even more. After the war, in his memorial to the 
throne providing advice about post-war development, he listed building railways as one of the 
priorities.268 However, after the war, Zhang Zhidong did not have not enough funds to support the 
operation of the Hanyang Iron and Steel works because of the large amount of war indemnity and 
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foreign loans passed on to the provinces. He had to change the Hanyang Iron and Steel works from a 
state enterprise to a commercial enterprise and find someone to run and finance the Hanyang Iron and 
Steel works for him.269 Zhang had considered both foreign and Chinese sources of capital, and finally 
decided to transfer the Hanyang Iron and Steel works to Sheng Xuanhuai.270  
 
Sheng Xuanhuai was a major figure in the late nineteenth century. Sheng was a native of Changzhou, 
Jiangsu. His father, Sheng Kang, knew Li Hongzhang and had served under Hu Linyi, the governor of 
Hubei during the Taiping Rebellion. Sheng Kang became Hubei Provincial Surveillance Commissioner 
in 1863. Since 1870s, Sheng Xuanhuai had been a subordinate of Li Hongzhang, established and was in 
charge of Li’s many self-strengthening projects, such as the China Merchants Steamship Navigation 
company and the Imperial Chinese Telegraph Administration. Since 1883, Sheng was the Tianjin 
Customs Commissioner and was in charge of logistics at the front line in the north during the first Sino-
Japanese war.271  
 
After the war, Li Hongzhang became the subject of public criticism, was deprived of any government 
post and left the position of Governor General of Zhili. Wang Wenshao became the new Governor 
General of Zhili. In late 1895, some censors also impeached Sheng Xuanhuai for bribery and 
corruption during the war. Sheng was subjected to an investigation and had to leave the China 
Merchants Steamship Navigation company and the Imperial Chinese Telegraph Administration 
temporarily (he was later restored to those positions). Without Li Hongzhang’s support and protection, 
Sheng felt that his political career was in danger. So he started to contact his acquaintance Yun Zuyi 
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who was also a native of Changzhou and was currently the Hubei Provincial Surveillance 
Commissioner, seeking new opportunities in Zhang Zhidong’s government. 272  
 
In early 1896, Sheng Xuanhuai arrived in Hubei and met Zhang Zhidong. At the same time, Zhang 
Zhidong also got a message from the Qing court asking him together with the Governor General of 
Zhili, Wang Wenshao, to seek Chinese funds and supervise the building of the Beijing-Hankou line. 
Considering the large amount of funds needed to build the Beijing-Hankou line, Zhang and Sheng felt 
that it was very difficult to seek Chinese funds since Chinese businessmen were often reluctant to 
invest in new projects if the prospect of the project was unclear. Sheng suggested establishing a Lu-
Han railway company and seek foreign loans first to build the railway. After the building of the railway 
when the Chinese businessmen saw the profit that they could make in running the railway, Chinese 
businessmen could invest in the company and repay the foreign loans. In establishing a Lu-Han railway 
company, Zhang, Sheng and Wang could still control the building of the Beijing-Hankou line even if 
they used foreign capital. Zhang Zhidong was keen to build the Beijing-Hankou line as soon as 
possible, and thus agreed with Sheng and tried to persuade Wang adopting Sheng’s advice. Although 
the Qing court asked him to consider several Chinese businessmen who claimed that they could invest 
10, 000, 000 silver taels, Zhang Zhidong and Sheng Xuanhuai did not believe that the funds from these 
Chinese businessmen was without foreign influence. Thus Zhang only planned to examine these 
Chinese businessmen perfunctorily, and then told the court that these businessmen were not reliable 
and suggested the court establishing the Lu-Han railway company.273 Here we see again that Zhang 
Zhidong discounted the Qing court’s wish not to use foreign loans and put the building of the Beijing-
Hankou line in the highest priority. The Governor-general of Zhili, Wang Wenshao agreed with Zhang 
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and Sheng. They decided to submit a memorial to the throne together asking the court to allow them to 
establish the Lu-Han railway company. They were very careful in choosing words in the memorial and 
telegraphed each other several times in order to get the words right since they were afraid that the court 
would insist on using Chinese funds and refuse to use foreign capital.274  
 
Hearing that Robert Hart, the Inspector-General of China’s Imperial Maritime Customs Service, 
planned to set up a bank, Sheng Xuanhuai also suggested establishing a bank.275 However, Zhang 
Zhidong told Sheng that he might arouse intense jealousy if he were in charge of both a railway 
company and a bank. Zhang preferred Sheng to first establish the Lu-Han railway company then submit 
a request to the court to found a bank. Thus he refused Sheng’s request to submit a memorial to the 
throne recommending Sheng.276 Zhang also disapproved of Sheng asking for the building of the 
Guangdong railway by the company, fearing others’ criticism and jealousy. Nonetheless, Zhang still 
submitted a memorial to the throne helping Sheng to get the court’s permission to build the Guangdong 
railway fearing that Sheng might withdraw from the task.277 In September 1896, Sheng Xuanhuai went 
to Beijing upon the Emperor’s request after Zhang Zhidong and Wang Wenshao recommended him for 
the position of manager of the Lu-Han railway company.278 In October, the Emperor approved the 
founding of the railway company and appointed Sheng as the person who was in charge of building all 
the railways in China.279 Sheng also got permission from the court to establish a bank in order to attract 
Chinese capital.280 Now Sheng Xuanhuai’s political career had reached a new level. He became a 
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central government official supervising all the railways in China, the chief manager of the Imperial 
Chinese Railways Company. At the same time, he was the founder of the Imperial Bank of China in 
Shanghai, the first bank founded by Chinese in China, and was still in charge of the Hanyang Iron and 
Steel works, the China Merchants Steamship Navigation company and the Imperial Chinese Telegraph 
Administration.281 
 
With the Qing court’s support, Zhang Zhidong, Wang Wenshao and Sheng Xuanhuai started to seek 
funds to build the Beijing-Hankou line. They planned to build the railway from both ends, starting from 
Lugou Qiao and Hankou at the same time, in accordance with the court’s wishes.282 In March 1897, the 
Belgian consul contacted Zhang Zhidong and told him that Belgium would like to provide a loan to 
China to build the Beijing-Hankou line. Zhang asked for five conditions regarding the loan:  
1) 4% yearly interest rate; 
2) no other discounts or fees;  
3) China to choose building materials, not necessarily using Belgium materials;  
4) Belgium could not intervene in the building of the railway;  
5) Belgium provided a loan first, then China would build the railway. The loan could not use the 
railway that had already been built as security. 
 
The Bulgian consul in Hankou accepted all the conditions except Condition 1 and asked for a 5.5% 
yearly interest rate. Zhang Zhidong believed that Belgium would intervene in China’s affairs less since 
Belgium was only a small country. He also believed that Belgium would reduce the yearly interest rate 
                                                
281 Feuerwerker, China's Early Industrialization; Sheng Hsuan-huai (1844-1916) and Mandarin Enterprise, 189-241. 
282 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol. 9, 158. 
Mu Zhang 135 
 135 
if Belgium knew that Britain and America were providing loans with less interest. Therefore, Zhang 
would rather borrow money from Belgium than from Britain or America.283  
 
In May 1897, Zhang Zhidong made a draft contract with the Belgian consul to get loans from Belgium 
to build the Beijing-Hankou line. Belgium agreed to reduce the interest rate of the loan to 4% per year. 
But the loan was 90% discounted. After calculation, this was even cheaper than 5% yearly interest rate 
with no discount. Zhang believed that the loan conditions were good and decided to telegraph the 
Zongli Yamen to get permission. He also asked the Zongli Yamen to redirect any enquiries about loans 
from other foreign powers to the Imperial Chinese Railways Company. Obviously, in this way, the 
company would replace the Zongli Yamen in controlling the building of Chinese railways.284 
 
Zhang Zhidong telegraphed Sheng Xuanhuai and Wang Wenshao about the Belgian loan for the 
Beijing-Hankou line. Sheng Xuanhuai worried that Zhang had taken the matter of seeking loans too 
lightly. Sheng told Wang that foreigners often provided good conditions when trying to get permission 
for the loan but asked for more benefits before signing formal contract. So Sheng Xuanhuai was still 
contacting other countries, such as Britain and America for the Beijing-Hankou line loan while 
negotiating with Belgian representatives.285 In the meantime, the Qing court refused to provide security 
for the Beijing-Hankou line loan, which put Sheng Xuanhuai at a disadvantage in the negotiations 
because Belgium and Britain both asked for a national guarantee. America did not ask for a national 
guarantee but demanded more benefits, so Sheng would not consider a American loan at the 
moment.286 Zhang Zhidong criticized the Qing court’s position in his telegram to Sheng. Zhang thought 
that the Chinese government should provide security for the railway loan, otherwise China would lose 
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the control of its railway if the Qing court allowed them to borrow foreign money using the railway as 
guarantee.287 
 
After several round of negotiations and comparing between Belgium, Britain and America, Sheng 
Xuanhuai decided to borrow money from Belgium since Belgium’s loan conditions were better with 
only a 4% yearly interest rate and 90% discount.288 Hearing that the Beijing-Hankou line was going to 
use a Belgian loan, Britain and Germany were not happy. The British ambassador and German 
ambassador tried to press the Qing court to accept their loans. Facing the pressure from Britain and 
Germany, the Qing court could not make a decision. Li Hongzhang, Sheng Xuanhuai’s old patron, was 
communicating with Sheng frequently in the Zongli Yamen at that time. He was at Sheng’s side and 
was crucial in persuading the Qing court to accept the Belgian loan. Weng Tonghe, who was then in the 
Zongli Yamen and the president of the Ministry of Revenues, also agreed with Li and Sheng. Li and 
Weng had told the court of the benefits of the Belgian loan many times. Li told British and German 
ambassador that Sheng Xuanhuai was in charge of negotiating loan contract and asked them to talk to 
Sheng.289 Therefore, we can see that the Zongli Yamen at this stage was willing to give Sheng the right 
to negotiate railway loans so that it could avoid all the pressures from foreign powers. In this way, 
foreign powers could not use railway loans as an excuse to press China for other concessions.  
 
On 27 May 1897, Sheng Xuanhai and Belgian representatives signed the draft contract for the Beijing-
Hankou line loan in Hankou. If we look at the contract carefully, we can see that Sheng Xuanhai had 
tried to get the best loan conditions as he claimed in his telegram to Li Hongzhang.290 The loan was 
only 90% discounted with a 4% yearly interest rate. The Imperial Chinese Railway Company had the 
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right to supervise Belgian engineers and workers. China could choose its own products to build the 
railway. If China could not manufacture the required building materials, China could buy materials 
from any other countries. Only if a Belgian company could match the best price would China buy 
materials from the Belgian company.291 
 
However, in July, when Sheng Xuanhuai was discussing the formal contract with Belgian 
representatives in Shanghai, they changed their minds and wanted to add an additional contract beside 
the formal contract. Compared to the contract of the newly approved HSBC loan, which was 96% 
discounted with a 5% yearly interest rate, Belgian representatives felt that the benefits that they got 
from the Beijing-Hankou line loans were too little and they asked to add an additional 7.5% fee. Sheng 
Xuanhai and Li Hongzhang of course could not agree with their request. Sheng even telegraphed the 
foreign office of Belgium and told them that Belgian representatives in Shanghai asked a large amount 
of fee beside the formal Beijing-Hankou line loan contract, which was not a good practice and would 
harm Belgian business.292 After several rounds of negotiations, Belgian representatives agreed to only 
add a few benefits. Sheng worried that other countries might also ask for more benefits if he turned to 
other countries, so he agreed to Belgium’s conditions. On 27 July 1897, Sheng and Belgian 
representatives signed the formal contact and the additional conditions on Shanghai. Compared to the 
draft contract, the yearly interest rate changed from 4% to 4.4%.293 
 
Belgian representatives changed their mind again in early 1898 after Germany occupied Kiaochow in 
Shangdong by force in November 1897, capitalising on the murder of two German missionaries in 
Shangdong.294 Seeing an unfavourable prospect for China’s future, Belgian representatives were 
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reluctant to provide money according to the loan contract for the building of the Beijing-Hankou line, 
saying that even Chinese national bonds were hard to sell in the market at the moment, let alone 
railway bonds.295 They only agreed to provide 350, 000 pounds secured by the Beijing-Hankou line at 
the beginning. Then they would provide a small installment of the loan for the building of the Beijing-
Hankou line, capped at 1, 400, 000 pounds. This was much less than the 4, 500, 000 pounds originally 
decided in the formal contract. They also required that the yearly interest rate should be changed to 5%. 
Sheng Xuanhuai was angry with Belgian representatives and asked help from Li Hongzhang, hoping 
that Li could persuade Belgium to follow the contract.296 In the meantime, the French ambassador also 
came to Li Hongzhang, asking to change the Belgian loan contract and adding more benefits since most 
of the Belgian loan was French capital.297 Li Hongzhang refused their request and was afraid that 
Belgium would finally breach the contract. He told Sheng Xuanhuai that the central government would 
not intervene in the decision about the loan and it was up to Sheng to decide if he would give Belgium 
more benefits. The government only required that the building of the Beijing-Hankou line could not be 
stopped.298 
 
Considering the current situation, Sheng Xuanhuai decided to increase the yearly interest rate to 5% as 
Belgium required, but still insisted on borrowing 4, 000, 000 pounds from Belgium according to the 
contract. He was also contacting Britain and America showing them the same loan conditions and 
indicating that he was prepared to borrow from Britain or America in case Belgium withdrew the loan. 
He only worried that the French ambassador would raise objections in the Zongli Yamen if he did not 
borrow from Belgium. Li Hongzhang told Sheng that he would send French representatives to the 
Imperial Chinese Railway Company if they came to the Zongli Yamen.299 From here we can see that the 
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Zongli Yamen still preferred Sheng Xuanhuai and the Imperial Chinese Railway Company to negotiate 
the Beijing-Hankou line loan and intended to stay out of the competitions between imperialist powers 
over the loan. 
 
Even if Sheng had increased the interest rate to 5%, Belgium still insisted on providing only 1, 400, 
000 pounds for the Beijing-Hankou line loan. Sheng complained to Li Hongzhang that Shanxi had 
agreed to pay as high as 8% interest rate per year with additional benefits to get a loan to build railways 
in Shanxi. This obviously would affect the negotiations over the Beijing-Hankou line loan. He 
suggested that the Zongli Yamen should decide an interest rate for all the foreign loans. Li Hongzhang 
told him that this was not possible since the interest rate for each loan was different.300 After so many 
negotiations, Sheng Xuanhuai was angry with Belgium’s capricious behaviour. Since he was also 
negotiating the Yue-Han railway (the Guangzhou-Hankou line) loan with America at the same time, he 
suggested borrowing money from America to build the Beijing-Hankou line too if the contract with 
Belgium was discarded. America was happy to provide loans for both the Guangzhou-Hankou line and 
the Beijing-Hankou line.301 Unfortunately, the Spanish-American war broke out in April 1898. Li 
Hongzhang worried that investors would become hesitant because of the war. America might not be 
able to provide loans for the Guangzhou-Hankou line, let alone the Beijing-Hankou line. He suggested 
that Sheng continue to negotiate with Belgium. Li also believed that it was better to seek the 
Guangzhou-Hankou line loan and the Beijing-Hankou line loan from different countries in order to 
contain the influence of the two countries on Chinese lands.302 
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However, Belgian ambassador to China insisted on changing the contract. Disputes between the 
Belgian ambassador and Sheng focused on the following points: 1) Considering the current situation, 
the Belgian ambassador worried that Beijing-Hankou line would be taken over by other countries if 
Belgium did not seek protection from a superpower. So he insisted on letting the French ambassador 
arbitrate if disputes over the Beijing-Hankou line between him and the Zongli Yamen arose. Sheng 
objected to this condition because he and Zhang Zhidong chose Belgium for the Beijing-Hankou line 
loan on the grounds that Belgium was a small country and would not intervene in Chinese affairs. If 
France was involved, things would be totally different. 2) Belgium was only willing to provide 1, 400, 
000 pounds first to build the southern section from Hankou to Xinyang and insisted that the Imperial 
Chinese Railway Company should build the northern section from Baoding to Zhengding using the 
company’s funds whereas Sheng Xuanhuai hoped that the Beijing-Hankou line could be built within 
three years and would like Belgium to build the railway from both ends. 3) Belgium asked that 
dividends and shares of the loan could be used to pay customs and huojuan (commodity dues). Sheng 
Xuanhuai disagreed.303  
 
At this stage, Russian ambassador also started to question the Beijing-Hankou line loan in the Zongli 
Yamen, asking Li Hongzhang why the contract was still not decided. It was clear that both Russia and 
France were behind Belgium in the negotiations over the loan. But now Sheng XuanHuai, Li 
Hongzhang and Zhang Zhidong had no other choice but to continue to negotiate with Belgium. 
Belgium, France and Russia were also keen to get the loan contract signed according to their desired 
conditions. So the negotiation continued. Regarding point 2, Sheng agreed to a Belgian loan to support 
the building of the southern section from Hankou to Xinyang first after discussing it with Li 
Hongzhang. When the King of Belgium and the Russian ambassador asked Li Hongzhang about the 
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loan contract, Li told them clearly that Belgium should build the railway from both ends. Belgium 
agreed with this after discussing with Russia provided that Belgium should sell bonds for the northern 
section differently.304 From the final contract signed on 26 June 1898, we can see that the Imperial 
Chinese Railway Company was going to use its own funds (from the Chinese government ) to support 
the building of the northern section from Lugou Qiao to Baoding whereas Belgian loans supported the 
building of the rest of the Beijing-Hankou line from Hankou to Baoding. The building of the northern 
section from Lugou Qiao to Baoding (using Chinese government funds) and the building of the 
southern section from Hankou to Xinyang (using the first installment of the Belgium loan) would start 
at the same time.305 
 
Li Hongzhang and Sheng Xuanhuai firmly objected to points 1 and 3 in the contract. Li told the 
Russian ambassador that it was not possible to use dividends and shares to pay customs and tax. Seeing 
Li Hongzhang and Sheng Xuanhuai’s intransigence, the Belgian and Russian ambassadors no long 
insisted on point 3 in the contract. Li and Sheng also told the Belgian ambassador that they should let a 
third person arbitrate if disputes rising between them. The third person should not be appointed 
beforehand. However, the Belgian ambassador still insisted on letting the ambassador of the country 
which held the most shares to arbitrate, thus obviously this would still be the French ambassador. After 
rounds of negotiations, the solution was to write “let a third person arbitrate” in the contract whereas 
Sheng Xuanhuai wrote a letter to the Belgian representative in which Sheng agreed to let the 
ambassador of the country which held the most shares arbitrate. Now Belgian ambassador and Sheng 
Xuanhuai finally reached an agreement. They both wished to sign the contract immediately in case 
something happened and affected the contract. Zhang Zhidong also preferred for Sheng to sign the 
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contract first, then he and Wang Wenshao would submit a memorial to the throne together to get the 
permission from the Qing court.306  
 
On 26 June 1898, the final contract of the Beijing-Hankou line loan was signed by the Belgian 
representative and Sheng Xuanhuai in Shanghai. Comparing this contract with the original contract, 
Belgium had more rights and benefits, having a monopoly to provide building materials, having the 
right to manage the trains and the right to appoint and supervise railway staff. Because Russia and 
France were behind Belgium in the negotiations of the Beijing-Hankou line loan, Russia and France 
saw this as a great diplomatic success whereas Britain saw this as a failure since Russia and France had 
extended their influence to inland China along the Yangtze river, Britain’s sphere of influence. After 
seeing the contract and finding that the shares of the Beijing-Hankou line were sold by the Russo-
Chinese bank, British ambassador sought to prevent imperial approval of the contract. Under British 
pressure, the court hesitated and held back the memorial to the throne submitted by Zhang Zhidong and 
Wang Wenshao.307 On 6 August 1898, the Zongli Yamen assured the British ambassador that no 
Russian capital was involved in the Beijing-Hankou line loan. However, the British ambassador saw 
the mere involvement of the Russo-Chinese bank as the Zongli Yamen’s betrayal of its promise not to 
involve Russian capital. On 12 August, the Beijing-Hankou line contract was ratified. Britain 
immediately demanded other concessions from China to compensate for the loss of the Beijing-Hankou 
line and sent warships to China’s coast. Under military pressure, China ceded the right to build five 
railways to Britain: the railway from Tianjin to Zhenjiang, from Zhenzhou to Xiangyang, from 
Kowloon to Guangzhou, from Pukou to Xinyang and the railway from Suzhou, Hangzhou to Ningbo. 
The British were allowed to buy Beijing-Hankou line shares in order to offset Russian and French 
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influence, too. In October 1898, Britain also got the right to build the railway from Shanhaiguan to 
Niuzhuang, thus extending its influence to northeast China, Russia’s sphere of influence.308 
 
Other railway lines 
 
In the meantime, Zhang Zhidong and Sheng Xuanhuai needed to worry about other railways too. After 
Germany occupied Kiaochow in Shangdong, Germany demanded China’s permission to build the 
railways in Shangdong. Zhang Zhidong believed that this was very dangerous since building the 
railways in Shangdong gave Germany opportunities to occupy the whole Shangdong province.309 
However, the Kiaochow incident had to be settled quickly. Otherwise, other foreign powers would act 
imitating Germany to get lands in China. Zhang Zhidong especially worried that Britain and Japan 
would work together to occupy areas along the Yangtze river (areas in his governing provinces).310  
 
On 6 March 1898, the convention respecting the Lease of Kiaochow between China and Germany was 
signed. The signing of this convention started a new round of competition between imperialist powers 
in China. Before the signing of the convention, only Britain was able to set up a formal colony – Hong 
Kong in China. All the other imperialist powers had only gained concessions in treaty ports. Now 
Germany got Kiaochow as a so-called “leased territory” (foreign-controlled territories resembling 
formal colonies) for 99 years from China. Russia followed Germany and on 27 March obtained Port 
Arthur; Britain extended its colony from Hong Kong to Kowloon in June and got Weihaiwei in July; 
and France had Guangzhou Bay in 1899 (Figure 12).311  
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What was even worse, the convention respecting the Lease of Kiaochow was not only about the Lease 
of Kiaochow. According to the convention, Germany obtained the right to build a railway in Shandong 
province. The convention also ceded the right of mining in areas within 15 kilometers along the railway 
to Germany.312  After the Lease of Kiaochow, the French also obtained the right to build railways from 
the border of Indo-China to Chinese cities in Guangxi. Before the convention, China had already 
allowed Russia to build the North Manchuria Railway (also known as the Chinese Eastern Railway) 
according to the Li-Lobanov Treaty (Sino-Russian Secret Treaty), providing a shortcut for the Trans-
Siberian Railway from Chita across northern inner Manchuria via Harbin to the Russian port of 
Vladivostok. The treaty was signed between China and Russia as a form of secret military alliance 
against possible future aggressions by Japan in May 1896.313 
 
With Germany, France and Russia penetrating to inland China through the building of railways, Britain 
had to have a share too. The ideal railway for Britain was the Guangzhou-Hankou line and Britain was 
active in getting China to borrow money from Britain to build the Guangzhou-Hankou line. Sheng 
Xuanhuai seemed to prefer a British loan to build the Guangzhou-Hankou line since Britain asked for a 
lower interest rate (though with additional conditions). Zhang Zhidong thought this was a very 
dangerous idea because Britain could extend its sphere of influence to inland China through the 
Guangzhou-Hankou line which connected the areas north of Hong Kong to inland China. He 
telegraphed Wang Wenshao and asked him to stop Sheng Xuanhuai signing a loan contract with 
Britain.314 The literati and businessmen in Guangdong and Hubei went into a panic and suggested that 
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the Imperial Chinese Railway Company should let them raise funds and build the railway by 
themselves. They could set up a company that was led by the Imperial Chinese Railway Company and 
raise fund for the railway. If the funds raised were not enough, the Imperial Chinese Railway Company 
could also seek foreign loans. Zhang Zhidong agreed with this idea and asked Wang Wenshao to 
submit a request with him to ask permissions from the Zongli Yamen. In this way, the Zongli Yamen 
could leave the matter to the Imperial Chinese Railway Company and reply to Britain that the building 
of the railway had already been decided if Britain pressed the Zongli Yamen to get a British loan to 
build the Guangzhou-Hankou line.315 
 
Besides worrying about the British intervening in the Guangzhou-Hankou line, Zhang Zhidong heard 
that Rong Hong had submitted a request to the Zongli Yamen to build a railway from Beijing to 
Qingjiang (in Jiangsu) in November 1897. Rong promised to provide the Zongli Yamen with 1 million 
silver taels for the railway. This was not good news for the Beijing-Hankou line since China only 
needed one railway connecting the north to the south. Rong’s railway would be a great competition to 
the Beijing-Hankou line. Zhang Zhidong, Sheng Xuanhuai and Wang Wenshao together asked the 
Zongli Yamen not to permit Rong’s railway. Zhang suspected that the 1 million silver taels that Rong 
provided to the Zongli Yamen was foreign funds. Even if Rong had Chinese funds, he could buy shares 
from the Imperial Chinese Railway Company to support the building of the Beijing-Hankou line, not to 
build another railway connecting the north to the south. Zhang Zhidong even suggested that the Zongli 
Yamen should send anyone coming to Beijing regarding Rong’s railway to him and Wang Wenshao 
first so that they could help the Zongli Yamen to examine their funding sources. Here again, we see 
that, in the name of the Imperial Chinese Railway Company, Zhang Zhidong, Sheng Xuanhuai and 
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Wang Wenshao were trying to replace the Zongli Yamen in controlling the building of Chinese 
railways. 
 
However, the Zongli Yamen did not listen to Zhang Zhidong and decided to build the railway from 
Beijing to Qingjiang as suggested by Rong Hong despite Zhang Zhidong, Wang Wenshao, Sheng 
Xuanhuai and Liu Kunyi’s objections. Zhang was horrified and strongly objected to this idea since the 
railway built by the Germans in Shandong could be connected to Rong’s railway easily. If the railway 
in Shandong were connected to Rong’s railway, Germans troops could arrive in Beijing from Shandong 
within one day. This was a very serious security matter.316  
 
Here it is intriguing that from Rong Hong’s point of view, building the railway from Beijing to 
Qingjiang was a way to save China.317 Rong Hong was born in 1828 in Guangdong. In 1835 when he 
was seven years old, he attended a Christian school founded by an English lady in Macao. His 
subsequent education was completely in English. In 1847, he went to study in America and got into 
Yale University three year later. In 1852 Rong Hong became an American citizen and graduated from 
Yale University in 1854. He then went to China, holding a few posts and involved in business. In the 
1870s, he was the supervisor of the Chinese Educational Mission to the United States (1872-1881). 
When the first Sino-Japanese war broke out, Rong Hong proposed a plan to mortgage the Island of 
Formosa (present day Taiwan) to some Western power for the sum of $400, 000, 000, which China 
could use to organize a national army and navy to carry on the war. The plan was presented to Zhang 
Zhidong through Zhang’s secretary Cai Xiyong. Zhang supported Rong’s plan, however, Rong was not 
able to get a loan in London because of Li Hongzhang and Robert Hart’s impediment to securing the 
loan with customs’ revenues. In 1895, Rong Hong returned to China again following Zhang Zhidong’s 
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request and served in the provincial government of Jiangsu, Anhui and Jiangxi. He met Zhang Zhidong 
in the summer of 1895 in Nanjing and presented his ideas of saving China by rebuilding the Chinese 
government appointing Western consultants and using Western methods. Zhang was not impressed by 
him. After staying in Nanjing several months without much work and pay, Rong went to Beijing at the 
invitation of his old friend, Zhang Yinhuan, who had been Chinese Minister in Washington from 1884 
to 1888. Zhang Yinhuan was at that time a senior member of the Zongli Yamen and the first secretary in 
the Ministry of Revenues of which Weng Tonghe, tutor to the late Emperor Guangxu, was the 
president.318 Thus Rong Hong’s railway was supported by Zhang Yinhuan in the Zongli Yamen and for 
Rong and Zhang, building the railway was a way to inhibit the German influence in Shandong.319 Their 
view was also supported by Li Hongzhang and the Qing court.320 
 
However, undoubtedly Britain was behind Zhang Yinhuan and Rong Hong. It was Zhang Yinhuan who 
contacted the HSBC and got the HSBC loan secured by likin in Chinese provinces. The communication 
between Hart and James Duncan Campbell showed that he had even taken bribes from HSBC, and this 
was not the first time that he took bribes from Britain.321 The choosing of Zhang Yingheng as the 
person who attended the celebration of the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Victoria in London is also 
intriguing. Although Rong Hong did not mention Hart in his My life in China and America when he 
talked about a Chinese national bank that he was going to establish in Beijing in 1896,322 Sheng 
Xuanhuai believed that Hart was behind this bank and quickly submitted a proposal for the Imperial 
Bank of China to the court (discussed before). As discussed before, during the first Sino-Japanese war, 
Rong Hong also tried to secure foreign loans for China. As an American citizen and a person who lived 
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in America many years, he did not seek loans in America, but went to London instead, showing his 
unusual connection with Britain.323 
 
Besides the Guangzhou-Hankou line and Rong’s railway, Britain also attempted to get the right to build 
railways in Shanxi province. Shanxi was situated next to Zhili where Beijing was located, and thus was 
in a strategic position. Shanxi was also famous for its mining resources deposits, especially coal mines. 
In the end, both Britain and Russia got the right to build the railways in Shanxi. Britain built the 
railway from Taiyuan to Pingyang and Russia built the railway from Taiyuan to Zhengding. Despite the 
fact that Zhang Zhidong telegraphed the Zongli Yamen and asked the Zongli Yamen not to permit the 
building of railways in Shanxi using foreign capital because the building of Beijing-Hankou line would 
need the coal resources in Shanxi, the Zongli Yamen still permitted Hu Pinzhi, the governor of Shanxi, 
to introduce foreign capital to build the railways in Shanxi. Zhang Zhidong had also telegraphed Hu 
and tried to convince him of the harm of using foreign capital to build railways in Shanxi. Hu 
disregarded Zhang Zhidong’s telegram and told Zhang that the Zongli Yamen had already permitted the 
building of these railways.324  
 
With increasing imperialist penetration into the Chinese inland through railways in 1898, Zhang 
Zhidong felt that China was at a crucial life-or-death moment. He believed that the only way to save 
China was to train troops and build railways. Zhang Zhidong and Sheng Xuanhuai conceived the idea 
of training troops in Hubei and Hunan where the Hanyang Iron and Steel works and The Bureau of 
Guns and Artillery were.325 China would have the chance to survive if four railways were built within 
four years: Lu-Han (Beijing to Hankou), Yue-Han (Guangzhou to Hankou), Ning-Hu (Nanjing to 
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Shanghai), Ning-Han (Nanjing to Hankou). Without these railways, 200,000 troops would still not be 
enough given the difficulties of transporting troops. However, as Sheng Xuanhuai wrote to Zhang, 
foreign loans all asked for harsh conditions, such as investing in shares, participating in the decision-
making process and having a monopoly to provide building materials. The Shanxi railway had agreed 
to pay as high as 8% interest rate per year with additional benefits. Rong’s railway had given 75% 
profits to foreign shares and China only had 25%. Surely other countries would also ask for more 
benefits if they were going to provide railway loans.  
 
Given the urgent situation in 1898, the four railways, especially the Beijing-Hankou line and the 
Guangzhou-Hankou line, had to be built quickly in Zhang Zhidong’s eyes. Zhang told Sheng that as 
long as Britain was not providing loans to build the Guangzhou-Hankou line, and the Chinese had 
control over the railway, he was ready to give up more benefits to foreigners.326 After several 
negotiations, Sheng Xuanhuai chose an American loan to build the Guangzhou-Hankou line.327 The 
American ambassador to China had been contacting Sheng since 1897 and was active in the contest of 
providing loans to build the Guangzhou-Hankou line.328 In 1898, America not only got the right to 
provide loans to build the Guangzhou-Hankou line and also had the right to manage the railway, just 
like the Inspector-General of China’s Imperial Maritime Customs Service managing Chinese maritime 
customs. This obviously harmed Chinese sovereignty, but given the situation in 1898, Zhang Zhidong 
could only suggest that Sheng should insist in the contract that Chinese officials should manage the 
railway with foreigners together just as in Chinese maritime customs, and the railway could not be used 
to transport foreign troops and do anything harmful to China.329 
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Regarding the Ning-Hu railway, Zhang Zhidong also strongly opposed the use of British capital. Zhang 
planned to use German capital to build the Ning-Hu railway so that Germany would not build railways 
in Shandong. However, since Germany had already acquired the right to build railways in Shandong in 
the convention respecting the Lease of Kiaochow, Zhang first agreed to let Britain or Britain with 
Germany together build the Ning-Hu railway.330 But he quickly changed his mind when he heard that 
foreigners often drew an analogy between railways and scissors: wherever a railway goes, it would cut 
a nation into pieces. He telegraphed Sheng Xuanhuai and asked him not to follow the Zongli Yamen to 
give Britain the right to build the Ning-Hu railway alone in order to restrict British influence along the 
Yangtze river.331 
 
He wrote:  
Britain sees the Yangtze river as its sphere of influence … It has taken Weihaiwei in the north 
and the eleven provinces in the south have been in its sphere of influence too. How could this 
not destroy China? The British Inspector-General of Hankou customs has suggested to me that 
we use British officers to train Chinese troops more than ten times. … So their intention is very 
clear…. If we let Britain build the Ning-Hu railway alone, it would have the whole south-east 
China. … This is a life-or-death moment; we could not all listen to the Zongli Yamen.  
 
However, the Zongli Yamen had already allowed Britain to build the Ning-Hu railway. Sheng Xuanhuai 
telegraphed Li Hongzhang (who was then in the Zongli Yamen) and asked for his advice. Li did not 
agree with Zhang Zhidong and criticised Zhang’s idea that whoever built the railway would occupy the 
area where the railway was as naïve. Sheng agreed with Li and complained to Li that it was difficult to 
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communicate with Zhang Zhidong and Liu Kunyi.332 In May 1898, Sheng Xuanhuai signed a draft 
contract with a British bank to get loans to build the Ning-Hu railway.333 In the same year, Britain and 
Germany also obtained the right from the Zongli Yamen to build the Jin-Pu line (a railroad line between 
Tianjin and the northern bank of the Yangzi River). The Germans would build the line in Shandong and 
Zhili while the British would build the line in Jiangsu.334 Zhang Zhidong could not persuade Sheng 
Xuanhuai nor the Zongli Yamen, but he still insisted that the railway from Pukou to Xinyang in Hubei 
could only be built by the Imperial Chinese Railways Company. Neither British capital nor Rong’s 
foreign capital were allowed to control the building of the railways in Hubei.335 
 
From the negotiations of various railways in China, we can see that Zhang Zhidong, Sheng Xuanhuai, 
Li Hongzhang (representing the Zongli Yamen) and Zhang Yinhuan (representing the Zongli Yamen) 
sometimes could not agree with each other. Although Sheng left Li Hongzhang after the first Sino-
Japanese war and sought Zhang Zhidong’s protection, he still communicated intensively with Li 
Hongzhang in the Zongli Yamen. Sheng and Li often had similar opinions and Li was happy that the 
Zongli Yamen stayed away from the competition over railway concessions between imperialist powers 
and the Imperial Chinese Railways Company led by Sheng in charge of railway negotiations. Zhang 
Zhidong wished to minimize foreign influences in Chinese land as much as possible, particularly 
British influence in his governing provinces. He could not agree with Sheng Xuanhuai and Li 
Hongzhang when they chose British capital purely from a business point of view. As mentioned before, 
Sheng and Li did not believe Zhang’s idea that whoever built the railway would occupy the area where 
the railway was. However, Zhang Zhidong had little influence on Li nor Sheng, and thus had no power 
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over deciding the negotiations over railway concessions. He was also not able to persuade other 
provincial governors, such as Hu Pinzhi, the governor of Shanxi. The relationship between Li 
Hongzhang and Zhang Yinhuan in the Zongli Yamen was intriguing. Sometimes they cooperated and 
sometimes they were competitors. Li supported Zhang Yinhuan regarding Rong’s railway, but the 
establishing of the Imperial Bank of China by Sheng (thus surely supported by Li) was obviously 
against Rong’s scheme of a Chinese national bank (supported by Zhang Yinhuan and Hart). 
 
From June 1898 when the Hundred Days’ Reform started, another important figure in late nineteenth 
and early twentieth Chinese history, Rong Lu, also started to become involved in the negotiations over 
railway concessions. Rong Lu (1836-1903) was a member of the Manchu Plain White Banner and was 
deeply trusted by the Empress Dowager Cixi. He served in various political and military posts in his 
early years, such as serving in the Ministry of Works (1871-73, 1878-79), in the Ministry of Revenues 
(1873-78), as Minister of the Imperial Household (1873-79), as the general commandant of the Beijing 
Field Force (1870-79), the first army in China equipped with modern firearms and drilled in the 
Western manner, and as the general commandant of the Beijing Gendarmerie (1877-79). In early 1879, 
he was retired from all his posts for various reasons according to different records. In 1887, he was 
recalled from retirement and from 1891 to 1894 he served as Tartar General of the Manchu garrison at 
Xi’an. In 1894, Rong Lu was summoned from Xi’an to celebrate the sixtieth birthday of Empress 
Dowager Cixi’s in Beijing and became the general commandant of the Beijing Gendarmerie again, in 
charge of maintaining order in the capital. After the first Sino-Japanese war, he was appointed 
president of the Ministry of War and became the person who was in charge of training and reforming 
Qing troops. He nominated Yuan Shikai to oversee the creation and training of the New Army in Zhili 
and sponsored the expansion of three other armies: the Yi Army under Song Qing, the Gansu Army 
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under Dong Fuxiang, and the Wuyi Army under Nie Shicheng.336 In June 1898, Rong Lu became the 
governor-general of Zhili, replacing Wang Wenshao. Since then, Rong Lu and Zhang Zhidong were the 
two Chinese governors-general supervising the building of railways in China. Wang Wenhao had been 
transferred to the central government, serving as the president of the Ministry of Revenues and member 
of the Grand Council and the Zongli Yamen. Weng Tonghe, the previous president of the Ministry of 
Revenues was suddenly deprived of any posts and sent back to his hometown.337 
 
From Rong Lu’s career, we can see that he had a very strong political background and had real military 
power. As soon as he was appointed the governor-general of Zhili supervising the building of railways, 
both Zhang Zhidong and Sheng Xuanhuai were keen to contact him and get him on their side.338 In 
July, the Qing court established a Mining and Railway Bureau in Beijing managed by Wang Wenshao 
and Zhang Yinhuan, supervising all the mining and railway matters in China.339 This action was 
obviously the central government’s move to centralize its power over railway and mining matters, and 
to decentralize the power of the Imperial Chinese Railways Company led by Sheng Xuanhuai. This can 
be also seen as a sign of Li Hongzhang’s loss of power and Zhang Yinhuan’s rise of power in the 
Zongli Yamen since Li Hongzhang supported the Imperial Chinese Railways Company and was happy 
the Zongli Yamen stayed away from railway matters. Hearing this news, Sheng Xuanhuai decided to go 
to Beijing immediately and told Zhang Zhidong that he needed help in seeking promised government 
fund to build the northern section of Beijing-Hankou line from Lugou Qiao to Baoding.340 The Mining 
and Railway Bureau also supported Rong Hong’s proposal of building a railway from Zhenjiang to 
Tianjin. Again, Zhang Yinhuan was behind Rong Hong. Sheng Xuanhuai saw this as a great 
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competition to the Beijing-Hankou line since China could not afford to have two trunk lines at the 
moment. He asked the bureau to stop the building of Rong’s railway and only allowed other railways to 
connect to the Beijing-Hankou line. He also accused Rong of getting unreliable British capital.341 
Sheng’s accusation turned out to be true. Rong Hong was not able to secure enough funds to support 
the building of the railway within the term of the concession (6 months) that was granted to him.342   
 
Increasing imperialist pressures not only fragmented Chinese land through treaty port concessions, 
leased territories and railway concessions (see Figure 12),343 they also catalyzed the divisions between 
the central government and the provincial government, between persons in the central government, 
between persons in the provincial government, and between government and business. Facing intensive 
imperialist pressures, Zhang Zhidong, Sheng Xuanhuai, Li Hongzhang, Zhang Yinhuan, Weng Tonghe 
and Rong Lu all had their own priorities, own ideas and plans to save China from disintegration. Some 
of them tried to act together yet very often they disagreed with each other. Political alliances were 
formed and broken easily. Without strong political alliances in the central government, Zhang Zhidong 
found that it was more difficult to influence central-government decisions, which led to his further 
withdrawal to his governing provinces. Here we see that imperialism not only damaged central 
provincial relations, it also started to break the connection between provincial governors and the central 
government. Chinese politics had been heading towards a most unstable period. 
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Figure 12: Railway concessions in China 
Source: Railway enterprise in china 
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Chapter 7: Divided priorities in the Hundred Days’ Reform 
 
The year 1898 was not only a year when China faced serious imperialist pressure but also a year of 
political turmoil. This chapter focuses on how Zhang Zhidong’s relations with the central government 
changed in the Hundred Days’ Reform (1898). China’s defeat in the first Sino-Japanese war and the 
subsequent scramble of concessions made Reform an urgency. Most scholars agree that the Hundred 
Days’ Reform would not occur without the support of the Qing court, especially the Empress Dowager 
Cixi’s support. In 1898, the Qing court and the Empress Dowager started to see Reform as necessary 
and they supported Reform.344 Besides Reform needs, the Hundred Days’ Reform could also provide 
the Empress Dowager an opportunity to change the political landscape in Beijing and I would argue 
that the central government’s reform priority was to centralize power in its own hand and undermine 
the power of provincial governors.  
 
The death of a few significant figures in 1897 and 1898 also made the situation more complex. Political 
power struggle tangled with reform needs in the Hundred Days’ Reform. The central government’s 
suspicion and reform of provincial politics and the political purges after the failure of the Hundred 
Days’ Reform led to Zhang Zhidong’s further withdrawal from central government politics. 
 
Zhang Zhidong’s connections in the central government  
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The death of Li Hongzao (1820-1897) in July 1897 was a big blow for Zhang Zhidong.345 Li Hongzao 
entered the Hanlin Academy in 1852 after achieving the first rank in the civil service examination. He 
was made a tutor to Emperor Tongzhi who then ascended the throne at the age of five in 1861. In 1876, 
he entered the Zongli Yamen and in 1880, when he was served on the Grand Council and in the Zongli 
Yamen, he led a group of officials, including Zhang Zhidong, who condemned Chong Hong in the 
Crisis of Ili. In the power struggle between Empress Dowager Cixi and the Grand Council led by 
Prince Gong (1833-1898) in 1884, Li was dismissed from the Grand Council and lowered in rank three 
grades (Cabinet Change of Jiashen). However, during the first Sino-Japanese war, with Prince Gong’s 
return to power, Li was also restored to membership of the Grand Council and to the position of an 
advisor to military affairs. From 1864 to 1884, Li Hongzao was an influential figure in the central 
government. He was referred to as the leader of a group of officials who attacked corrupt officials and 
were known as Qingliu in Beijing, among them Zhang Zhidong, Sheng Yu, Zhang Peilun and Bao 
Ting.346 
 
Zhang Zhidong communicated frequently with Li Hongzao. Zhang wrote as many as 95 letters to Li 
when Zhang was the governor of Shanxi (1881-1884) and these letters are just those that survived 
today. From letters that Zhang wrote to Li in 1896 and 1897, we can see that Zhang discussed a lot of 
things with Li, including the Hanyang Iron and Steel Works, the Beijing-Hankou line, the opening of 
Shashi as a treaty port, and the flood in Hubei. He also asked Li to pass on his request to people in 
power, thus we can see that Li was an important person in the central government who could help 
Zhang. In 1896, when Zhang heard that Li was sick, he immediately sent his close relatives to invite 
the famous doctor Chen Lianfang to go to Beijing to see Li and he would pay all the fees. When Chen 
refused to go to Beijing because he needed to take care of his 90-year-old mother, Zhang asked his 
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friends and students to invite Chen again and pointed out that Li Hongzao was crucial in present 
politics. Within two months, Zhang had telegraphed his relatives, friends and students many times to 
invite Chen Lianfang to see Li Hongzao in Beijing and was prepared to pay all the fees and arrange 
transportation. He also telegraphed Li inquiring about Li’s health. In October 1896, Li told Zhang that 
he was recovering and it was not necessary to send Chen Lianfang to Beijing. Unfortunately, on 25 
July 1897, Li died in his house. The next day when Zhang heard the news, he was shocked and grieved 
deeply over the loss of a worthy and virtuous minister. He saw the death of Li as a significant change in 
politics which would affect the overall situation. Compared to Zhang Zhidong’s ordinary response to 
the death of his cousin Zhang Zhiwan (1811-1897, who was also in the Grand Council) a month ago, 
Zhang Zhidong obviously saw Li Hongzao as a far more important figure in the central government 
than his cousin Zhang Zhiwan.347 
 
On 29 May 1898, Li Hongzao’s patron Prince Gong also died. The death of Prince Gong marked the 
end of a political era in Qing China. Prince Gong, Yixin, was the sixth son of Emperor Daoguang. 
After Emperor Daoguang died in 1850, Yixin’s half-brother succeeded to the throne and became 
Emperor Xianfeng. Yixin was made a prince of the first degree with the designation, Gong at the same 
year. From 1853 to 1855, he was a member of the Grand Council. In 1860 he was in charge of the 
negotiations with imperialist powers and signed the Treaty of Tianjin and the Treaty of Beijing after the 
Second Opium war (1856-1860). In August 1861, Emperor Xianfeng died. Yixin, conspired with the 
two Empresses Dowager Ci’an and Cixi, seized power from a group of eight regents appointed by 
Emperor Xianfeng on his deathbed to assist his infant son and successor, Emperor Tongzhi (the Xinyou 
Coup in 1861). Since then, Yixin was the leader of the Grand Council and the Zongli Yamen which was 
founded by himself in January 1861. Yixin supported many of China’s self-strengthening projects 
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(including Li Hongzhang’s projects) and attempted to modernize China in the late nineteenth 
century.348 Yixin’s rise of power alerted his former ally Empress Dowager Cixi, thus under the reign of 
Emperor Guangxu, Cixi used Yixin’s half-brother Yihuan (Prince Chun, 1840-1891, the seventh son of 
Emperor Daoguang), Emperor Guangxu’s father, to counteract the power of Yixin. In the Cabinet 
Change of Jiashen in 1884, Yixin was discharged from all offices and Yihuan became the real leader of 
the Grand Council and the Zongli Yamen. Since China’s warships were destroyed by the French in the 
Sino-French war in 1884, the Board of Admiralty was founded and Yihuan was appointed controller of 
the Board, together with Yikuang (Prince Qing, 1836-1916) and Li Hongzhang as associate controllers. 
Prince Chun, same as Prince Gong supported self-strengthening projects in different provinces. He 
stood behind Li Hongzhang in most of Li’s plans for the improvement and expansion of the Board of 
Admiralty, and supported Zhang Zhidong’s self-strengthening projects in Guangdong when Zhang 
faced charges of deficit.349 Despite the power struggle between Prince Gong and Prince Chun 
deliberately maintained by Empress Dowager Cixi in order to strengthen her own power, both Prince 
Gong (through Li Hongzao) and Prince Chun could be seen as Zhang Zhidong’s patron in the central 
government. This was an important reason why the central government sometimes bestowed extra 
power on Zhang and put him in significant posts during crises (as the Governor general of Guangdong 
and Guangxi during the Sino-French war and as the Governor general of Jiangsu, Anhui and Jiangxi 
during the first Sino-Japanese war). However, Prince Chun died in 1891. After China’s defeat in the 
first Sino-Japanese war in 1895, Prince Gong was resentful and declined to assume full responsibility. 
He was also old then and spent most of his last days at his garden until his death in May 1898.350 The 
loss of Prince Gong, Li Hongzao and Prince Chun in the central government explained why Zhang 
Zhidong felt that his words had little influence on the central government after 1895. 
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The political vacuum left by Prince Gong and Prince Chun in the central government was filled by 
Rong Lu and Prince Qing, Yikuang. Rong Lu and Prince Qing became the two persons who were 
trusted by Emperor Dowager Cixi most and Cixi started to play her balance of power game using Rong 
Lu and Prince Qing just as she used Prince Gong and Prince Chun. Although the death of Prince Gong 
and Prince Chun seemed to affect Cixi little since she quickly found two persons to replace them, it 
affected Zhang Zhidong greatly. Zhang Zhidong never met Rong Lu before and had to carefully write a 
letter to him in order to establish communication between them. In Zhang Zhidong’s archives, direct 
communication between Zhang and Rong was rare and Zhang normally relied on Sheng Xuanhuai to 
communicate with Rong Lu. Communication between Zhang and Prince Qing, even indirect 
communication, was rare in Zhang Zhidong’s archives. This was probably not only because Zhang 
Zhidong did not know Yikuang before but also because he disapproved of Yikuang’s character. 
Otherwise, he would write letters to Yikuang or asked Sheng Xuanhuai to introduce him to Yikuang 
just as he established communication with Rong Lu. Yikuang was adopted by his uncle and was made 
heir to the family estate with the low title of a noble of the tenth rank. However, Yikuan married his 
daughter to Cixi’s younger brother and was deeply trusted by Cixi. In 1884 when Prince Gong was 
discharged from all offices, Yikuang was made the head of the Zongli Yamen and remained in that 
position from 1884 to 1911. He was also made a prince of the second degree to which was attached the 
family designation, Qing. In 1894, he was raised to a prince of the first degree. Because of his 
insignificant birth and relations to Cixi, his power mostly came from Cixi. Therefore, he was the 
perfect tool that Cixi used to counter-balance the power of Prince Chun, especially during the later 
years of Emperor Guangxu’s reign when Emperor Guangxu was approaching mature age and taking 
over the governance of the country. Yikuang was infamous for his corruption and hoarding of great 
wealth, involving the “sale” of official positions and backroom deals in politics. He was charged with 
corruption several times during his political career and in late Qing anecdotes, newspapers and 
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memoirs, there were lots of records about Yikuang’s corruption.351 Yet he was protected by Cixi and 
remained a prominent figure in late Qing politics until the downfall of the Qing dynasty in 1911, and 
died peacefully in the Republic in 1916. Zhang Zhidong, as a person who identified himself as a 
Qingliu official, and who hated corruption and rarely accepted bribes in his whole life, surely would 
not want to associate with Prince Qing, and consequently his words would become less important in the 
central government.  
 
Zhang was fully aware of his loss of influence in the central government and preferred to stay in his 
governing provinces. On 23 April 1898, the Qing court summoned Zhang to go to Beijing because Xu 
Tong recommended Zhang in a memorial to the throne as a consultant of foreign affairs. Zhang’s 
student Yang Rui and some other central government officials in Beijing were behind Xu’s request and 
they hoped that Zhang could enter the Grand Council and the Zongli Yamen. Chen Baozhen, the 
governor of Hunan, knew their wishes from his informants in Beijing and he looked forward to this 
prospect and telegraphed Zhang the next day, asking Zhang to go to Beijing as soon as possible. 
However, Zhang was not sure of the court’s intention and hesitated to start his journey. Not until 2 May 
after the Qing court issued two imperial edicts by telegraph to urge Zhang had Zhang replied to the 
court that he would start his journey and go to Beijing as soon as possible. The same day, he 
telegraphed Chen, telling Chen that he did not believe that the court was going to let him enter the 
Grand Council and the Zongli Yamen. Nonetheless, Zhang left Hubei on 9 May upon the court’s 
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request and planned to go to Beijing through Shanghai. However, an anti-foreign riot broke out in the 
newly opened port of Shashi (in Hubei), and on 14 May the court asked Zhang to return to Hubei to 
deal with this riot first. On 31 May, Chen telegraphed Zhang, showing his wish for Zhang to enter the 
central government again and asked Zhang to go to Beijing after quelling of the riot. Zhang replied 
Chen, speaking frankly that there were few things that he could do in Beijing and he would prefer to 
stay in the provinces where at least he could do something, no matter how small it was. In the end, 
Zhang did not go to Beijing during the Hundred Days’ Reform since on 15 July, the Qing court ordered 
Zhang to stay in the provinces.352 In September, Chen Baozhen telegraphed the Zongli Yamen and 
wished Emperor Guangxu to summon Zhang Zhidong to Beijing again. Some officials in Beijing also 
planned to submit a request to the Emperor to summon Zhang to Beijing. When Zhang heard the news, 
he telegraphed Qian Xun in Beijing, asking him to stop their actions. From Chen’s telegram, we can 
see that he was not happy with the radical reforms carried out during the Hundred Days’ Reform led by 
Kang Youwei and suspected the abilities of officials in the Grand Council and the Zongli Yamen. For 
him, Zhang Zhidong was the person who had the ability to direct reforms.353 Chen’s view must be 
shared by those who also wished Zhang to go to Beijing. With the death of Prince Gong and Prince 
Chun and the downfall of Li Hongzhang, Zhang Zhidong must be the only hope for a self-
strengthening China led by reformers who were not as radical as Kang Youwei. Yet, Zhang hesitated, 
withdrew to his governing provinces, for he knew very well that the situation in Beijing had changed 
and he was no longer a significant figure there.  
 
Ma Zhongwen believes that Zhang Zhidong was keen to go to Beijing in April and Zhang was behind 
Xu Tong and Yang Rui’s actions.354 I think this is not the case. As Mao Haijian pointed out, Zhang was 
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not aware of Xu Tong’s memorial to the throne and showed his surprise in the telegram to Yang Rui 
and his cousin Zhang Bin very clearly.355 If Zhang were keen to go to Beijing, he would not stay in 
Hubei until May. In 1894, he set off to Jiangsu the third day after the court ordered him to transfer from 
governor general of Hubei and Hunan to governor general of Jiangsu, Anhui and Jiangxi. Xu Tong’s 
memorial to the throne only showed that in 1898, facing increasing imperialist pressure, a group of 
Chinese reformist officials saw Zhang Zhidong as their leader and hoped that Zhang could enter the 
Grand Council and the Zongli Yamen. This shows that they were not happy with the current policy 
made by the Grand Council and the Zongli Yamen and hoped that Zhang’s participation in the policy 
making could change the situation. Zhang, too was not happy with the Zongli Yamen’s policy. He was 
frustrated that the Zongli Yamen agreed to the HSBC loan which used the salt likin in Yichang as 
security. On 28 April, Yu Yinlin, Provincial Administration Commissioner of Anhui, submitted a 
memorial to the throne, criticising Weng Tonghe and Zhang Yinhen for signing the HSBC loan without 
thinking of the four provinces’, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Zhejiang and Hubei’s financial situation. It was 
possible that Zhang was behind Yu’s memorial to the throne.356 In short, the current Grand Council and 
the Zongli Yamen, especially Weng Tonghe and Zhang Yinhen, were under attack in April 1898 
because of their unwelcom policy. In May their situation became even worse. On 17 May, Xu Tong 
submitted a memorial to the throne, impeaching Weng Tonghe and Zhang Yinhuan for receiving 
bribery and corruption.357 On 29 May, Censor Wang Pengyun impeached Weng Tonghe and Zhang 
Yinhuan for receiving bribery. On 6 June, Gao Xiezeng criticized Zhang Yinhuan for increasing the 
funds for the Imperial Customs. Within a month, Weng and Zhang were impeached several times. On 
15 June, Weng was discharged from all offices and sent back to his hometown. Manchu troops entered 
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into Zhang Yinhuan’s house in Beijing and held Zhang in detention. Zhang escaped from death only 
because he submitted two million silver taels, the bribery that he received, to the court.358 
 
The downfall of Weng Tonghe was due to a series of reasons, not just criticism from censors, 
provincial governors-general and governors.359 Weng Tonghe’s downfall indicated a new round of 
power shuffle in the Grand Council and the Zongli Yamen. After Weng left, Wang Wenshao entered the 
Grand Council and the Zongli Yamen on 23 June. Rong Lu took Wang’s previous post and became the 
governor-general of Zhili. Manchu noble Gang Yi had already entered the Grand Council and the 
Zongli Yamen in 1894, and succeeded in the power struggle between him and Weng Tonghe. On 11 
July, Manchu noble Yu Lu entered the Grand Council. A new Grand Council formed. Members of the 
Grand Council included Prince Li (Shi Yi), Gang Yi, Qian Yingpu, Liao Shouheng, Wang Wenshao 
and Yu Lu.360 Among them, Prince Li had no ambitions nor abilities and only sought to maintain his 
position. Qian Yingpu was sick and was on leave several times since early 1898. Liao Shouheng rarely 
had his own opinions and only helped to write imperial edicts.361 Wang Wenshao was known for his 
tact and was careful not to argue with any officials.362 The people who had real power during this 
period at the start of the Hundred Days’ Reform were Gang Yi in the Grand Council, Rong Lu as the 
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governor-general of Zhili and Prince Qing as the head of the Zongli Yamen. All of them were Manchu 
nobles. The Qing court’s determination to centralize power in the hands of Manchu nobles was clear.  
 
Not only Qingliu officials had been abandoned with the death of Li Hongzao and the leave-taking of 
Weng Tonghe, Li Hongzhang had also been marginalized and excluded from central power. Li 
Hongzhang only served in the Zongli Yamen not in the Grand Council after the first Sino-Japanese war. 
The power that governors-general and governors (predominantly Han Chinese) acquired in the military 
and financial spheres since the Taiping Rebellion through the establishment of the brave battalions and 
the collection of likin had been gradually taken back by the Qing court. Li Hongzhang’s Huai army was 
defeated in the first Sino-Japanese war and was reduced to 30 battalions led by Nie Shicheng. The 
Xiang army was reduced to 30 battalions led by Wei Guangshou. Nie’s army resided in Tianjin and the 
Dagu forts and Wei’s army resided in Shanhaiguan, both around Beijing serving to defend the capital. 
Besides reducing the old brave battalions, the Qing court planned to train new troops following western 
methods. All these military reforms were led by Rong Lu. Therefore, Rong Lu replaced Li Hongzhang 
after the first Sino-Japanese war and became the person who held military power. For the first time 
after the Taiping Rebellion, Manchu nobles started to control military affairs in the Qing empire and 
governors-general and governors lost their military power completely. The use of Jiangsu, Jiangxi, 
Zhejiang and Hubei’s likin as the security of the HSBC loan reduced governors’-general and 
governors’ financial authority too. Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Zhejiang and Hubei were the richest provinces in 
Qing China. Likin in these provinces constituted a large portion of provincial revenue and was the main 
revenue that governors-general and governors controlled. Using likin to pay the HSBC loan means that 
governors-general and governors in these provinces were left with less money at their disposal. 
 
This was the situation that Zhang Zhidong faced in June 1898. His hesitation to go to Beijing was a 
sensible political choice. True, the Qing court called for reforms after the war, but it called for reforms 
Mu Zhang 166 
 166 
led by Manchu nobles and aimed for centralizing power. The Qing court must realize the difficulty of 
transporting troops from provinces to defend Beijing in the first Sino-Japanese war too. However, 
instead of training troops in provinces and building railways as Zhang suggested, it preferred to train 
troops by Manchu nobles and centralize armies around Beijing. 
 
Political rivalry in the Hundred Days’ Reform 
 
In June 1898, the Young Emperor Guangxu’s strong desire to reform after China’s defeat in the first 
Sino-Japanese war added a further complexity to the current political situation. On 11 June, Emperor 
Guangxu issued an imperial edict announcing reform as the national policy of the country, signaling the 
start of the Hundred Days’ Reform.363 Zhang Zhidong paid close attention to Beijing’s condition during 
the Hundred Days’ Reform. Although Zhang had lost much influence in the central government, he still 
had a wide network of informants to provide him with timely news from Beijing. Zhang’s informants 
in Beijing included his eldest son Zhang Quan who was attending the civil service examination in 
1898, his nephew Zhang Jian as a cadet officer in the Ministry of Personnel, nephew Zhang Bin, 
student Yang Rui as a candidate secretary in the Cabinet, student Huang Shaoji in the Hanlin Academy 
(Huang was also Zhang’s niece’s husband), and several officials from Hubei who for various reasons 
were temporarily in Beijing, such as Yun Zuqi (Yun Zuyi’s brother), Qian Xun and Qu Tingzhao. 
Sheng Xuanhuai had also been to Beijing in August and Zhang news from Beijing on to Zhang.364  
 
Zhang’s close monitoring of Beijing’s conditions shows his political sensibility and ambition. The 
political vacuum left by the death of Prince Gong and Li Hongzao and the expulsion of Weng Tonghe 
                                                
363 For a general view of the Hundred Days’ Reform, see Hao Chang, “Intellectural change and the reform movement, 1890-
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inevitably caused a new round of political rivalry in Beijing. As discussed before, Empress Dowager 
Cixi had seized the opportunity first and appointed her most trusted officials Rong Lu and Prince Qing 
to significant posts. The young Emperor Guangxu was eager to prove himself and cultivate his own 
trusted officials to carry out his reform plan. Zhang Zhidong, too was trying to put his men into the 
central government. After the first Sino-Japanese war, the Qing court had requested central government 
officials and provincial governors-general and governors to recommend talented individuals who were 
knowledgeable and practical about current affairs, and those who were specialized in astronomy, 
geography, mathematics, science and/or engineering were summoned to see the emperor for 
examination. Zhang Zhidong had recommended 26 people from all over the country in two memorials 
to the throne, most of them were or had been his private secretaries or subordinate officials. A few 
persons recommended by Zhang were assigned important posts, for example Yu Yinlin as the 
Provincial Administration Commissioner of Anhui, Yu Liansan as the Provincial Administration 
Commissioner of Shanxi, Yun Zuyi as the Provincial Administration of Commission of Zhejiang, Yuan 
Shikai as the Provincial Surveillance Commissioner of Zhili, Huang Zunxian as Salt Intendant in 
Changbao, Hunan, Cai Jun as Prefect of Susong in Jiangsu, etc.365 However, their posts were in the 
provinces and rarely had they entered the central government. Zhang Zhidong could use them to build 
his network in other provinces but was not able to build a new influential network in Beijing. Besides 
the two memorials to the throne, Zhang had also submitted another two memorials to the throne 
recommending talented individuals to the emperor. 15 people recommended by him were recorded by 
the Grand Council.366  
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After the German occupation of Kiaochow in 1897, the Qing court again asked provincial governors-
general and governors to recommend talented individuals. The emperor had issued three imperial edits 
in December 1897, January 1898 and on 11 June 1898 (the same day when the Hundred Days’ Reform 
started), asking for people with military, political and diplomatic talents respectively. Two days later, 
Xu Zhijing, as a member of the Hanlin Academy, and not a governor-general or governor, 
recommended Kang Youwei, Huang Zunxian, Tan Shitong, Zhang Yuanji and Liang Qichao as 
exceptional reform officers who could be consultants to the emperor or governors of a province. Xu 
also requested Emperor Guangxu to see them personally for examination.367 On 16 June, Kang Youwei 
was summoned to the palace for his first personal audience with the emperor. The summoning of Kang 
Youwei and the appointment of him as a member of the Zongli Yamen with the exceptional privilege of 
presenting memorials straight to the emperor without going through channels shows Emperor 
Guangxu’s determination to bypass some of the old bureaucracy that he saw as an obstacle to the 
reform and to cultivate his own trusted officials around him. 
 
Emperor Guangxu’s three imperial edicts seeking talented individuals provided an opportunity for 
Kang Youwei to get close to the centre of power. The three imperial edicts also provided opportunities 
for Zhang Zhidong to put his men in the central government. Zhang Zhidong paid close attention to 
Kang Youwei’s action in Beijing. Because of the difference between them in political and reform ideas 
(discussed later), Zhang did not want to see Kang Youwei in power. On 1 August, Zhang 
recommended another 5 persons as people with diplomatic talents. They were Chen Baochen, Huang 
Zunxian, Fu Yunlong, Qian Xun and Zheng Xiaoxu. Huang Zunxian and Fu Yunlong had already been 
summoned to Beijing before. The same day Qian Xun and Zheng Xiaoxu were also summoned to 
Beijing to see the emperor. On 29 August Emperor Guangxu received two memorials to the throne 
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from Chen Baozhen, the governor of Hunan, recommending 15 officials from Hunan in the first 
memorial to the throne and 17 persons from other provinces in the second memorial to the throne. 
Some of the 17 persons in Chen Baozhen’s second memorial were also in Zhang Zhidong’s previous 
recommending lists, for example Chen Baochen, Wang Bingen and Yun Zuqi. Some were Zhang 
Zhidong’s students and close to him, for example, Yang Rui and Liu Guangdi.368 Chen Baozhen must 
have consulted Zhang Zhidong regarding his second memorial and the communication between then 
was evident in Zhang Zhidong’s archive. Chen told Wang Binen in Zhang Zhidong’s government that 
he recommended 32 persons, among whom 15 persons were summoned to Beijing to see the emperor. 
Therefore, the emperor must be very pleased with his recommendation.369 In fact, the 15 persons except 
2 persons were all from the second memorial which contained 17 persons recommended by Chen as 
talented individuals in other provinces. 13 out of 17 persons from Chen’s second memorial were 
permitted to see the emperor personally. Some of them, such as Yang Rui and Liu Guangdi even 
became secretaries in the Grand Council later.370  
 
The Hundred Days’ Reform provided governors such as Zhang Zhidong with a golden opportunity to 
establish their own network in Beijing. This was particularly important for Zhang Zhidong since his old 
network in Beijing was dissolving. Through recommending talented individuals for the reform, Zhang 
tried to extend his influence in the central government. He also worried about the increasing influence 
of Kang Youwei’s reform ideas in Beijing and tried to prevent their spread by recommending his own 
men to the emperor and spelling out his own reform ideas. On 19 July, Huang Shaoji recommended 
Zhang Zhidong’s Quanxue Pian (Advice on Learning) to Emperor Guangxu when he was seeing the 
emperor. This work must have been very much appreciated by the emperor and Empress Dowager 
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Cixi. On 25 July, the emperor issued an imperial edict ordering to publish widely Advice on Learning 
and asked all governors-general, governors and literary chancellors in provinces to read it (one should 
be aware that without Cixi’s support, Advice on learning would have not been widely published and 
promoted as the official guidance for reform. For Cixi’s influence on Emperor Guangxu, see 
subsequent paragraphs).371 
 
The appearance of Zhang Zhidong’s Advice on Learning in late July shows that at this stage Zhang had 
sensed the danger of Kang Youwei’s reform ideas to the Qing dynasty and thought that it was 
necessary to make his own ideas and position clear. The Advice on Learning had two volumes: the first 
9 chapters and the second 15 chapters. The title of the first chapter in the first volume is “Tong Xin 
(United hearts)”. Zhang explained in this chapter:  
 
I hear that there are three ways to save China in today’s changing world. The first is to maintain 
the reigning Dynasty; the second is to conserve Confucianism; and the third is to protect the 
Chinese Race. In fact, they together constitute one. Maintaining the reigning Dynasty, 
conserving Confucianism and protecting the Chinese Race must be seen as inseparably 
connected; this is called “united hearts”. For in order to protect the Chinese Race we must first 
conserve Confucianism, and if Confucianism is to be conserved we are bound to maintain the 
Dynasty. But, it may be asked, how can we protect the Race? We reply by knowledge; and 
knowledge comes from Confucianism. How can we conserve Confucianism? We reply by 
strength; and strength lies in the troops. Consequently, in countries of no prestige and power the 
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native religion is not followed, and in kingdoms that are not prosperous and powerful the native 
race is held in light esteem by their more fortunate neighbors.372 
 
The above quote shows that Zhang Zhidong saw maintaining the Qing dynasty and making it strong 
and powerful as the first priority since this was the only way to conserve Confucianism and protect the 
Chinese. In the next chapter named “The inculcation of loyalty”, Zhang took great pains to justify the 
rule of the Qing dynasty. In the very first sentence of chapter 2, he claimed that “no dynasty since the 
Han and the Tang has exhibited a greater benevolence toward its subjects than our Holy Qing.” Then 
he went on to list a series of Qing policies and compared them with the policies in previous dynasties, 
only to show the advantages of the Qing dynasty in caring its people.373 The third chapter of the first 
volume is named “The three moral obligations”, in which again Zhang emphasized the obligation of 
subjects to the emperor and the impossibility of realizing republicanism in China. He wrote: 
 
The Emperor is the head of the Subject, the Father is the head of the Son, and the Husband is 
the head of the Wife. These tenets have been handed down from the sages, and as Heaven does 
not change, so they never change.374 
 
In the following chapters of the first volume, Zhang discussed the importance of knowing the 
difference between the Chinese Race and the western races since if one is not from the same race his 
heart is essentially different, of honoring the classics, of preserving the present hierarchy of power, thus 
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again against republicanism, of making Chinese learning the basis of education while utilizing Western 
knowledge, of choosing the right Chinese learning to learn with the purpose of using it in today’s 
world, and of abolishing opium.375 
 
All in all, the first volume of Zhang’s Advice on Learning justified the rule of the Qing dynasty and the 
importance of making it strong and powerful as a means to conserve Confucianism as the basis of 
education. The second volume contains practical advice for self-strengthening, including promoting 
learning, sending students overseas, setting up modern schools, reforming educational system, 
translating western books, reading newspapers, reforming laws, reforming the civil service 
examination, promoting agriculture, industry, commerce, military learning, mining technology and 
railways, upholding Chinese learning as moral while utilizing Western learning for practical matters, 
maintaining the army, and tolerating Christianity.376 
 
Although Kang Youwei’s many reform ideas were similar to Zhang Zhidong’s practical advice for self-
strengthening in the Advice on Learning, the big difference between Kang and Zhang is that Kang also 
aimed to reform the present political structure and gradually lead it to a republic whereas Zhang again 
and again highlighted the importance of maintaining the Qing dynasty, the hierarchy of power and the 
obligation of subjects to the emperor.377 Zhang’s reform ideas were supported by the Qing court at this 
stage. The Advice on Learning was allowed to be published widely and the reform edicts that Emperor 
Guangxu issued in July and August overlaped with Zhang’s advice. These edicts were supported by 
Empress Dowager Cixi too. Although Cixi had officially announced her retirement in 1889, she still 
retained much power on political matters. Almost all important memorials to the throne, after Emperor 
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Guangxu commented on them, were transferred to Cixi for review, including those submitted during 
the Hundred Days’ Reform. Emperor Guangxu and the Grand Council also needed to consult Cixi’s 
opinion before making any important decisions. During the Hundred Days’ Reform, Emperor Guangxu 
had been to Cixi’s residence Yihe Garden ten times and consulted many important matters, including 
announcing reform as the national policy of the country on 11 June.378 Without Cixi’s permission, the 
Hundred Days’ Reform would not have started at the first place.  
 
Let us consider the reform decrees issued in June, July and August. It is true that they aimed to promote 
agriculture, commerce and industry, to modernize the army and to reform education by establishing 
modern schools and replacing the eight-legged essay with new requirements for essays on current 
affairs in the civil-service examination, as suggested in Zhang Zhidong’s Advice on Learning. 
However, some of the decrees also strengthened and centralized power in the central government. For 
example, the Bureau of agriculture, industry and commerce was established in Beijing with branch 
offices in every province. A mining and railway bureau was founded in the central government in 
charge of all railways in China. The reform also placed more responsibility and a larger burden on 
provinces. Within a short time, governors-general and governors had to set up all kinds of institutions, 
such as the Bureau of agriculture, industry and commerce, the Bureau of baojia (police), western-style 
schools and post offices. In the meantime, the Qing court asked the provinces to reduce local armies 
and military expenses while assigning a new central government fund – the navy fund – to the 
provinces. No wonder governors-general and governors were not keen to carry out these reforms.379 
Zhang Zhidong complained to Sheng Xuanhuai that Hubei had already lost its salt likin and now it had 
to submit 150, 000 silver taels every year to the central government for the new navy fund, which was 
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the most among all the provinces. Zhang had little money left and had no idea how to solve the 
financial problem. As the court asked to reduce local armies and military expenses, he had to dissolve 
the army which protected Daye iron mines and Ma’anshan coal mines.380 The difficult financial 
situation that Zhang Zhidong’s government faced can be seen from the paying of the HSBC loan. Salt 
likin from Yichang was only about 740, 000 silver taels each year (including additional likin) but was 
used to pay 1, 000, 000 silver taels for the HSBC loan. Zhang Zhidong did not know how to get more 
money and asked the Ministry of Revenues to reduce the allocated loan payment for Hubei. The 
Ministry of Revenues refused his request on 29 August 1898.381 However, Zhang could not find any 
other revenues in his governing provinces to add to salt likin from Yichang to pay the HSBC loan and 
until October 1898, he was still paying 40, 000 silver taels less every month for the HSBC loan.382 
 
From late August, Emperor Guangxu’s reform turned to a more radical direction with increasing 
influence from Kang Youwei and his group. He abolished a number of offices in the central 
government and several provincial offices under the governors and governors-general. In early 
September, he dismissed the two presidents and four vice-presidents of the Board of Ceremony and 
appointed four young reformists, Yang Rui, Lin Xu, Liu Guangdi and Tan Shitong to be secretaries in 
the Grand Council. The remodelling of the government structure had upset the power base of the 
Empress Dowager Cixi and the fortunes of her most trusted officials. Cixi responded quickly on 21 
September with a successful coup which stripped Emperor Guangxu of his power and forced him into 
solitary seclusion, followed by a purge of literati and officials involved in Kang Youwei’s movement. 
After that, she stayed in power for another decade until her death. The four young reformists together 
with Kang Youwei’s brother were executed without a trial on 28 September. Kang Youwei fled to 
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Hong Kong with the help of British officials and his follower Liang Qichao escaped to Japan.383 On 26 
September, Cixi, in the name of Emperor Guangxu, announced that offices in the central government 
should stay the same, thus revoking Guangxu’s remodeling of the central government’s structure. 
However, she continued Guangxu’s reform of abolishing some provincial offices under the governors 
and governors-general, of establishing western-style schools and of reforms in agriculture, industry and 
commerce if they could bring benefits to the government and the people.384 
 
On 28 September, Rong Lu entered the Grand Council while still commanding all the armed forces in 
North China. Yu Lu, another Manchu noble, became the governor-general of Zhili.385 On 29 
September, Zhang Yinhuan was sentenced to banishment to Xinjiang probably because of his close 
contact with Emperor Guangxu during the Hundred Day’s reform. He would have been executed had it 
not been for the earnest efforts of the Japanese ambassador to China.386 Zhang Yinhuan’s situation after 
his sentence demonstrated again his intriguing and close relations with western powers. He was 
escorted to Xinjiang by foreigners.387 Early on 7 September, Li Hongzhang had already been expelled 
from the Zongli Yamen because of the pressure from Britain. Yu Lu replacing Li became a member of 
the Zongli Yamen.388 Therefore, after the Hundred Day’s Reform, Manchu nobles ensured their control 
of the Grand Council and the Zongli Yamen. Previously powerful Han officials, such as Li Hongzhang, 
Zhang Yinhuan, and Weng Tonghe were removed from the central government. A few new Han 
officials had entered the Zongli Yamen since late September 1898, such as Yuan Chang and Xu 
Jingcheng. However, they were not able to influence the decision-making process in the Zongli Yamen 
since they were new and had not much power. In October, political conditions in Beijing became 
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unstable and rumors were spreading. Zhang Zhidong’s informant in Tianjin reported to Zhang that Li 
Hongzhang, as well as many other officials, were leaving or thinking of leaving Beijing.389 For the first 
time after the Taiping rebellion, Manchu nobles had firm control of the Grand Council, the Zongli 
Yamen, Zhili province and the armed forces in North China. Han Chinese influence on the central 
government and in the north had been reduced to a minimum. With limited connections to Manchu 
nobles, Zhang Zhidong’s connection to Beijing was also reduced to a minimum. The central-provincial 
relations in the late Qing was in danger of breaking down. As I have shown, this process of political 
fragmentation was not due to the direct working of imperialism but resulted from Chinese struggle 
against Euro-American and Japanese imperialism. The political rivalries in the Hundred Days’ Reform 
clearly illustrate this argument. Facing increasing imperialist aggressions, different political bodies had 
different plans and agendas, and all of them were pursuing power to the extreme. Provincial governors 
had retreawted and left the central stage in the hope of surviving in their own provinces. The central 
government had concentrated power, yet was isolated and lost provincial support. Qing political 
fragmentation was due to the power struggles between various political bodies not the direct working 
of imperialism.  
  
                                                
389 Zhang Zhidong archives, vol. 78, 122. 
Mu Zhang 177 
 177 
Chapter 8: The breakdown of central-provincial relations in the Boxer movement 
  
This chapter examines how Zhang Zhidong together with other provincial governors and Chinese 
officials dealt with foreign encroachment during the Boxer movement. The increasing foreign military 
pressure on China both to the north and to the south during the Boxer movement forced Zhang to 
choose between his governing provinces and Beijing regarding allocating troops and military resources. 
The effective communication between Zhang and other provincial governors in the southeast sharply 
contrasts with the communication breakdown between Zhang and Beijing during the Boxer movement. 
In the end, in order to save his governing provinces from foreign invasion, Zhang chose to disregard 
Beijing’s order and unite the provincial governors in southeast China to sign a “Mutual Protection of 
Southeast China” contract with Euro-American and Japanese imperialist powers. This event signifies a 
big breakdown of central-provincial relations in the late Qing. 
 
Military preparations during the Boxer movement 
 
For a long time, most foreigners in late Qing China were not alerted to the Boxer activities in West 
Shangdong and South Zhili. Indeed, there were anti-missionary riots in Qing China since mid-
nineteenth century and a few missionaries and foreigners had been killed during those roits, such as in 
the 1891 anti-missionary riot that I discussed before in this thesis. However, as late as in the spring of 
1899, most foreigners did not foresee an outbreak of a massive anti-foreign movement in China which 
eventually led to a war. In October 1899, missionaries and foreigners started to sense the danger and 
anti-foreign placards and pamphlets were reported in foreign newspapers. The murder of the British 
missionary Brooks in Shangdong at the end of December alerted the foreigners. On 5th of January, 
1900, Claude MacDonald, the British Ambassador, reported the activities of the Boxers to the British 
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Foreign Ministry and stressed that British, German and American Ambassadors should urge the Qing 
government to protect foreign missionaries and local Chiristians.390  
 
Foreign pressure also forced the Qing court to remove Yu Xian from the post Governor of Shangdong 
for his support of the Boxers. Yu came to Beijing and his idea of using the Boxers as a force against 
foreign encroachment found lots of supporters in the court, including Prince Duan, Prince Zhuang and 
Grand Secretary Gang Yi. They presented the idea to the Empress dowager and earned her support too. 
Yu Xian was not punished and was transferred to the Governor of Shanxi. The court continued to be 
ambiguous to the issue of the Boxers and on 11 January, decreed that “when peaceful and law-abiding 
people practice skill and calisthenics for the purpose of defending themselves and their families, or 
when they combine in village communities for the mutual protection of the rural population, this is 
only a matter of mutual help and collective defence”.391 This decree caused uneasement among foreign 
ambassadors in Beijing and they saw it as evidence of the Qing court’s support of the Boxers, thus the 
support of anti-foreign sentiment in China. In the following months, foreign ambassadors in Beijing 
continued to send diplomatic notes to the Zongli Yamen, urging the Qing court to suppress the Boxers. 
In April, in order to pressure the Qing court, foreign gunboats started to gather outside the Dagu forts 
guarding the approaches to Tianjin. However, increasing foreign pressures only made the Qing court 
even flirted with the idea of organizing the Boxers into “mintuan (militia)”.392  
 
Because of the Qing court’s protection and perhaps even encouragement, Boxers’ activities increased 
in both frequency and severity. In May 1900, the Boxers spread from Shangdong province to Zhili 
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province in which the Qing capital Beijing was located. They were gathering in Zhuozhou and 
destroying the railway and telegraph lines near Zhuozhou which constituted the northern part of the 
Beijing-Hankou railway. Zhang Zhidong, the governor-general of Hunan and Hubei, proposed the 
building of the Beijing-Hankou railway after the first Sino-Japanese war in 1895. The Beijing-Hankou 
railway, which started from Beijing, passing Dingxing, Baoding, Zhengding, Xinyang and ending in 
Hankou, was the first railway in Qing China through the north and south (Figure 13).  
 
Figure 13: Stations along the Beijing-Hankou railway (Orange) and stations along the Beijing-Tianjin 
railway (Purple) 
Note: Fengtai was also along the Beijing-Tianjin railway. It was the conjunction of these two railways, 
Source: Created by the author using Google Map 
 
Zhang and Sheng borrowed money from Belgium to build the Beijing-Hankou railway. Unlike the 
Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchurian Railway, the Beijing-Hankou railway was still 
under Chinese control and protection. The last thing that Zhang and Sheng wanted to see was foreign 
troops along the Beijing-Hankou railway line. Zhang argued with foreign powers several times to 
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prevent them from sending troops along the railway. In April, he had already sent his troops to protect 
the southern part of the Beijing-Hankou railway which was within his governing provinces. 
Immediately after hearing the activities of the Boxers, Zhang and Sheng both telegraphed the Zongli 
yamen, Ronglu (the President of the Guards Army, which was the best armed and trained body of 
Imperial Chinese Troops) and Yulu (the governor-general of Zhili), suggesting that some of 
General Nie Shicheng‘s troops (the Front Division of the Guards Army) should go to Dingxing to stop 
the Boxers spreading further south to Baoding, the provincial capital of Zhili.393 
 
Yulu as the governor-general of Zhili, however, was very busy in Tianjin at that moment and had to 
ignore Zhang and Sheng’s request. The Boxers not only were spreading south but also moving north 
along the Beijing-Hankou railway line. Within days, the Boxers moving north destroyed railways, 
stations and telegraph lines along the railway line and spread to the outskirts of Beijing. Soon they 
burned the Fengtai station which was only 10 kilometers from Beijing. And about 20 foreigners were 
missing.394 Fortunately, the Boxers in Fengtai had gone after hearing of the arrival of Imperial Chinese 
troops and the Beijing-Tianjin railway line resumed selling tickets.395 
 
Ronglu in Beijing took seriously the security of Beijing and the Beijing-Tianjin railway, and acted very 
quickly in response to any potential dangers. He ordered four battalions to protect Beijing's 
main railway station, Majiapu, three to protect Yongding Gate, the former front gate of Beijing’s outer 
city wall, and six to protect Fengtai railway station. On 30 May, despite the fact that he was unwell, he 
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went to Majiapu, Beijing's main railway station, by himself and took the train from there to Fengtai 
station to examine the damage in Fengtai. Fortunately, the railways were intact and the Beijing-Tianjin 
railway was still selling tickets.396 
 
At this point, Beijing was still very secure, Ronglu had in total 11 battalions to protect Beijing. The 
Beijing-Tianjin railway was intact too. But the heads of the foreign legations in Beijing believed that 
the Beijing-Tianjin railway line was being destroyed by the Boxers, resulting in Beijing being cut off 
from the coast. This caused great panic among the embassies. On 28 May, Claude MacDonald, the 
British Ambassador, called a meeting of all foreign ambassadors, and at that meeting all the 
ambassadors agreed to send soldiers into Beijing to protect the legations. The Dean of the Diplomatic 
Corps, Spanish ambassador J. B. de Cologan, representing the ambassadors of Britain, France, Russia, 
Germany, USA, Austro-Hungary, Italy and Japan, informed the Zongli Yamen that the Legation guard 
would enter Beijing and require cooperation from the Zongli Yamen. The Zongli Yamen refused the 
ambassadors’ request initially, but the ambassadors kept pressing the Zongli Yamen.397 
 
In the meantime, Yulu continued to receive intelligence reports about the gathering of gunboats and the 
landing of foreign troops with arms from the Dagu forts to Tianjin. On 30 May, the Legation guards 
had already arrived in Tianjin and were seeking Yulu’s cooperation to transport them to Beijing by 
train through the Beijing-Tianjin railway line. All the ambassadors also decided on the same day that 
the Legation guards must enter Beijing, “permission or no permission”.398 
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French Tianjin Consul, Comte du Cheylard, as the representative of the ambassadors in Beijing kept 
pressing Yulu to give permission to the Legation guards to take a train to Beijing. Yulu telegraphed the 
Zongli Yamen several times to discuss this pressing issue and finally at 4am on 31 May, the Zongli 
Yamen agreed the Legation guards to enter Beijing given that no more than 30 soldiers per country 
were sent. At 4pm, a total of 406 Legation guards, much more than the number agreed by the Zongli 
Yamen, boarded a train from Tianjing station and arrived in Beijing in the evening.399 
 
The Legation guards entering Beijing was a key moment turning the Boxer Movement to the Boxer 
war. Until mid May 1900, Boxer activities largely aimed at Churches and Chinese Christians, only one 
foreigner was killed. In late May, the Boxers started to destroy railways and telegraph lines, threating 
the security of Beijing. For the first time since 1900, the Qing court decreed an order to wipe out the 
Boxers if they refused to disband. However, when the foreign ambassadors insisted to send the 
Legation guards to Beijing, the Qing court quickly changed its mind and issued a decree to stop wiping 
out the Boxers.400  
 
Since 28 May, with the gathering of gunboats and the landing of foreign troops from the Dagu forts, the 
Boxers were no longer the only issue troubling Yulu. Foreign encroachment came to the fore. Yulu 
started to gather as many troops as possible in Tianjin. He had asked General Nie to lead several Front 
Division battalions to Fengtai. On 29 May, Nie telegraphed Yulu that he planned to lead four battalions 
to Fengtai by train from Tianjin and leave one in Tianjin. Yulu quickly replied that there were only five 
battalions in Tianjin, which was not enough to guard the city. He asked Nie to bring eight battalions 
with him, four to Fengtai and four to stay in Tianjin. When Nie arrived in Tianjin with the eight 
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battalions, Yulu just received Ronglu’s telegram that there were already enough troops in and around 
Beijing. So after discussing with Nie and Ronglu, Yulu arranged the four battalions originally in 
Fengtai along the Beijing-Tianjin railway line, mostly in Yangcun and Langfang. Thus, Nie with the 
four battalions was patrolling the Beijing-Tianjin railway line at that time.401 
 
The landing of the Legation guard also alerted Nie. On 31 May, Nie telegraphed Yulu secretly saying: 
“foreign threats were especially pressing now”. He suggested gathering Chinese gunboats to occupy 
strategic positions, notifying the forts of the Yellow Sea to take strict precautions, even stopping selling 
tickets to foreigners in Tianjin station. Yulu replied that the Zongli Yamen had already permitted the 
Legation guards to enter Beijing, but he completedly agreed with Nie that “foreign actions were 
unpredictable and coastal defence crucial”.402 
 
General Nie had been appointed by an Imperial Edict on 30 May to protect both Beijing-Hankou and 
Beijing-Tianjin railway lines, hence Yulu also asked Nie how he was going to protect these two lines. 
Nie replied that he planned to leave most of the battalions in Tianjin. The battalions which had left 
Tianjin would also return to Tianjin, “to strengthen the defence of Tianjin”.403 Obviously, to Nie and 
Yulu, the defence of Tianjin against foreign encroachment was far more important than protecting the 
two railway lines. 
 
On 31 May 1900, with the 406 Legation guards in Beijing, and the gathering of gunboats and the 
landing of more foreign troops from the Dagu forts, the possibility of foreign invasion from Dagu forts 
to Tianjin then to Beijing was real. Yulu and Nie, who were the local political and military leaders 
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respectively started to put the security of the Dagu forts and Tianjin on top of their list. They started to 
gather all their troops around Tianjin. Even before the landing of the two-thousand foreign troops led 
by Seymour, Chinese local officials and military generals were alerted to possible foreign invasion and 
ordered their troops to move to strategic positions.   
 
While Nie and Yulu were preparing to defend Tianjin, the situation along the Beijing-Hankou railway 
line continued to deteriorate. Tens of thousands of Boxers occupied Zhouzhou on 29 May, and a group 
of foreign engineers encountered the Boxers on their way to Tianjin. Four were killed on 31 May. But 
no matter how urgent the situation was and how much Zhang Zhidong, Sheng Xuanhuai and Zhili 
troops along the railway line called for help, Yulu and Nie were determined to keep all the troops 
around Tianjin. Yulu even ordered most of the Zhili cavalry battalions in Laishui back to Tianjin. He 
also ordered the battalion that went to Fengtai back to Langfang, a town in the middle of the Beijing-
Tianjin railway line. When Lieutenant Zhang Shihan asked for more cavalry from Yulu after two 
British missionaries were killed by the Boxers in Yongqing, Yulu refused. Nie was also moving troops 
from Tangshan to the strategic locations along the coast and between Tianjin and the Dagu forts, 
including Tanggu, Hangu and Junliangcheng.404  
 
Up to 2 June 1900, the Boxers were not only threatening the Beijing-Hankou railway line, but also 
Zhili’s provincial capital, Baoding. Under the pressure from Zhang Zhidong and Sheng Xuanhuai, 
Ronglu finally went to the Qing court and asked for an Imperial Edict to order Nie moving to 
Zhouzhou.405 However, the Qing court’s attitude to the Boxers changed dramatically the next day. The 
Imperial Edict ordering Nie to Baoding was never issued. Instead, an Imperial Edict was issued to 
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Ronglu face to face demanding peaceful treatment for the Boxers, to disperse them not to exterminate 
them. The same Imperial Edict was sent to Ronglu and Yulu in writing urgently and Ronglu was 
required to spread it to all the troops.406  
 
With the increasing activities of the Boxers along the two railway lines, more foreign gunboats were 
gathering at the Dagu forts and the ambassadors in Beijing were pressing the Zongli Yamen to allow 
more foreign troops into Beijing. On 6 June, Yulu reported to the Zongli Yamen that there were 27 
foreign gunboats at the Dagu forts. The next day, at 2am, Ronglu telegraphed Yulu requiring him to 
send two million bullets to Beijing. Yulu then telegraphed Liu Kunyi, the governor-general of 
Liangjiang (including Jiangsu, Anhui and Jiangxi), to organize these bullets. Unfortunately, the ship 
carrying these bullets was detained in Yantai by the foreign powers when fire opened at the Dagu 
forts.407 
 
The prospect of a war between China and the foreign powers became more clear when Nie saw about 
two thousand foreign troops led by Seymour in Yangcun on 10 June. These troops, unlike the Legation 
guards, were sent to China completely without Chinese authorizaition. Nie was surprised by the 
presence of these troops and immediately changed the strategic deployment of himself and his troops, 
no longer staying in Yangcun to prevent the Boxers entering Tianjin but returning to the strategic 
coastal town Lutai. He telegraphed Yulu, asking him to let the Zongli Yamen tell the ambassadors that 
“he was unable to protect these foreign troops”.408 
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Yulu, at the same time, ordered Zhili troops along the Beijing-Hankou railway line all back to Baoding 
and urged the officials in Baoding to take great precautions to defend Baoding.409 Nie also ordered five 
Front Division battalions back to Tianjin to protect arsenals, and all the troops out back to their original 
defensive location.410 It is not very clear why the Qing court’s policy towards the Boxers changed 
dramatically on 3 June. But even before 3 June, Yulu and Nie had sensed the danger of foreign 
encroachment in Tianjin and were preparing their troops for it. It is highly possible that Ronglu and the 
Qing court in Beijing were also aware of the danger. The landing of the Seymour expedition and the 
increasing number of gunboats in Dagu forts only reinforced their fear.  
 
Viewed from the Chinese side, the foreign powers were obviously very aggressive. The Zongli Yamen 
tried in vain to stop the Legation guards coming to Beijing. General Nie was shocked to discover the 
landing of Seymour’s two-thousand foreign troops on Chinese soil. Yulu received intelligence reports 
day by day about the increasing numbers of gunboats and foreign troops at the Dagu forts and around 
Tianjin. This time, the global force of the new imperialism struck China hard and directly pointed to its 
centre.  
 
Information exchange 
 
While Yulu and Nie were busy moving their troops back to Tianjin, the powerful governors-general of 
southeast China were deeply worried. On 8 June, Zhang Zhidong (the governor-general of Hubei and 
Hunan) and Liu Kunyi (the governor-general of Jiangsu, Anhui and Jiangxi) both got the message from 
Yulu that Gangyi would go to Zhouzhou to peacefully disperse the Boxers. Immediately, they sensed 
that the Qing court’s policy to the Boxers had changed. To them, this was a dangerous change because 
                                                
409 Zhidong jiaofei diancun, 469-70, 474, 479-483.  
410 Ibid, 477.  
Mu Zhang 187 
 187 
once the Boxers spread and killed more foreigners, foreign intervention would be inevitable. Once 
foreign troops landed on Chinese soils, “China was in danger”. They tried hard to change the court’s 
mind. They telegraphed the Zongli Yamen, Ronglu and Yulu several times to explain the danger of this 
policy and begged them to persuade the court to give it up.411 
 
Sheng Xuanhuai felt the same as Zhang Zhidong and Liu Kunyi. He even telegraphed to Li 
Hongzhang, the governor-general of Liangguang (Guangdong and Guangxi), who was the governor-
general of Zhili between 1870 and 1895, suggesting Li return to Zhili to deal with the current crisis. 
From Robert Hart, Inspector-General of China's Imperial Maritime Custom Service (IMCS), Li knew 
that the foreign powers would send troops to China if the court did not change its policy towards the 
Boxers, but he also knew of the court’s determined support for the Boxers. So he stayed silent to 
Sheng’s suggestion.412 
 
Being the founder and supervisor of the Imperial Telegraph Administration (ITA), which administered 
and supervised tens of thousands of miles of telegraph wires in China, Sheng Xuanhuai stood at a 
unique position in this crucial moment of Chinese history.413 He was the most important mediator 
between the governors-general and the centre of information flows. Through officials who were 
working in the many offices of the ITA, Sheng in Shanghai was monitoring the telegrams sent by 
foreign agencies from China to different countries. On 10 June, he intercepted a telegram sent overseas 
by Reuters in Tianjin. Reuters bureau advocated that the foreign powers should send troops to protect 
foreigners in China and quickly take over the railways. He also intercepted a telegram sent by the 
British Ambassador to the British Consul in Shanghai. The telegram revealed that a great number of 
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foreign troops were arriving in China and “if China could not solve its problems by itself, the foreign 
powers had to take over and administer its military and political affairs, just like in Egypt”. The next 
day, hearing that the Seymour expedition was heading to Beijing, Sheng telegraphed Li Hongzhang 
again, begging him to return to Zhili. He also telegraphed Zhang Zhidong and Liu Kunyi, asking them 
to persuade Li back to Zhili.414 
 
On 13 June, Sheng got the shocking message that Japanese chancellor, Sugiyama Akira, was killed by 
Chinese troops in Beijing.415 Li Hongzhang still did not want to go to Zhili in this dangerous moment. 
Soon came the message to Sheng that the head of the Zongli Yamen changed from Prince Qing to the 
anti-foreign Prince Duan. Yuan Shikai, the governor of Shandong (a Chinese province located on the 
coast of the Yellow Sea), felt threatened too. He telegraphed Sheng, Zhang Zhidong and Liu Kunyi of 
the possible arrival of many foreign troops and the great danger that China faced, and asked them what 
plans they had.416 
 
The pressing foreign threats, the death of the Japanese chancellor and the power shift in the Zongli 
Yamen all pointed to a great crisis in China. Without delay, Sheng telegraphed all these shocking 
messages to Liu Kunyi, Zhang Zhidong, Li Hongzhang, Wang Zhichun (the governor of Anhui), Lu 
Chuanlin (the governor of Jiangsu), and Yuan Shikai. These people’s governing provinces almost 
included all the provinces along the southeast China coast and the provinces along the Yangtze river.417 
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Facing this great crisis, despite the obvious support that the Qing court gave to the Boxers, Zhang 
Zhidong and Liu Kunyi decided to submit a joint report with Yulu to persuade the court to change its 
policy to the Boxers from “disperse” to “exterminate”. They carefully chose the wording of this report, 
and revised the draft several times. The report was sent to the court on 15 June.418  
 
Also on 15 June, Sheng intercepted a telegram sent overseas by a foreign journalist in Tianjin, in which 
the journalist reported: Tianjin was full of the Boxers, foreign churches were all burnt, thousands of 
Russian troops carrying four cannons were heading to Beijing and Chinese troops were gathering too. 
Another intercepted telegram sent by a journalist in Tianjin to the London Times claimed that the best 
foreign houses, churches and Maritime Custom Service residences in east Beijing were burnt by the 
Boxers on 13 June. The Boxers killed hundreds of Chinese Christians and servants. The foreigners got 
away from the Boxers and ran to the Legation guards. Because the communications from Beijing were 
cut off since 10 June, and Yulu in Tianjin was busy with gathering troops, Sheng’s intelligence network 
became the sole source of information about Beijing and Tianjin. Once Sheng got any information, he 
would quickly send it to the governors-general and governors who were looking for any information 
from Beijing and Tianjin anxiously.  
 
On the same day, Sheng intercepted another telegram sent by a journalist in Tianjin. The telegram 
claimed that foreign powers decided to attack the Dagu forts that night. General Nie was taking 2500 
troops from Lutai to Junliangcheng. The Left Division of the Guards Amy led by Song Qing were 
heading to Beijing through Shanhaiguan. 
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Tianjin was in danger. Sheng immediately telegraphed the Taiyuan office of the Imperial Telegraph 
Administration (ITA), urging them to protect the west telegraph line in case the south line through 
Tianjin was cut off (Figure 14). China Merchants' Steamship Company (under Shang’s supervision) in 
Shanghai also urged its office in Tianjin to send all its ships to Shanghai. Sheng’s swift action saved his 
ships. The Boxers and the foreign troops in Tianjin opened fire outside Tianjin’s foreign concession in 
the evening on 15 June. At 1am on 16 June, the telegraph poles in Tianjin’s concession were destroyed 
by the fire. Once knowing that the communication between Tianjin and Shanghai was cut off, Sheng 
quickly notified all the ITA offices and Governor Yuan in Shangdong that all telegrams sent to Tianjin 
should be sent to Yantai, a coast town in Shangdong, then carried to Botou by ships of the Maritime 
Custom Service, and then carried to Tianjin by special couriers.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: North-Eastern China, with MS Additions Showing Chinese Imperial Telegraph, 1894.  
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Note: Orange line represents Chinese Imperial Telegraph. Peking is Beijing, Tientsin is Tianjin 
 
Source: FO 925/2390: North-Eastern China, with MS Additions Showing Chinese Imperial Telegraph. 
No 594-I, 94. 1:1,355,000. Quartermaster General's Department, India No 1028 
 
 
War seemed inevitable now. More intercepted telegrams sent by journalists confirmed that more than 
40 gunboats were at the Dagu forts. Admirals of all foreign powers held a meeting on 14 June planning 
to attack the Dagu forts.419 Meantime, another telegram intercepted by Sheng caused great panic. The 
telegram was sent by London Reuters in which it revealed some British Parliamentary speeches stating 
that “all foreign powers agreed with each other regarding the current China crisis, and Britain should 
send troops to the Yangtze river”. The translation of these speeches actually was not very precise. The 
accurate translation should be “Britain had already sent troops to the Yangtze river to protect foreign 
lives and property, and all the powers agreed with the action taken by the Admiral”.420 But the 
translator, probably affected by the strong tension between China and the foreign powers lately, and the 
loss of Port Arthur, Qingdao, Weihaiwei and Guangzhouwan to Russia, Germany, Britain and France 
within years after 1895 (Figure 15), saw this message as a sign to scramble for China by all the foreign 
powers, and as a sign that Britain would occupy the Yangtze river. 
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Figure 15: North-Eastern China (Map 2) Showing Leased Territory and Sphere of Influence of Great 
Britain and of Germany, and Russian Leased Territory and Central Zone, 1898 
Green: Russia, Pink: Great Britain, Yellow: Germany 
Source: FO 925/2363 
 
 
Sheng thought this too. Immediately, he at least telegraphed this intercepted message to Ronglu, Li 
Hongzhang, Liu Kunyi and Zhang Zhidong. Unfortunately, these secret communications between 
Sheng, Ronglu, Li Hongzhang, Liu Kunyi and Zhang Zhidong are not found in all published archives. 
But after carefully studying Sheng’s return telegrams to Ronglu, Li, Liu and Zhang on 17 June, it was 
clear that these people were in close telegraph communication on 16 and 17 June. Their secret 
telegraph communications were referred in Sheng’s return telegrams as “Hao telegram”, “Ge telegram” 
and “Rong telegram”. 
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Their close communication and the impact of this “scramble for China” message on them were also 
apparent in the fact that Liu Kunyi and Zhang Zhidong telegraphed Ronglu again on 16 June only one 
day after they had submitted a joint report to the Qing court. They stressed the urgency of the crisis and 
called for immediate action. Zhang reminded Ronglu that if war came to Beijing, the provinces would 
not be safe. This was obviously because he got the message from Sheng that Britain would occupy the 
Yangtze river. Now not only Beijing and Tianjin in north China was in danger, south China, where the 
governors-general’ own provinces, were in danger too. Liu and Zhang’s telegrams to Ronglu on 16 
June were not even sent through the normal temporary route Yantai-Botou-Tianjin-Beijing because 
Sheng thought it was too slow. Sheng sent the telegrams from Shanghai to Blagoveshchensk in Russia, 
then to Tianjin through the north telegraph line, then to Beijing (Figure 11). 
 
When Ronglu received these “Rong telegrams”, he must have suggested to the Empress Dowager that 
she should restore Li Hongzhang to the position of the governor-general of Zhili in order to save China. 
Considering the distance between Beijing and Guangzhou, and the cut off communication from Beijing 
and Tianjin, Ronglu’s suggestion was most likely adopted by the Empress Dowager at once, for on 18 
June, Li notified Sheng that he got the telegram asking him to the Qing court.421 
 
Although the translator, Sheng and the governors-general misunderstood the British Parliament’s 
speeches as a plan to scramble for China on 15 June, events of the following days confirmed their fear. 
As early as 11 June, Russia decided to send more troops from Lushun to Dagu. On 12 and 13 June, 
2700 Russian troops landed at Dagu. Shortly afterwards Britain sent 950 troops to Dagu from Hong 
Kong and India (later changed to only from India), and decided to maintain strongest military force in 
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China. Later Japan also sent 1200 troops to Dagu. On 16 June, the Admirals sent an ultimatum to Yulu 
and the Chinese troops at Dagu. At 1am on 17 June, the Chinese troops and the foreign gunboats 
opened fire at the Dagu forts. Six hours later, the Dagu forts were captured. More foreign troops were 
coming to China.422  
 
The same day, Sheng Xuanhuai learned of the capture of the Dagu forts. He telegraphed this important 
message to Yulu, Li Hongzhang, Liu Kunyi and Zhang Zhidong, Yuan Shikai, Wang Zhichun, Lu 
Chuanlin, Kuijun (the governor-general of Sichuan), Xu Yingkui (the governor-general of Minzhe) and 
Yu Liansan (the governor of Hunan) on 18 June. The governing provinces of these people included all 
the provinces along China’s southeast coast and the Yangtze river (Figure 16).  
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Figure 16: All the provinces in China, white area are the provinces that Sheng telegraphed 
Source: Modified by the author using https://sacu.org/provmap.html 
 
 
“Mutual Protection of Southeast China” 
 
While the foreign powers were engaging in battles with Chinese troops and the Boxers at Dagu and 
Tianjin in north China, they were also contacting the governors-general of southeast China. The 
interactions and negotiations between the governors-general and the foreign powers were self-sustained 
actions out of the control of the Qing court. As early as 14 June, the British Acting Consul in Shanghai, 
Pelham Laird Warren, telegraphed the British Foreign Secretary, Marquess of Salisbury, suggesting an 
immediate agreement between Britain and the governors-general (Liu Kunyi and Zhang Zhidong) to 
rely on British power for the protection of the Yangtze provinces if war broke out between Britain and 
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the Beijing government. Warren’s suggestion was exactly what Salisbury was thinking. The next day, 
Salisbury telegraphed Warren and the British Consul in Hankou, indicating them to inform Liu Kunyi 
and Zhang Zhidong that Britain would like to provide gunboats to protect the Yangtze provinces. He 
also notified this decision to the British Admiralty. The British Admiralty then notified the British 
troops at Dagu that they could call for gunboats from the Philippines and the South Division of the 
Admiralty to protect British lives and properties in the Yangtze provinces.423  
 
So on 16 June, the same day when the ultimatum was issued to the Dagu forts, one British gunboat was 
sent to Nanjing to contact Liu Kunyi, one was sent to Hankou to contact Zhang Zhidong, one was sent 
to the Wusong forts that guarded the entrance to the Yangtze river, and one was sent to Shanghai.424 
 
On 17 June, British Hankou Consul, E. D. H. Fraser met Zhang Zhidong to inform him of Britain’s 
intention to protect the Yangtze provinces. Warren and Hart also met Liu Kunyi to inform him of this 
intention. Zhang telegraphed Liu at once to make sure that they both refused British protection. Liu told 
Zhang that he thought the same as Zhang. Both replied to British consuls that they would like to protect 
foreign lives and properties in the Yangtze provinces themselves. Britain could send one or two 
gunboats into the Yangtze river for regular patrols, but no more in case the gunboats disturbed the 
locals. Zhang also telegraphed Luo Fenglu, Chinese Ambassador to Britain in London, asking him to 
forward his reply to Salisbury. Liu Kunyi and Zhang Zhidong knew very clearly that Britain’s interests 
in the Yangtze provinces and that southeast China would be in danger if they did not protect the 
Yangtze provinces from the Boxers themselves.425 So they telegraphed all the important officials in 
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their provinces and other governors-general and governors to protect churches, missionaries, 
foreigners, railways and telegraph lines.426  
 
Meantime, Zhang Zhidong was actively mobilizing troops and buying weapons. He asked Yu Liansan, 
the governor of Hunan, to recruit and mobilize troops, borrowed eight senior military officers and 24 
junior military officers from Yuan Shikai, recalled Wang Bingen back to Hubei immediately once he 
bought all the required guns in Shanghai, and telegraphed the Chinese Ambassador to Germany, Lü 
Haihuan and Qian Nianqu in Japan, asking them to buy German and Japanese guns and ammunition.427 
 
He was also contacting Chinese ambassadors in foreign countries. First he was trying to get Japan on 
China’s side. He asked the Chinese Ambassador to Japan, Li Shengduo, to tell the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Japan secretly that the court had already recalled Li Hongzhang to Beijing to make peace 
with the foreign powers. If the foreign powers continued to land troops in China, occupied Beijing and 
divided China, Japan could only get one piece. But if Japan could persuade the other powers to cease 
fire, China would be in debt to Japan and bring Japan endless benefits. “If China was divided, could 
Japan survive alone?”. However, Japan was not impressed by Zhang’s words.428  
 
Then on 21 June, Zhang telegraphed the Chinese Ambassador to the USA, Wu Tingfang, asking him to 
earnestly request the USA to save southeast China. Zhang appreciated that the USA gunboats did not 
open fire at Dagu and admired that the Americans were always “righteous, just and never take 
advantage of others' difficulties and use the many to defeat the few”. If foreign gunboats entered the 
Yangtze river, inland China would be in chaos just like north China and business would be greatly 
                                                
426 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol 10, 58-63; Liu Kunyi. Liu Kunyi yiji, 2563-64; Sheng Xuanhuai, Yu zhai cun gao, 836. 
427 Zhang Zhidong quanji, vol 10, 58-63.  
428 Ibid, 63-65.  
Mu Zhang 198 
 198 
affected. He humbly asked the USA to persuade the other powers not to send gunboats into the Yangtze 
river, and he and Liu Kunyi would take the responsibility of protecting the Yangtze provinces, 
exterminating the bandits and making sure that no accident happened.429  
 
Liu Kunyi’s situation was even more urgent than Zhang Zhidong’s since his governing provinces were 
downstream of the Yangtze river. Warren still kept pressing Liu and Yu Lianyuan (Shanghai Daotai), 
but Liu was not affected. From Sheng, Liu knew that John Calvin Ferguson, an American, had said that 
foreign powers did not plan to capture the Wusong forts. Sheng believed that Britain’s offer of 
protection was a trick. If accepting its offer, other powers would raise disputes. At that time, war would 
break out.  Liu agreed with Sheng’s suggestion of letting Daotai Yu inform all foreign consuls in 
Shanghai that governors-general preferred foreign powers not to intervene and would like to protect the 
Yangtze provinces by themselves.430  
 
Liu Kunyi and Zhang Zhidong kept contacting other governors-general and governors in southeast 
China to ensure that they were on the same side. These governors-general and governors submitted a 
joint report to the court on 20 June, asking the court to exterminate the Boxers and make peace with the 
foreign powers. On 22 June, Zhang telegraphed Chinese ambassadors to the foreign powers again 
expressing his wish to make peace. On 23 June, even after they got the Imperial Edict ordering them to 
send troops to save Beijing, Liu, Zhang and Yuan sent a joint telegram to Prince Qing and Ronglu, 
urging them to persuade the court to make peace with the foreign powers. Despite the court’s attitude 
and the situation in the north, Liu, Zhang and Yuan were determined to exterminate the Boxers in their 
provinces, protect foreign lives and properties, and not let the war expand to southeast China.431 
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While Liu, Zhang, Sheng and Yuan were worrying about the security of southeast China, the British 
troops at Dagu were not better off. The Seymour expedition encountered the Boxers and Chinese 
Imperial troops 64 kilometers away from Beijing on 15 June. On 17 June, when the foreign troops 
captured the Dagu forts and left for Tianjin, there were few troops left at Dagu. On 18 June, the foreign 
troops at Dagu lost contact with Tianjin. All north China was under arms. British Rear Admiral at 
Dagu, James A, T. Bruce heard strong gunfire from Tianjin’s direction. Bruce requested 
reinforcements. British Admiralty told Bruce on 20 June that 800 troops would come to Hong Kong to 
wait for further orders and more gunboats were coming to Dagu.  
 
Since 20 June, Britain’s attitude to Liu Kunyi and Zhang Zhidong started to change. The British 
Foreign Ministry informed the British Admiralty of Liu and Zhang’s refusal of British protection and 
suggested that the Admiralty should notify Admirals in the gunboats along the Yangtze river not to 
show off British power, and to only tell Liu and Zhang that British gunboats were ready for help 
anytime.432 
 
On 21 June, Bruce sent a secret telegram and informed the Admiralty that the newest message from 
Tianjin showed that urgent reinforcements were needed, casualties were high and there were not 
enough weapons. There were lots of ambushes around Tianjin and the Chinese bombarded the foreign 
concessions in Tianjin. Yet Bruce had no troops to reinforce Tianjin. He had lost contact with Seymour 
for seven days and with Tianjin for five days. The foreign troops at Dagu were only enough to defend 
Dagu and Tanggu; they could not go to reinforce Tianjin. But the troops from Hong Kong and 
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Weihaiwei would not arrive until the next day. The Admirals of all foreign powers at Dagu at once 
made a decision. They announced to all the governors-general and governors in southeast China that 
they would only use force against the Boxers and the people who were preventing them from saving 
their fellow countrymen in Beijing.  
 
Until 23 June 1900, reinforcements from Hong Kong still had not arrived at Dagu. The Russians and 
the Germans were the head of the foreign powers since there were 4000 Russian troops and 1300 
German troops at Dagu. Troops from other countries were few and no further reinforcements from 
Russia or German would arrive. On 24 June, Bruce telegraphed the Admiralty again that he had no 
troops to reinforce the Seymour expedition. Fighting around Tianjin continued. Bruce decided to turn 
Weihaiwei into a temporary medical base and shelter.433  
 
Salisbury was busy mobilizing more troops to reinforce Dagu and Tianjin, but his troops would arrive 
later since they came from India. He could not provide immediate reinforcements that Bruce needed 
most. So he contacted Whitehead, British Ambassador to Japan, to persuade Japan to send troops to 
China. He also contacted Load Pauncefote, British Ambassador to the USA, to suggest that Mr. Hay, 
U.S. Secretary of State, should send troops to China from Manila, Capital of the Philippines, for the 
U.S. Legation was also in danger as the other legations.434  
 
Considering Japan’s scruples about other powers’ reactions to its reinforcement troops, especially 
Russia’s and Germany’s, on 25 June, Salisbury contacted Sir C. Scott, British Ambassador to Russia, 
to persuade Russia to allow Japan reinforce 20000 to 30000 troops at Dagu, given the urgency of the 
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current situation. He explained that Britain would reinforce Dagu’s 10, 000 troops from India and was 
sure that Russia would reinforce Dagu too.  
 
On 26 June, Salisbury telegraphed Viscount Gough, British Counsellor to Germany, informing 
Germany that Britain had requested Russia’s permission for 20, 000 to 30, 000 Japanese reinforcements 
to Dagu and that Britain hoped to secure the German emperor’s support to Britain’s this decision. Only 
the fear of other powers’ reactions prevented Japan from sending more troops to China. After several 
communications with Britain, Japan quickly agreed to mobilize 13, 000 troops to Dagu and told Britain 
that these troops were ready to go at any time.435 
 
From 21 June to 26 June, Salisbury finally secured a large number of Japanese troops to reinforce Dagu 
and Tianjin. But the announcement to only use force against the Boxers and the people who were 
preventing foreign troops entering Beijing, made by Bruce and the Foreign Admirals on 21 June when 
they had no hope of immediate reinforcement to Dagu, provided Liu and Zhang with an opportunity to 
make peace with the foreign powers. 
 
On 23 June, from Yuan Shikai, Li Hongzhang, Liu Kunyi, Zhang Zhidong, and Sheng Xunahuai knew 
that the court had decided to declare war against all foreign powers and an Imperial Edict sent out from 
the court on 21 June was asking the governors-general and governors to fight with the Boxers against 
the foreign powers. But Yuan did not make the message of this Imperial Edict public and only 
telegraphed it to Li, Liu, Zhang and Sheng secretly. He also told them that the Zongli Yamen asked all 
foreign ambassadors to leave Beijing within 24 hours and telegraphed Chinese ambassadors to return to 
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China. Messages from Baoding also informed Sheng that the court had declared war. The same day, 
Sheng telegraphed these messages secretly to Li, Liu and Zhang.436 
 
After receiving these messages, Sheng quickly telegraphed every ITA offices asking them not to make 
these messages public, and to forward any messages from Beijing through encrypted telegram. On 23 
June, Sheng telegraphed Li, Liu and Zhang informing them that north China had no hope, and urged 
them, for the benefits of the country and the people, to take all necessary measures to protect south 
China from foreign invasion. He suggested that Li, Liu and Zhang should make an agreement with all 
foreign consuls in Shanghai through Shanghai Daotai Yu before they received the 21 June Imperial 
Edict. The agreement should make it clear that foreign powers protected Shanghai concessions and the 
governors-general protected the Yangtze provinces – this was the so-called “the Mutual Protection of 
Southeast China”.  
 
Sheng’s telegram arrived Li, Liu and Zhang at 10am on 24 June. At 10pm, Liu and Zhang agreed after 
several telegraph communications. On 25 June, Sheng received Liu and Zhang’s telegram, asking him 
and Shanghai Daotai Yu to meet the foreign consuls together immediately. Zhang informed Sheng that 
they were following the 20 June Imperial Edict in which the court asked the governors-general to 
defend their land together. At noon, Sheng also received Li’s telegram in which Li stated that the 21 
June Imperial Edict was a false Edict and he would not obey.  
 
Now, with Sheng as the mediator, Li, Liu and Zhang all agreed to obey the 20 June Imperial Edict to 
defend their provinces together and disregard the 21 June Imperial Edict. They decided not to make the 
21 June Imperial Edict public. At 3pm on 26 June, Shanghai Daotai Yu and Sheng met the foreign 
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consuls to discuss the Mutual Protection of Southeast China. On 27 June, the consuls, quoting the 
announcement made by the Admirals at Dagu, replied to Sheng and Shanghai Daotai Yu that the 
foreign powers only use force against the Boxers and the people who were preventing them entering 
Beijing; they had no interest in the Yangtze provinces.437  
 
The above discussion shows that the foreign consuls in Shanghai agreed with “the Mutual Protection of 
Southeast China” at a time when the Admirals at Dagu was in a difficult situation. The foreign troops 
were continuously fighting with the Boxers and Chinese Imperial troops around Tianjin and they had 
no immediate reinforcement. The foreign consuls in Shanghai probably were also frightened and feared 
that they would be the next to be besieged after the foreign legations in Beijing and the foreign 
concessions in Tianjin if they did not agree with “the Mutual Protection of Southeast China”. 
 
But the foreign powers’ difficulty was short-lived. On 26 June, Salisbury secured a large number of 
Japanese reinforcements. On 27 June, the troops at Dagu and British Consul at Tianjin finally knew 
Seymour’s position. Yulu sent a very urgent telegram to Liu, Zhang and Yuan on 23 June informing 
them he could only defend Tianjin for 4 or 5 days and asking for immediate reinforcements from them. 
Because the telegraph line was cut, Zhang received Yulu’s telegram on 26 June but he did not return 
this telegram until 2 July. In his return telegram, he told Yulu that there were no reinforcements to 
Tianjin, and asked him to save the foreign ambassadors in Beijing in order to make peace with the 
foreign powers.438  
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Li Hongzhang, Liu Kunyi and Zhang Zhidong were determined not let the war came to southeast China 
even if the war in north China continued and the court declared war officially against all foreign 
powers on 24 June. Later, Sheng and Yu made 9 articles about “the Mutual Protection of Southeast 
China” and sent them to Foreign Ministries of the foreign powers through Chinese foreign 
ambassadors. Salisbury replied that he appreciated governors-general’s support in protecting the 
provinces but these articles could only be statements nor part of an agreement. Other foreign consuls 
also said that they could not sign these articles since protecting the provinces were always the 
governors-general’s responsibility thus there was no need to make another agreement. Up to 29 June, 
only the USA promised not to send troops into the Yangtze provinces. Even if Sheng, Li, Liu and 
Zhang reduced the articles to only Chinese protection of foreigners and foreign properties in the 
Yangtze provinces, the foreign powers still refused to sign the agreement.439 
 
Facing unprecedented foreign encroachment in 1900, Yulu and General Nie prepared early and 
mobilized all the troops at their disposal. Yulu’s role in the siege of concessions in Tianjin was not very 
clear. General Nie was surely fighting the foreign troops from the very start when he left Yangcun. The 
Dagu forts were captured on 17 June, but the allied force only began to assault Tientsin until 13 July. 
For nearly a month, the Boxers and the Chinese Imperial troops were fighting the allied force around 
Tianjin. They could have won the fight and recaptured Dagu if they got reinforcements from Zhang 
Zhidong before the allied force got further reinforcements. 
 
Unfortunately, like the other governors in southeast Chinese provinces, Zhang Zhidong was not keen to 
fight against the foreign powers. He just wanted to keep peace in his governing provinces. And he 
knew that he did not have enough modern weapons and ammunition to fight: Zhang was buying guns 
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and ammunition from foreign countries as early as mid-June. He chose to disregard the court’s orders 
and unite other governors-general in southeast China through Sheng’s telegraph network to negotiate 
with the imperialist powers by themselves in this 1900 crisis.  
 
Zhang Zhidong’s choice to disregard the central government’s orders in this 1900 crisis was not 
accidental. If he had better connections in the central government and were able to influence central-
government decisions, he would not have made this choice. However, since the first Sino-Japanese war 
the central government would transfer the burden from the imperialist powers to provincial governors. 
Provincial troops were sent to the front line, provincial incomes were squeezed to pay the war 
indemnity and support central-government initiatives and projects while at the same time, provincial 
governors were excluded from the decision making process in Beijing. Facing increasing imperialist 
aggression, the central government chose to sacrifice provincial interests and strengthen its own power. 
Similarly, provincial governors, such as Zhang Zhidong chose to sacrifice central-government interests 
for its own survival. Not all the imperialist powers wanted to see a fragmented Qing China. Facing the 
imperialist invasion of external powers during the Boxer movement. Qing provincial governors could 
have chosen to unit with the central government. However, they did not. Instead, they were against the 
central government’s decisions. Their choice in the 1900 crisis reflected the inevitable result of a 
gradual process of political fragmentation in late Qing China since the first Sino-Japanese war.   
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
The thesis asks how imperialism affected late Qing central-provincial relations in the last decade of the 
nineteenth century. By asking this question, I am aware of the fact that I have assumed imperialism 
affected late Qing politics and singled out imperialism as a factor. This does not mean that I see 
imperialism as the only factor or a decisive factor that influenced late Qing central-provincial relations 
in the last decade of the nineteenth century. In the thesis, I have discussed other factors, for example, 
the political vacuum left when a few significant figures died in 1898 also had a huge impact on central-
provincial relations. However, the aim of highlighting imperialism’s effect on central-provincial 
relations is two-fold: firstly, the thesis brings imperialism to the study of central-provincial relations in 
late Qing China, which is rarely done by previous studies of central-provincial relations; secondly, 
since previous studies about imperialism in China mostly focus on economic, social or cultural effects, 
the thesis brings central-provincial relations, and generally discussions on political effect of 
imperialism to the study of imperialism in late Qing China. 
 
The first big blow to central-provincial relations in the late Qing was the first Sino-Japanese war. 
Transferring from the governor-general of Hubei and Hunan to the governor-general of Jiangsu, Anhui 
and Jiangxi during the first Sino-Japanese war, Zhang Zhidong had to rely on mostly on his private 
secretaries, not local officials to carry out the task of defending southeast China’s coast and supporting 
the front line in the north. He also had conflicts with local officials in things like taking foreign loans or 
buying western weapons. Because of the possibility of Japan invading both north China and southeast 
China’s coast, thus into Hubei and Hunan through the Yangtze river, Zhang Zhidong had to allocate 
resources between the front line in the north, his present short-term governing provinces (Jiangsu, 
Anhui and Jiangxi) and his previous long-time governing provinces (Hunan and Hubei). During the 
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war, although the support of Hubei and Hunan had the lowest priority, Zhang Zhidong still used 
Jiangsu’s funds for the Hanyang Iron and Steel works in Hubei. This shows that Zhang Zhidong saw 
Hubei and Hunan as his most important political bases even if he was in other positions than that of the 
governor-general of Hubei and Hunan. The difficulty of transporting troops and weapons to the front 
line in the north during the first Sino-Japanese war made the central government realise the importance 
of concentrating troops around Beijing, and of building a railway line connecting north China to south 
China. Training new armies in areas around Beijing following western methods became the central 
government’s priority, and in order to support the new armies, old battalions in the provinces must be 
reduced.  
 
 
After the war, Zhang Zhidong returned to his previous position as governor-general of Hubei and 
Hunan. In the negotiation of the opening of Shashi, Zhang insisted on not setting up exclusive Japanese 
concessions and giving Japan extraterritorial jurisdiction in Shashi, but rather urged the establishment 
of an international concession in which Chinese police had control. However, to Zhang Zhidong’s 
disappointment, the Zongli Yamen agreed to give Japan extraterritorial jurisdiction and even agreed to 
build the infrastructure for Japan under Japanese pressure in the negotiation of the opening of 
Hangzhou and required Shashi to also follow the Hangzhou regulations. Zhang Zhidong refused to 
follow the Hangzhou regulations and insisted on not promising Japan anything more than what was 
stipulated in the Treaty of Shimonoseki and according to the most favoured nation treatment. 
 
The disagreement between Zhang Zhidong and the central government was not only manifested in the 
opening of Shashi but also in the repayment of the 200, 000, 000 war indemnity. The treaty of 
Shimonoseki signed after China’s defeat in the first Sino-Japanese war and the subsequent foreign 
loans borrowed from Britain in order to pay the 200, 000, 000 war indemnity touched Zhang Zhidong’s 
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interest in his governing provinces greatly. Hearing that the Zongli Yamen planned to use salt likin in 
some southeast provinces (including Zhang’s governing province Hubei) as security to borrow money 
from the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank Corporation (HSBC) to repay the third instalment of the 200, 
000, 000 war indemnity, and had allowed Robert Hart, the Inspector-General of China's Imperial 
Maritime Customs Service (IMCS), to supervise the collection of likin in the provinces, Zhang Zhidong 
objected to this plan fiercely. He did not understand why the Zongli Yamen hurried to borrow money 
from Britain to repay the war indemnity. The war indemnity could wait according to the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki, Zhang argued with the Zongli Yamen since there were no other conditions attached to it. 
Despite Zhang Zhidong’s objection, Weng Tonghe and Zhang Yinhuan in the Zongli Yamen still signed 
the contract for the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank Corporation (HSBC) loan in February 1898. Their 
considerations were different from Zhang’s. As officials in the Zongli Yamen and the Ministry of 
Revenues, the security of Beijing was their priority and they were keen to repay all the war indemnity 
within three years so that Japanese troops could withdraw from Weihaiwei as soon as possible. They 
also preferred to pay off the war indemnity at once and save the interest since they knew very well that 
it would be difficult for the Ministry of Revenues to apportion the war indemnity to the provinces 
without governors-general’ and governors’ resistance to payment. 
 
The loss of salt likin in Yichang, Hubei as security of the HSBC loan affected Hubei’s finance greatly. 
Chapter 3 has shown that salt likin was one of the few provincial incomes that Zhang Zhidong had 
control. Now he had to pay 1, 000, 000 silver taels for the HSBC loan every year, yet salt likin from 
Yichang was only about 740, 000 silver tales each year (including additional likin). Zhang Zhidong did 
not know how to get more money and asked the Ministry of Revenues to reduce the allocated loan 
payment for Hubei. The Ministry of Revenues refused his request. However, Zhang could not find any 
other revenues in his governing provinces to add to salt likin from Yichang to pay the HSBC loan and 
Mu Zhang 209 
 209 
until October 1898, he was still paying 40, 000 silver taels less every month for the HSBC loan despite 
the Zongli Yamen requested him to pay the full amount several times. 
 
During the first Sino-Japanese war and the post-war negotiations, we can see that Zhang Zhidong, as a 
provincial governor-general, had different considerations from the central government facing 
increasing imperialist pressure. The central government was trying to concentrate troops around 
Beijing and transfer the burden of the war indemnity to the provinces whereas Zhang Zhidong tried to 
defend provincial interests as much as possible. In the scramble for railway concessions after the 
German occupation of Kiaochow, Zhang Zhidong and the central government again disagreed on 
various matters. Although Zhang Zhidong and the central government agreed that building railways 
was crucial in saving China, they had different plans regarding which railway to build and from which 
country to borrow money. Zhang Zhidong wished to minimize foreign influences in Chinese land as 
much as possible, particularly British influence in his governing provinces Hubei and Hunan. He could 
not agree with Sheng Xuanhuai and Li Hongzhang in the Zongli Yamen when they chose British capital 
purely from a business point of view. 
 
However, Zhang Zhidong’s influence in the central government was declining after a few of his friends 
and acquaintances in the central government died in 1897 and 1898. He had little influences on Li 
Hongzhang nor Sheng Xuanhuai who together with him were in charge of railway matters. In 1898, the 
political vacuum left by the death of Prince Gong and Li Hongzao and the expulsion of Weng Tonghe 
caused a new round of political rivalry in Beijing. The central government seized this opportunity to 
centralize power in the hands of Manchu nobles, such as Rong Lu and Prince Qing. China’s defeat in 
the first Sino-Japanese war and the subsequent scramble of concessions made Reform an urgency. 
However, the central government’s reform priority was to centralize power in the hands of Manchu 
nobles and undermine the power of provincial governors. Political power struggle tangled with reform 
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needs in the Hundred Days’ Reform. The central government’s suspicion and reform of provincial 
politics and the political purges after the failure of the Hundred Days’ Reform led to Zhang Zhidong’s 
withdrawal from central government politics. 
 
The issue of defending both north China and southeast China at the same time occurred again in the 
1900 Boxer movement. And this time, neither the central government could influence Zhang Zhidong’s 
decision nor Zhang Zhidong could influence the central government because facing increasing 
imperialist pressure since the first Sino-Japanese war, the central government had chosen to centralise 
power in its own hands and disregarded provincial interests that Zhang Zhidong valued most. The 
result was a complete breakdown of central-provincial relations in the Boxer movement. Provincial 
governors in southeast China disregarded the court’s orders and united together under the leadership of 
Zhang Zhidong and Sheng Xuanhuai to negotiate peace with the allied imperialist powers in order to 
save their provinces while Qing troops in north China were fighting against the allied imperialist 
powers. Without reinforcements from southeast Chinese provinces, the Qing troops in the north, which 
were just centralized in the hands of the central government, were finally defeated, leaving a bleak and 
uncertain future for China. 
 
My thesis clarifies some questions. First, it argues that increasing imperialist pressure damaged 
Chinese central-provincial relations in the last decade of the nineteenth century. Ironically, this process 
of political fragmentation did not result from the direct working of imperialism but the Chinese 
struggle against imperialism. Governors and governors-general, such as Zhang Zhidong, started to put 
the security and interests of their governing provinces at the highest priority, even ready to sacrifice the 
interest of the central government. The central government too saw its safety as the most important 
priority and was ready to give up provincial interests. This observation shows that Euro-American and 
Japanese imperialism did not just “encourage the most innovative state-making in China since mid-
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1600s”440, as Stephen R. Halsey argues in his book Quest for power, but also resulted in the 
disintegration of the Qing empire in terms of central-provincial relations. These two effects were not 
conflicting but existed at the same time in a heterogeneous process. With China re-emerging as a 
significant power in the twentieth-first century, China’s struggle in the late nineteenth century seems a 
remote past. Recent scholarship on late Qing China, such as Stephen R. Halsey’s Quest for power and 
William T. Rowe and Timothy Brook’s China’s Last Empire: The Great Qing emphasizes the 
successes in Chinese state-building.441 Indeed, there were many innovative state-making efforts, for 
example, the building of railways in the late Qing, but the last decade of the nineteenth century also 
saw the breakdown of central-provincial relations in China resulted from Chinese struggle against 
imperialism. The most innovative state-making in China in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century had to lie in the provinces given the fact that China escaped colonization by the imperialist 
powers with broken central-provincial relations. A question to historians of twentieth-century China is 
how the broken central-provincial relations were restored in the twentieth century and subsequently 
China reemerged as a significant player in the world of nations.  
 
The thesis illustrates an innovative approach when studying imperialism’s effect on China. Instead of 
discussing economic or cultural effects broadly (such as discussions following the modernisation 
paradigm or about the relation between imperialism and Chinese nationalism), or examining economic, 
cultural or social effects in China’s contact zones, for example in Robert Bickers, Anne Reinhardt or 
Elisabeth Köll’s books, we need to also consider imperialism’s effect on Chinese provinces, especially 
inland provinces. Even if these provinces were not China’s contact zones, the thesis shows that they 
could still be affected by the imperialist powers. Moreover, when studying these provinces, we should 
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not just see them as China’s local places, but should see them in a “translocal” perspective. Although 
positioning in the inland, they were connected to the central government and the coastal areas 
geographically (through roads, railways and rivers), politically and economically. Therefore, when the 
global force of imperialism launched on Chinese shores in the late nineteenth century, the inland 
provinces were also affected. My thesis only chooses central-provincial relations as the focus of my 
inquiry but imperialism’s effect on Chinese inland provinces could be manifested in many other areas. 
The deepening of the scholarship will help us understand late Qing China better, and thus lead to a 
better understanding of contemporary China. 
 
Second, regarding the debate on the nature of provincial power with respect to the central government in 
the late Qing, simply saying that provincial governors had more power or the central government had 
more control of the provincial governors is not enough. Each provincial governor-general or governor 
was different and should be studied differently. Zhang Zhidong’s case is unique compared to that of the 
other two prominent provincial governors-general and governors, Li Hongzhang and Yuan Shikai. It is 
easy to tell if Li or Yuan’s power was increasing or decreasing by examining the change of their positions. 
After China’s defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), Li was deprived of any government 
post and left the position of Governor-General of Zhili and commissioner of trade for the northern ports. 
Part of Li’s Huai Army vanished during the war and that which survived was reduced to 30 battalions 
led by Nie Shicheng under the leadership of Ronglu. Li then served in the Zongli Yamen for a few years 
and left Beijing, taking the position of Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi (in the south of 
China) in 1898. Therefore, Li’s power declined from 1894. 
 
Following the Qing court’s order, Yuan began to train the New Army in Xiaozhan 小站 (near Tianjin) 
in 1895. In 1898, this New Army had already become powerful enough to be one of the important forces 
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in the Hundred Days’ Reform. In the coup of September 1898, Yuan chose to support the Empress 
Dowager instead of the reformers and Emperor Guangxu 光緒. This choice earned him trust from the 
Empress Dowager, and the New Army that he was training in Xiaozhan received financial support from 
the Qing court. In December 1899, Yuan was appointed Governor of Shandong by the court in the hope 
that with the New Army, he could control the Boxers in Shandong. He did, suppressing the Boxer 
Movement and protecting missionaries, diplomats and foreign businessmen in Shandong, subsequently 
cultivating good relations with the imperialist powers (particularly Germany and Britain). In 1900, Yuan 
joined Zhang and other governors-general and governors in southeast China in signing a ‘Mutual 
Protection of Southeast China’ contract with the imperialist powers. Li returned as the Governor-General 
of Zhili and commissioner of trade for the northern ports in late 1900 and died shortly after he signed a 
treaty with the allied imperialist powers in September 1901. After Li’s death, Yuan succeeded him as the 
Governor-General of Zhili and commissioner of trade for the northern ports in November 1901. The 
influence of the foreign powers, Yuan’s military power and the Empress Dowager’s personal trust all 
contributed to Yuan’s appointment to the Zhili posts.442 Therefore, from 1894 to 1900, Yuan Shikai’s 
power was increasing; these years were crucial for his later success. 
 
Compared to those of Li and Yuan, Zhang’s position did not change much. From 1894, Zhang 
remained as Governor-General of Hubei and Hunan, with the exception of a period as Governor-
General of Jiangsu, Anhui and Jiangxi during the First Sino-Japanese War. It may appear that his 
power remained the same during this period; however, this article demonstrates that this was not the 
case. As for most of the governors-general and governors in late Qing China, Zhang’s power in his 
governing provinces was limited. He only controlled approximately 18 Brave battalions in Hubei in 
1893 (9000 troops in total). These troops were either transferred to north China and defeated in the 
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First Sino-Japanese War or the Boxer Movement, or gradually reduced for financial reasons after 1894. 
Zhang only began to train the famous Hubei New Army in the early twentieth century. He also had 
limited control over Hubei’s revenues, mostly in salt likin and native opium tax. The HSBC loan 
secured by salt likin in Hubei and other provinces significantly undermined his disposable funds in 
Hubei. In Zhang’s case, his power was undermined from 1894. During this period, the central 
government concentrated more power than ever in itself since the Taiping rebellion. However, 
sacrificing provincial interests to strengthen the central government was a double-edged sword. When 
Zhang Zhidong’s provincial government and the central government both faced imperialist pressure in 
1900, Zhang chose to defend provincial interests instead of the central government since his connection 
to the central government had already broken down and provincial interests were more important to 
him.  
 
By using Zhang Zhidong as a case study, the thesis broadens the scope of inquiry when considering the 
nature of provincial power with respect to the central government in the late Qing. Every provincial 
governor-general or governor counts and a detailed study of one governor-general or governor will 
provide us more information about this topic and lead us one more step to a generalisation of the nature 
of provincial power in the late Qing. Moreover, we should not only look at whether provincial 
governments or the central government had more power but also pay attention to their relations and 
study how their relations changed over time. Their relations were just as important as the distribution of 
power in determining the political landscape in late Qing China. 
 
The search of wealth and power for China is a prominent theme in the late Qing and remains relevant 
to China today. Xi Jinping, the president of the People’s Republic China talks about the “Chinese 
dream”. Zhang Zhidong in the late nineteenth century also dreamed of a wealthy and strong China and 
for his whole life, he was in search of wealth and power for China. The thesis shows that good central-
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provincial relation was crucial for Zhang Zhidong’s self-strengthening projects, and thus was crucial 
for building a wealthy and strong China. As China is a country with many provinces, the difficulties 
that Zhang experienced in balancing provincial needs and central government needs is a permanent 
theme in Chinese politics. Understanding the changes in central–provincial relations and the reasons 
behind the changes will help scholars and politicians understand the problems and challenges facing 
China today. Central–provincial relations continue to occur behind the scenes in a prosperous China 
with a strong central government, but will take precedence again when China faces threats. 
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Glossary 
Academy of Hunan and Hubei 两湖书院 
Anhui 安徽 
Anlu 安陆 
AnXiangYunJing Taotai 安襄郧荆道 
Baoding 保定 
Bao Ting 宝廷 
Beijing 北京 
Beijing-Hankou railway 京汉铁路 
Beijing's main railway station, Majiapu  
北京铁路总站马家堡 
Peiyang (Beiyang) 北洋 
Blagoveshchensk 海兰泡 
Bohai Gulf 渤海湾 
Botou 泊头 
Brave battalions 勇营 
Bruce, James A, T.  布鲁斯 
Buchheister &. Co. 瑞生洋行 
Bureau of Anti-smuggling fees 防缉经费局 
Bureau of Atlas 舆图局 
Bureau of Arms 军械局 
Bureau of Brokerage and Likin 牙厘局 
Bureau of Chuan Salt 川盐总局 
Bureau of Community Self-defence 保甲局 
Bureau of Guns and Artillery 枪炮局 
Bureau of Huai Salt Sales 淮盐督销总局 
Bureau of Iron Affairs 铁政局 
Bureau of Native Opium Tax 土药税务专局 
Bureau of Rehabilitation 善后局 
Bureau of Shunzhi Disaster Relief  顺直赈捐局 
Bureau of Silver coin casting 银元局 
Bureau of Textile 织布局 
Bureau of Transport 转运局 
Cai Jun 蔡钧 
Cai Xiyong 蔡锡勇 
Canton 广州 
Campbell 金登干 
Caoliang 漕粮 
Carlowitz &. Co. 礼和洋行 
Cehai Battle Ship 测海兵轮 
Changde 常德 
Changsha 长沙 
Changzhou 常州 
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Cheylard, Comte du 杜士兰 
Chen Baochen 陈宝琛 
Chen Baozhen 陈宝箴 
Chen Lianfang 陈莲舫 
Chen Peizhou 陈培周 
China Merchants' Steamship Company  
招商局 
Ci’an 慈安 
Cixi 慈禧 
Chonghou 崇厚 
Chongqing 重庆 
Chucai Battle Ship 楚材兵轮 
Cologan, J. B. de 葛络干 
Dagu 大沽 
Dairen (Dalian) 大连 
Danyang 丹阳 
Daoguang 道光 
Daye 大冶 
De’an 德安 
Defence  Battalion 武防营 
Diding 地丁 
Ding Battalion 鼎字营 
Dingxing 定兴 
Dong Fuxiang 董福祥 
Duyun 都匀 
Fan Fen (Fan Shixun) 樊棻（樊时勋） 
Feng cavalry Battalions  凤字马队营 
Fengtai 丰台 
Feng Tianyu 冯天瑜 
Feng Zicai 冯子材 
Ferguson, John Calvin 福开森 
Foochow (Fuzhou) 福州 
Fu Yunlong 傅云龙  
Gangyi 刚毅 
Gansu Army 甘军 
Gao Xiezeng 高燮增 
Ge telegram 个电 
Gough 高夫  
Grain Intendant 督粮道 
Green battalions 绿营 
G. T. Gardner 嘉托玛 
Guangdong 广东 
Guangxi 广西 
Guangxu 光绪 
Mu Zhang 250 
 250 
Guangya 广雅 
Guangzhouwan 广州湾 
Guards Army 武卫军 
Gu Hongming 辜鸿铭 
Guizhou 贵州 
Gu Yanwu 顾炎武 
Hangu 汉沽 
HanHuangDe Taotai 汉黄德道 
Hangzhou 杭州 
Hankow (Hankou) 汉口 
Hanlin Academy 翰林院 
Hanyang 汉阳 
Hao telegram 号电 
Hay 海约翰 
Hebei 河北 
Henan 河南 
Hong Battalions 鸿字营 
Hongkong and Shanghai Bank Corporation 汇
丰银行 
Huai battalions 淮军 
Huang Shouzhong 黄守忠 
Huang Shaoji 黄绍箕 
Huangzhou 黄州 
Huang Zongxi 黄宗羲 
Huang Zunxian 黄遵宪 
Hua Pingsan 华聘三 
Hubei 湖北 
Hubei Publishing House 湖北书局 
Hu Ermai 胡二梅 
Hu Linyi 胡林翼 
Hunan 湖南 
Hu Pinzhi 胡聘之 
Ichang （Yichang）宜昌 
Ili 伊犁 
James Stewart Lockhart 骆克哈特 
Jiangnan 江南 
Jiangsu 江苏 
Jiangxi 江西 
Jiangyin 江阴 
Jiaozhouwan 胶州湾 
Jiashen 甲申 
Jiayuguan 嘉峪关 
Jinkui 金匮  
Jing customs 荆关 
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Jingguo 经国 
Jingmen 荆门 
Jingji 经济 
JingYiShi Taotai 荆宜施道 
Jingzhou 荆州 
Jinling Battle Ship 金瓴兵轮 
Jules Ferry 茹费理 
Junliangcheng 军粮城 
Kangxi 康熙 
Kang Youwei 康有为 
Keelung 基隆 
Kiangnan Arsenal 江南机器制造总局 
Kiaochow 胶州 
Kong Qinfu 孔庆辅 
Kowloon 九龙 
Kuang Qizhao 邝其照 
Kuijun 奎俊 
Kwang-chi 广济 
Laishui 涞水 
Langfang 廊坊 
Lang-Son (Liang Shan) 凉山 
Liaodong 辽东 
Li Guoqi 李国祁 
Li Hongzao 李鸿藻 
Li Hanzhang 李瀚章 
Li Hongzhang 李鸿章 
Likin 厘金 
Liquan 利权 
Li Renkai 黎仁凯 
Li Shengduo 李盛铎 
Li Xianyi 李先义 
Li Xizhu 李细珠 
Lian battalions 捻军 
Liang Dunyan 梁敦彦 
Liang Qichao 梁启超 
Liao Shouheng 廖寿恒 
Li Fangyu 李方豫 
Lin Bao 林保 
Lin Xu 林旭 
Liu Guangdi 刘光弟 
Kwang Ching Liu 刘广京 
Liu Kunyi 刘坤一 
Liu Linxiang 刘麟祥 
Liu Mingchuan 刘铭传 
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Liu Yongfu 刘永福 
Lu Chuanlin 鹿传霖 
Lugou Qiao 卢沟桥 
Lü Haihuan 吕海寰 
Lu-Han railway 卢汉铁路 
Tso Pai-ching (Zhou Zhengqing) 邹振清 
Luo Ergang 罗尔纲 
Luo Fenglu 罗丰禄 
Lüshun（Port Arthur）旅顺 
Lutai 芦台 
Lu Yin 陆胤 
Ma’anshan 马鞍山 
MacDonald, Claude 窦纳乐 
Ma Dongyu 马东玉 
Malcampo &. Co. 瑞记洋行 
Mandl & Co., H. 信义洋行 
Mandl Hermann 满德 
Mao Haijian 茅海建 
Ma Zhongwen 马忠文 
Miao Rebellion 苗民叛乱 
Minister of Railways 督办铁路大臣 
Ministry of Revenues （Board of Revenues）
户部 
Moorhead 穆和德 
Mr. Argent 金先生 
Mr. Green 柯先生 
Nanjing 南京 
Nanpi 南皮 
Nanning 南宁 
Nanyang 南洋 
Native customs 常关 
Native opium tax 土药税 
Nian rebellion 捻军叛乱 
Nie Shicheng 聂士成 
Ningbo 宁波 
Ning-Han 宁汉 
Ning-Hu 宁沪 
“Palos” “帕洛斯”号 
Pauncefote 庞士福特 
Peng Guangxin 彭广心 
Pescadores group 澎湖列岛 
Phlipp Lieder 李德 
Pingyang 平阳 
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“Porpoise” “海豚”号 
Prince Chun (Yihuan) 醇亲王（奕缳） 
Prince Duan (Zaiqi) 端王（载漪） 
Prince Gong (Yixin) 恭亲王（奕䜣） 
Prince Li (Shi Yi) 礼亲王（世译） 
Prince Qing (Yikuang) 庆亲王（奕劻） 
Provincial Administration Commissioner 布政
使（藩司） 
Provincial Surveillance Commissioner 按察使
（臬司） 
Pukou 浦口 
Qian Nianqu 钱念劬 
Qianlong 乾隆 
Qian Xun 钱恂 
Qian Yingpu 钱应溥 
Qin Chunming 芩春蓂 
Qingdao 青岛 
Qinhuang Island 秦皇岛 
Qingjiang 清江 
Qingliu 清流  
Qingyuan Bureau 清源局 
Quan Hansheng 全汉昇 
Qu Tingzhao 瞿廷昭 
Reuters 路透社 
Robert Hart 赫德 
Rong Hong 容闳 
Rong telegram 荣电 
Rong Lu 荣禄 
Rraser, E. D. H. 法磊斯 
Rugao 如皋 
Salisbury 索尔兹伯里 
Sang Bing 桑兵 
Salt Intendant, also Prefect of Wuchang 武昌盐
法道 
Schultz &. Co. 地亚士洋行 
Scott 斯科特 
Seymour 西摩尔 
Shandong 山东 
Shanghai 上海 
Shanhaiguan 山海关 
Shanxi 山西 
Shashi 沙市 
Sheng Battalions 升字营 
Sheng Kang 盛康 
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Sheng Xuanhuai 盛宣怀 
Sheng Yu 盛昱 
Shen Dunhe 沈敦和 
Shen Nenghu 沈能虎 
Shinan 施南 
Sichuan 四川 
Song Qing 宋庆 
Sugiyama Akira 衫山彬 
Sun Yanjing 孙燕京 
Sun Yatsen 孙中山 
Superintendent of Hankow Customs 江汉关监
督 
Superintendent of Ichang Customs 宜昌关监督 
Su Yunfeng 苏云峰 
Suzhou 苏州 
Tan Shitong 谭嗣同 
Taiwan 台湾 
Taiyuan 太原 
Tanggu 塘沽 
Tangshan 唐山 
Tang Jingsong 唐景崧 
Tang Shaoyi 唐绍仪 
Tan Jixun 谭继洵 
Taotai 道台 
The commissioner of trade for the Northern 
Posts 北洋大臣 
The London Times 伦敦太晤时报 
Tientsin (Tianjin) 天津 
Tianxia 天下 
Taiyuan 太原 
Tie Battalions 铁字营 
Tongwen Guan 同文馆 
Tong Xin 同心 
Tongzhi 同治 
Tongzhou 通州 
Treaty of Shimonoseki 马关条约 
Viceroy of Liangguang 两广总督 
Viceroy of Lianghu 两湖总督 
Viceroy of Liangjiang 两江总督 
Viceroy of Minzhe 闽浙总督 
Wang Bingen 王秉恩 
Wang Ermin 王尔敏 
Wang Pengyun 王鹏运 
Wang Wenshao 王文韶 
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Wang Zhichun 王之春 
Warren, Pelham Laird 霍必澜 
Weihaiwei 威海卫 
Wei Guangshou 魏光寿 
Weiyuan 魏源 
Weng Tonghe 翁同龢 
Whitehead 怀特赫德 
Wuchang 武昌 
Wuhu 芜湖 
Wuhsueh 武穴 
Wusong 吴淞 
Wu Tingfang 伍廷芳 
Wuxi 无锡 
Wuyi Army 武毅军 
Xiamen 厦门 
Xi’an 西安 
Xianfeng 咸丰 
Xiang battalions 湘军 
Xianghe Navy Battalions 襄河水师营 
Xiangtan 湘潭 
Xiangyang 襄阳 
Xiaozhan 小站 
Xiefang 谢放 
Xinjiang 新疆 
Xingyi 兴义 
Xinyang 信阳 
Xinyou 辛酉 
Xiong Tiesheng 熊铁生 
Xue Fucheng 薛福成 
Xu Jingcheng 许景澄 
Xu Tong 徐桐  
Xu Yingkui 许应骙 
Xu Zhijing 徐致敬 
Xu Zhixiang 徐志祥 
Yangcun 杨村 
Yanghu 阳湖 
Yang Rui 杨锐 
Yantai 烟台 
Yi Army 毅军 
Yichangcheng 义昌成 
Yingcheng 应城 
Yongding Gate 永定门 
Yongqing 永清 
Yongzheng 雍正 
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Yuan Chang 袁昶 
Yuan Shikai 袁世凯 
Yue-Han 粤汉 
Yuezhou 岳州 
Yu Geng 裕庚 
Yu Liansan 俞廉三 
Yu Lianyuan  余联沅 
Yulu 裕禄 
Yunnan 云南 
Yunyang 郧阳 
Yun Zuqi 恽祖祁 
Yun Zuyi 恽祖翼 
Yu Taotai 俞道台 
Yu Yinlin 于荫霖 
Zeng Guofan 曾国藩 
Zhang Bin 张斌 
Zhang Jian 张俭 
Zhang Maode 张懋德 
Zhang Quan 张权 
Zhang Peilun 张佩纶 
Zhang Shihan 张士翰 
Zhang Yinhuan 张荫桓 
Zhang Yuanji 张元济 
Zhang Zhidong 张之洞 
Zhang Zhiwan 张之万 
Zhao Fengchang 赵凤昌 
Zhengding 正定 
Zheng Xiaoxu 郑孝胥 
Zhenjiang 镇江  
Zhennanguan 镇南关 
Zhenzhou 郑州 
Zhejiang 浙江 
Zhili 直隶 
Zhoushan islands 舟山群岛 
Zhou Hanguang 周汉光 
Zhuozhou 涿州 
Zhushan 竹山 
Zongli yamen 总理衙门 
Zuo Zongtang 左宗棠 
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